



I P O A Q U A R T E R L Y

INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATION ASSOCIATION

Quick Facts

- The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy have ranked 20 top troubled countries that are in danger of collapse. 12 out of these 20 nations are located in Africa.

Source: *The Failed States Index, 2005*

- According to UN secretary general Kofi Annan, there are 21 crises in the world that have been neglected by the international community, partly because of the focus on Iraq and Afghanistan. More than 45 million people are affected by these crises, 17 of which are in Africa.

Source: *United Nations*

CONCEPTUALIZING THE PEACE OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT

By Allison M. Frendak-Blume

Many individuals work in conflict zones. They may be differentiated by type of employer—military, government, nongovernmental, international, or business; or reason for involvement—to “bring about peace among warring parties,” “do good,” or just “doing my job.” Whereas officials negotiating settlement agreements may concretely view themselves as integral to the peace process, others may question the place and significance of their actions. This article presents a framework to assist those operating abroad to achieve a better understanding of the environment in which they work.

The Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO) captures the functions, tasks, and organizations involved in an operation. George Mason University’s Peace Operations Policy Program (POPP) staff initially derived the framework from a series of six workshops conducted between December 1993 and November 1995. Senior-level officials, practitioners, and analysts connected to this field were

asked: “Why conduct peace operations?” “What makes them different from other operations?” “What are the component parts of a peace operation?” “How do these elements interact?” Their thoughts are reflected in the structure of the framework and validated with findings from 15 years of operations.

POPP defines a peace operation as an intervention into a complex contingency for the purpose of maintaining or restoring peace. The contingency may be due to conflict and/or natural disaster. Peace operations include what the US government regards as stability and reconstruction operations; the UK peace support operations; NATO crisis response or Non-Article 5 operations; the UN peacekeeping, peacebuilding, or peace enforcement operations; and relief agencies complex humanitarian emergencies. Within the domain of peace operations, there are four higher order functions—*Peace Making, Peace Building, Peacekeeping, and Peace Support*. It should be noted that earlier versions of the model contained wording that colored these functions with references to actors, as those in the field tend to view operations through military, political/governmental, and civil/humanitarian lenses.

Continued on page 7

THE SIMULTANEITY PROBLEM IN STABILIZATION/RECONSTRUCTION

By Jack Goldstone

Whether a government has been felled by conflict, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, or undergone a transition that requires government to be substantially restruc-

tured, as in Georgia or Ukraine, the key problem in achieving stabilization of the new government, and reconstruction of key institutions, is that everything must be done at once. The government must establish its legitimacy to win the loyalty of elites and the populace; the government must also demonstrate its effectiveness so that people will abide by its

rules and value its actions.

In more practical terms, the government must provide for the security of its people and their property; offer governance that is responsive to public demands; encourage economic recovery;

Continued on page 10

Inside This Issue

Conceptualizing the Peace Operations Environment	p.1
The Simultaneity Problem in Stabilization/Reconstruction Operations	
Message from the President	p.2
PAE: Military and Commercial Services around the World	p.3
Baghdad Tourism	p.5
New Peace Operations Initiatives	p.8

IPOA MEMBER PROFILE

HART SECURITY



Lord Westbury MBE, Chairman

Year Founded: 1999

Location: Baghdad, Basra, Dubai, Islamabad, Kabul, Kuwait, Limassol, London, Mexico City, Moscow, New York, Washington DC, Singapore

Key Services: HART is a leading specialist in international business risk consultancy with capabilities on land, sea and air including: training, mine action, political and security risk analysis, kidnap and ransom prevention and response services, port security, anti-piracy, executive protection, crisis management, crisis response and the provision of worldwide protective security services.

Background: Drawing on a lifetime of experience in conventional and Special Forces, as well as those gained as Chief Executive of Defense Systems Ltd. (DSL), formed in 1981, Lord Westbury gathered a dedicated team of professionals who are experts in their respective fields of security to form what is now an extremely successful, highly respected and professional global company. HART's international management team combines detailed knowledge of security methods, governmental regulations and a detailed understanding of the commercial realities that shape our clients' requirements. HART's Clients include Governments, Non-Governmental Organizations, United Nations, European Union, other Multi-National Organizations and Corporations.

Website: <http://www.hartsecurity.com>

Contact Information:

Charlie Trietline, +44 207 751 8462



PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

By Doug Brooks

It is gratifying to look back and note the changes within the Peace and Stability Industry over the past five years, as well as the improvements in public reputation. This positive change is in no small part due to the recognition that the leading companies have come together through IPOA to better address the key issues facing the industry. The humanitarian benefits of a proactive and truly professional industry are significant, a reality increasingly recognized by the international community. While many otherwise reputable companies continue to sit on the sidelines, six new companies have stepped forward to join IPOA in just the past few weeks. With the enormous changes taking place this year in international peace and stability operations, their timing could not be more significant.

It is also useful to take a look at the regulatory trends of the past year. The recent gatherings of government, academic and industry experts in New York, Switzerland and elsewhere over the past few months reflects a wider recognition of the private sector as a significant and legitimate player in peace and stability operations. A strong case is being made that existing international law does indeed cover potential private sector misdeeds - even when the private sector is not specifically covered by national laws. At the same time there is also general agreement that states need to be better legal enforcers. The industry has taken a lead in addressing many of the concerns through the IPOA Code of Conduct and our Standards Committee, though there are clear issues that only states can fully address. The industry has not been an impediment in this process at all, quite the contrary. IPOA has been

developing working relationships with lawmakers, nongovernmental organizations and international organizations to determine ways we can support and enhance this process.

In terms of operations, IPOA's theme for 2006 is 'Beyond Iraq'. We may see a gradual reduction in operations in Iraq while peace and stability operations elsewhere in the world pick up. Iraq has dominated interest within the industry because of the number and value of contracts, but also because of the type of work being done there. Nevertheless, the bulk of reconstruction funds have already been spent, and the Coalition will be gradually scaling back its presence in the country. The new Iraqi government is being formed and demand for private sector services will enter a new phase.

New opportunities for private firms continue to expand in international peace operations elsewhere in the world, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Haiti to the Sudan. Off-the-shelf aviation capabilities, rapid and professional humanitarian security, demining and small but critical niche services such as medical teams are giving international peace operations vastly more effective capabilities to carry out international mandates and ultimately, save lives. IPOA members have been leading the trend in this area and we are pleased with the results.

Continued on Page 11

PAE: GLOBAL OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE FOR PEACEKEEPING Q & A WITH STACEY RABIN, PROGRAM MANAGER

PAE offers worldwide operations and maintenance services as well as many other capabilities for all types of military and commercial installations.

IPOA: Welcome and thank you for taking the time to talk to us. Tell us about PAE's history and experience.

PAE: PAE was founded 50 years ago by Mr. Edward A. Shay. Our core business has been Operations and Maintenance (O&M) of facilities and Logistical Support Services since the Vietnam War when PAE built facilities for the Army Corps of Engineers. Upon completion the Corps needed these buildings to be maintained. During the peak of our work in Vietnam, PAE employed over 30,000 local nationals and operated 440 facilities.

During this same time we also expanded into Korea and Thailand. We began an O&M training division to work with local nationals in various countries and we trained up to 80,000 workers.

During the 1970s PAE expanded our O&M operations into Alaska, Germany and Saudi Arabia. The 1980s brought further O&M work for the US Armed Forces in Greece and Spain. We also began providing facilities maintenance and other support to US Embassies in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Israel, New Zealand and Russia. We provided fuel systems maintenance services at contingency air bases and other sites throughout Korea and Spain.

In the 1990s and thus far in the 2000s, we have added the following to our business portfolio:

Air Terminal Operations to include providing these services for UN peacekeeping efforts in East Timor and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Logistical support and base camp construction and O&M to West African Peacekeeping forces (ECOMICI, ECOMIL and ECOMOG) in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone. We have worked with the US military to build base camps in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal for the US Army to conduct training to host nation militaries. We are currently managing a logistics and training center in Sierra Leone, providing logistical support and construction for Liberia Security Sector Reform and providing logistical support to

the African Union in Darfur including the construction of 34 base camps.

IPOA: What services could you provide to support peacekeeping operations?

PAE: Many are discussed above but the core would be: Base Camp Construction, Air and Ground transportation, Power Generation, Water Systems and Purifications, Logistical Support Services, Food Service (partnering with other companies), Medical Services (partnering with other companies), Cargo Handling, Vehicle Operations and Maintenance, Transportation Management, POL Services, and Communications Operation and Maintenance.

IPOA: With regard to peacekeeping efforts, what are your major challenges?

PAE: When working in Africa and other remote locations of the world the time it takes to do things is always longer than in the developed world. There are multiple logistical obstacles that must be overcome and worked around. We like to place personnel that have previous experience with us so that they can bring to the program their knowledge in working in remote and hostile environments. The management personnel on these projects must be innovative and have flexible thinking. Situations change rapidly on the ground on peacekeeping missions and we must be able to "adjust fire," so to speak, to the dynamic environment.

To overcome the challenges, we also try to learn the local culture as quickly as possible or have personnel on our staff that understand the local culture. We instill in our employees respect for the local culture and environment. We recognize the importance of understanding and re-

specting the end user of our missions.

IPOA: Do you hire local staff?

PAE: Yes, we do hire local staff. In fact, local nationals make up the majority of our staffing on all of our projects. This way we are able to help the area in which we are working as well as provide training and skills that can be used after the peacekeeping mission is complete.

IPOA: Would you say that PAE assists local capacity-building?

PAE: Yes, I would say we are by the training and employment we provide to local nationals. This is a very rewarding part of our work in Africa. We have several local national members of our staff in Africa who began working with us in 1996 and they are still with us now, having moved up through the ranks to management positions. Contacts like these have been a tremendous asset to several of the peacekeeping missions we have participated in.

IPOA: Why are you a member of IPOA?

PAE: PAE is a member of IPOA because we believe that there should be transparency in contracting and we believe that the private sector can contribute greatly to conflict/post conflict situations. We believe that by providing education about how the private sector can add value to these peacekeeping missions, an increased number of organizations will be willing to work with the private sector. IPOA provides this education.



Photo Courtesy of Nathan Jones

Stacy Rabin has been with Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) Government Services, Inc. since 1988. She has been the Program Manager for Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI), Liberia (ECOMOG and most recently ECOMIL), Operation Focus Relief (Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal), Sierra Leone (ECOMOG and UN) and several operations in Sudan (Darfur, Nuba Mountain Cease Fire Monitoring and Civilian Protection Monitoring Team).



We live in a world that gets smaller each day. Inescapably, there are clashes between cultures and value systems. Tragedies that went unnoticed and undetected 10-20 years ago are daily brought to the world via network news and the Internet.

And now that we are aware of the many travesties of justice in the world, those of us who enjoy freedom and democracy are now bound to help share it with the world.

Through selfless commitment and compassion for all people, Blackwater works to make a difference in the world and provide hope to those who still live in desperate times.



BLACKWATER USA

www.blackwaterusa.com P.O. Box 1029 Moyock, NC 27958

BAGHDAD TOURISM

By Doug Brooks

Although Baghdad is not a tourist magnet, the holiday season was an ideal opportunity for me to visit Iraq and gain some first hand 'ground truth.' From 24 December until 4 January I had the invaluable opportunity to do fieldwork in Baghdad – a working vacation of sorts. Supported and hosted by IPOA member companies, I was able to visit field offices, learn first-hand perspectives of experienced personnel, and observe private sector operations functioning in this highly volatile environment. It was a privilege to meet and interview the experienced field staffs of our member companies and to brainstorm on how our association can best support their efforts. I found the trip both enlightening and invigorating.

Baghdad is an unexpectedly normal city, and during 'low-visibility' trips outside the 'International Zone' (IZ) riding in vehicles that blend in with Iraqi traffic, it was interesting to see Iraqi civilians going about normal day-to-day activities. Shops were full and spilling goods onto the sidewalk, as the hustle and bustle of everyday life was similar to any other city in the developing world. Traffic was chaotic, which is not atypical for the region, but I saw no accidents or even arguments. To an outsider, however, it gives the impression of being extremely dangerous. The police were out directing traffic through intersections, albeit with AK-47s instead of whistles. Baghdad is attractive, with strikingly beautiful palm trees and the Tigris River, with its bright green reed-covered islands, flowing through its heart.

But the conflict has brought unusual features as well, primarily in terms of security measures. Barbed wire and concrete are ubiquitous, making one wonder if the city will sink as a result of all the concrete barriers, bunkers and blast walls being installed. The IZ riverfront is lined with the huge concrete walls erected to frustrate snipers, which unfortunately, also frustrate most opportunities to view the river. Vast numbers of trucks including cement mixers

and flatbeds with preformed concrete barriers stream in and out of the IZ. The checkpoints to get into the IZ, frequent targets of suicide bombers themselves, are elaborate and extensive. The Iraqis, Americans and Georgians manning them are, understandably, simultaneously bored and paranoid.

During my visit Baghdad averaged about three large explosions per day. Since I did most of my work in the IZ, I would always look around to see if any of the experienced IZ personnel registered concern at the sound of a blast coming from various parts of the city. They never did while I was there. Within the 14 square mile IZ occasional mortar rounds or rockets did fall here and there, but they were considered a rather minor annoyance, and the rare casualties were often described more in terms of bad luck than as victims of the insurgency. I felt more at risk on New Years Eve when standing outside at the stroke of midnight as Iraqis celebrated by firing their personal-use assault rifles into the air on full-auto. I had been warned that after a recent soccer victory against Syria the falling bullets from celebratory gunfire caused more casualties than all the elections combined.

The infamous 'Route Irish' airport road still suffers from occasional random small arms fire, but today might be considered the safest highway in Iraq. With hard points every hundred meters or so, police and army checkpoints on all access roads, and large Iraqi armored cars parading majestically up and down the road, it is difficult to imagine how any insurgent would have the time or privacy necessary to emplace any sort of explosive device.

The main focus of my research while in Iraq was on private sector activities, and the scale of operations is indeed impressive. Companies are involved in a wide array of support activities, from gigantic infrastructure reconstruction projects to manning the coffee shop at the small food court in the IZ. Everywhere I went, however, I was pleased to see high levels of training, standards, and professionalism. Additionally, while the U.S. military is omnipresent, larger numbers of Iraqi military and police

appear to be providing security in and around Baghdad. At the various facilities in the IZ there is an astonishingly diverse array of uniforms, languages, vehicles and personnel.

Unlike my visits to peace and stability operations elsewhere in the world, I did not have the freedom to go out into the community and talk to Iraqis at random, something that would have been invaluable for better understanding the conflict. Nevertheless, I did have good discussions with many in the IZ, and while certainly not a random sample, it was nevertheless helpful in understanding Iraqi perceptions. From this small sample, they expressed their frustrations that their government could not cooperate on many issues, and that their security services are not more effective. They had a genuine fear of kidnapping and assassination for themselves and their families. In fact, many companies help their staffs' families move into the relative safety of the IZ.

While Baghdad was a fascinating experience – invaluable professionally and personally – it is regrettable that the country suffers from such a dire security situation. I will take the lessons learned during my visit and use them to improve some of the private sector aspects of the mission, especially in terms of enhancing coordination with the military, ensuring a good working relationship with the Ministry of Interior, and providing improved information to the Iraqi public.

Iraq has major hurdles to cross before it can be truly secure and sovereign. Sooner or later Iraq will be a 'normal country' again, with real tourists, good governance and effective security. Despite the immense complexities and ever-present risk, I observed that many capable professionals from both the public and private sectors are working together in the IZ to help make this a reality.

Doug Brooks is the President of IPOA



Confident risk assessment and mitigation worldwide

London Office: +44 (0) 20 7751 0771 general@hartsecurity.com

Limassol London Moscow New York Washington Baghdad Basra Kuwait Mexico Kabul Singapore

CONCEPTUALIZING THE PEACE OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT

Continued from page 1

In late 2001 the POPP team critically re-examined CMPO and decoupled the functions and tasks from those conducting the activities. *Peace Making* was defined as acting to identify, address, and transcend incompatibilities, and bring contending parties to agreement. *Peace Building* was considered acting to create a structure of peaceful, equitable, and interdependent relations between people in, and among, societies. *Peacekeeping* was acting to control the security environment in, and around, the territorial space affected by contending parties' incompatibilities. And *Peace Support* acting to provide logistical, administrative, and personnel support to the overall peace operation.

The functions are descriptive in nature and broken down into sub-functions. For instance, the *Peace Building* function "Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief" may include the requirement to "Provide Food," "Provide Water and Sanitation," "Provide Medical Care," "Provide Clothing," "Provide Shelter," "Provide Additional Assistance," "Conduct Search and Rescue," and "Provide Veterinarian Services." Tasks, on the other hand, are operational. They are associated with a function, can be assigned to an organization at a specific time and place, and may be measurable. Tasks under the "Camps" sub-function of *Peace Building's*

"Refugee and Displaced Persons" include "Develop camps," "Build camps," "Operate camps," "Provide electrical power," "Provide temporary shelter," "Secure camps," "Transport rations to camps," and "Transport supplies to camps." The final component—organizations—are listed by type, both military and civilian. Originally, tasks were related to organizations that had the capability to perform the activity but with recent research this has been updated to incorporate those who actually performed the tasks.

CMPO may be used as a planning tool. If one knew they were expected to establish refugee camps while out in the field an examination of the framework would detail those tasks normally associated with this function and the organizations that have performed this work in past operations, such as military forces, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, International Refugee Committee, Counterpart, CARE, World Vision United States, Church World Service, and Catholic Relief Services. The organizations might be contacted to obtain reports on best practices, or coordination could occur prior to deployment to prevent duplication of efforts should it be discovered that both will be operating in the current mission. One could also view where this activity fits into the overall operation. In 2001 POPP staff extracted certain elements of CMPO for the US Pacific Command to develop a web-based planning, collaboration, and mission execution tool set known as the Peace Operations Support Tool (POST).


The first prototype was oriented towards functions expected to be exercised during Cobra Gold 02, a Thai/US/Singaporean exercise conducted in May 2002. The planning cell discovered POST allowed them to simultaneously work on specific matters and view the entire intervention picture during the course of the exercise.

A number of research efforts have been performed using the CMPO framework. In 1996 POPP assessed the relevance of 400 tasks across 29 historical cases and demonstrated that peace operations can be categorized by type according to their task structure, including complex operations, humanitarian missions, observer missions, and diplomatic political missions to build civil authority. Task analyses for peacekeeping, conflict prevention, peace enforcement, and peacekeeper extraction missions were developed between 1997 and 2002 for NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency's effort to devise rational force structure templates for peace operations. Last year, Joint Forces Command asked that CMPO be utilized to substantiate the presence, duration, level of occurrence (strategic, operational, or tactical), and importance of 500 tasks performed by civilian and military actors in 13 post-Cold War peace operations for comparison with the type of actions currently represented in training models and simulations.

Finally, CMPO has also been used to address real-world problems. For example, when parties to the Liberian conflict could not agree on the modalities of a national election in 1997, a model was built to chart the decisions which had to be made and the resources which had to be applied to hold an election by a certain date. By making decision points concrete and necessary actions specific, a POPP-World Vision International team was able to cut through much of the rhetoric and hidden agendas surrounding the discussion of election dates.

Allison Frendak-Blume is Academic Director in the Peace Operations Policy Program. Those wishing more information about the framework and its applications may visit the POPP website: popp.gmu.edu.

Figure 1. The Conceptual Model of Peace Operations





School of Public Policy

Master of New Professional Studies: *Peace Operations*

Study theory and practice of peace operations, international civilian police operations, non-governmental organizations, elections, refugees/internally displaced persons, governance, and culture with world-renowned scholars and practitioners at one of the nation's leading schools of Public Policy.

Join us in an environment that encourages discussion and nourishes ideas. Our program is small enough to offer you an individual experience and large enough to be distinguished!

- 39-credit hours—night classes
- Conveniently located in Arlington, Virginia
- Affordable costs
- Apply now!

To find out more, please contact: Dr. Allison Frendak-Blame
afrendak@gmu.edu or 703-993-4983

THE SIMULTANEITY PROBLEM IN STABILIZATION/RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

Continued from page 1

and rebuild the infrastructure of transport, education, health care, communications, and energy supply. This quartet of security, governance, economy, and social welfare has become widely accepted in the area of stabilization/reconstruction operations (S/R ops). The problem for which there is no accepted solution is: what comes first? How do we prioritize operations in different sectors – or if we try to work simultaneously, how do we coordinate efforts across sectors to achieve the best outcome?

I would like to suggest that there is a fifth key element, that cuts across all the others, and which if given priority can greatly help the effectiveness of S/R ops, and that is *policing and justice administration*. This is sometimes referred to under the rubric of “rule of law,” but that vague term gives no indication of who is to provide and enforce those rules, or the breadth of activity required to make sure the rule of law operates across society. I will argue that giving priority to policing and justice administration, if done properly, goes far towards solving the simultaneity problem and buys time to develop other initiatives.

There are three general areas in which policing and justice administration must be active from the outset of S/R ops – public safety, civil and criminal justice, and reconciliation.

First is *public safety* of the civilian population, their property, their businesses, and their families. People must feel free to go about their business without constant fear of being robbed, raped, kidnapped or murdered. Business must be able to operate without fear of extortion, robbery, embezzlement, or grand corruption. Much attention was given to the failure to prevent looting in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq invasion. This was enormously destructive and could have been prevented or much reduced with an early focus on police-type protection of key institutions. But ‘looting’ of different kinds – bank robberies, extortion, corruption, theft, embezzlement (affecting up to billions in government and S/R funds) – continues to this day, in large part because of lack of effective protection for the civilian population and the private economy.

S/R ops often focus on providing *security* in the military sense – roadblocks, pursuit of insurgents, force protection, logistics protection – using military personnel or similarly

equipped contract forces. Such operations are of course important when armed insurgent forces remain active. Yet such activities do little or nothing to provide day-to-day protection for the civilian population, economic activity, or critical infrastructure. Indeed, the operation of armed checkpoints and pursuit of insurgents create considerable dangers for the civilian population.

Western political theory since the time of Hobbes and Locke has argued that the essential role of government is to protect the persons and property of the civilian population. Yet it is remarkable how often S/R ops forget this basic fact, and invest the bulk of their resources in force protection or anti-insurgency operations. Neglecting the essential task of providing public safety undermines the legitimacy of the new government, and leaves the field open for recruitment to the insurgency. Neglect of public safety also makes it difficult for businesses to operate, undermining economic recovery; it also makes it hard to protect critical infrastructure (which often only gets protection when force protection of reconstruction work is involved). In short, lack of civilian protection undermines all the necessary parts of R/S ops. *Public safety in areas controlled by the new government must be a top priority*. In the case of bringing stability to Iraq, providing a secure and safe zone for civilian activity in Baghdad is far more important than eliminating insurgent pockets in Fallujah or elsewhere in the far west or northwest.

If we separate *security* from *public safety*, equating the former with force protection and anti-insurgency, and the latter with safeguarding civilians and routine protection of banks, other businesses, and government property, then public

safety clearly is a police matter.

It does not require the training and equipment of a military force, but the quite different training, procedures, and skills of law enforcement personnel. In the United States, these activities are routinely handled by a mix of public police forces and private security forces; that should no doubt be the pattern in S/R ops as well.

The goal must be to develop an indigenous police capacity as soon as practical, but in the short run, the weak capacity and likely corruption and loyalty problems of the police forces carried over from the old regime make it impossible to rely on indigenous forces. Thus S/R ops must offer a short-term supply of appropriately trained and experienced personnel to provide police protection, and set up training academies to refurbish indigenous forces. The numbers of personnel involved in such operations would not be small – a city the size of Baghdad could require upwards of 25,000 police and private protection personnel. Yet compared to the 150,000 military troops operating in Iraq now, this is not large, and while the cost of police personnel would at first be in addition to, rather than a substitute for, the military, over the initial two or three years of S/R ops the existence of effective policing

Continued on page 10



THE SIMULTANEITY PROBLEM IN STABILIZATION/RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

Continued from page 9

and the greater government support and economic activity this would encourage, should allow more rapid reduction of military troop levels.

Second but absolutely integral with provision of public safety is *development of a civil and criminal justice system*. Criminal justice is clearly vital, since if police and private security personnel do not merely deter, but apprehend criminals, the latter need to be prosecuted, tried, and if found guilty, properly jailed. Again, private forces may be able to provide these services in the short run, as retired judges and private corrections companies routinely provide arbitration and prison construction and management services in the US. In the short run, these would be part of S/R ops



while the indigenous justice system is restored. A civil justice system is also necessary, however, as a common legacy of radical changes in government control are widespread disputes over property ownership (Kirkuk in Iraq being an obvious example). Establishment of a civil justice system whose impartiality and accessibility is respected is the best way to begin to cope with these problems. Corruption, fraud, and embezzlement also need to be strictly prosecuted, and wronged parties need somewhere to turn, if a private economy is to flourish.

Third, and crucially important to the reconstruction of indigenous government and military institutions is the immediate operation of *reconciliation* courts. These do not have the primary mission of wreaking vengeance or settling scores; separate tribunals should have the task of prosecuting the major evil-doers of the old regime. Rather, the role of reconciliation courts

should be to allow competent individuals associated with the old regime to clear their names and return to effective roles in society.

In Iraq, the dismissal of the army and of all high-level Baathist civil servants stripped the country of its cadre of skilled leaders and created over 400,000 individuals (millions of people if their families are included) who were humiliated and treated as enemies of society, who lost their livelihoods and their careers. There was no need for this. It is certainly true that Shi'ite and Kurd leaders demanded that Saddam's military and civil administration not simply be allowed to return to power. But sacking them was not the only alternative. They could have been sorted into a top cadre of a few thousand policy makers who actively led Saddam's regime, and many tens of thousands whose activities were more ambiguous.

These latter should have been given a day in court to present their actions and defend them, so that a court could determine whether they would be allowed to serve in the new regime. In one year, fifty reconciliation courts, each hearing three cases per day, could process over 37,000 individuals per year. In a couple of years, the entire senior civil service and major military and police officials could have been reviewed, and those not deeply implicated in Saddam's policies been given a chance to return to effective roles in ethnically integrated civil and security forces. Instead, US 'de-Baathification' policies were embarrassed by shifts and turns that made them seem arbitrary and ineffective.

It is truly remarkable that during the first few years of operations in Iraq, when questioned about the progress and effectiveness of stabilization efforts in that country, the US administration would so often fall back on statements that "we are doing many good things" and point to the reconstruction of schools as a chief example. They were able to do this because no prioritization of R/S ops had been established, so all "good things" could be given equal weight. Yet while rebuilding schools is clearly a good thing, it is hardly a good measure of the progress and effectiveness of R/S ops. Far more important is whether the parents of schoolchildren feel safe in their cities and villages, feel able to operate a business or bring home their wages without fear of theft or extortion, and have the electricity and the secure transport required to manufacture goods and get them to market. The crucial metrics for success should have been the level of

violence and crime in Iraq, the levels of per capita energy and transport in operation, and the number of experienced and qualified indigenous personnel cleared and restored to operate local institutions, with 'schools built' coming very low on the list of indicators of success.

Recent discussions of how to refit the military for R/S ops have focused on building light and mobile modular teams of special forces, who combine warrior training with the ability to fill key roles in R/S while also providing 'force protection' for reconstruction activities. I would argue that this is exactly the wrong approach to what is needed. The most important first step in areas that have been cleared of ongoing conflict is to bring in thousands of people with civilian skills in providing basic public safety and property protection, justice administration and corrections, and running arbitration courts. It is people with such skills, not all-purpose warrior/administrators, who are needed to get civilian life and the domestic economy up and running, build the legitimacy and effectiveness of the new government, and train the indigenous police and justice administration that will bring credible and reliable 'rule of law' to the recovering society.

Of course, such policing and justice administration teams, whether composed of personnel recruited from national governments or UN or NATO or managed by private contractors, must be held to the same level of professional standards as their counterparts in NATO or OECD countries; but the broad existence of such capabilities around the world should make the task of recruiting personnel with the requisite skills quite achievable. What matters is to integrate such forces into preparations for early stage R/S ops; this provides the best opportunity to simultaneously build the legitimacy and effectiveness of the new government, to free military forces for security operations, and to provide a 'safe space' for economic recovery and restoration of infrastructure and social services to begin.

Jack A. Goldstone recently joined the George Mason University School of Public Policy as the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel Professor and Eminent Scholar. He has conducted over twenty years of prize-winning research on social conflict and social change, focusing on global patterns of comparative development.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

Continued from page 2

The medium and long term future of the industry is looking bright and policy-makers are showing a greater understanding of the value that the private sector brings to peace and stability operations. A number of new initiatives will

dramatically change the shape of future international peace operations, including the new UN Peacebuilding Commission, the U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," the National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-44 outlining a larger role for the U.S. Department of State in peace and stability

operations, and other international efforts. Policy-makers are also showing a greater understanding of the immense private sector potential. While these movements augur well for the future of the Peace and Stability Industry, more importantly they offer promise for the art of ending conflicts.

Doug Brooks is the President of IPOA

NEW PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVES

U.S. Government to Boost Foreign Reconstruction and Stabilization Assistance Capabilities

Two documents released by the administration at the end of 2005 will have a major impact on reconstruction and stability operations

The National Security Presidential Directive-44, pertaining to the organization of all foreign reconstruction and stabilization assistance capabilities across US departments and agencies. The directive will:

Establish an entity, under the leadership of the State Department, analogous to the U.S. military's Joint Chiefs of Staff, responsible for the coordination of all capabilities across the various civilian agencies and the military.

The Secretary of State is responsible for coordinating with the Secretary of Defense for military components of reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

The objective is to create an integrated capability among U.S. Government departments and agencies for stabilization and reconstruction, without replacing any existing agency.

DoD Directive 3000.05 on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (STTR) Operations.

STTR Operations become a major priority of the DoD, with an emphasis similar to combat operations. As a core mission of the Department, training, planning and funding will be increased.

Integrated military-civilian teams are essential to success in this type of operations, and the DoD will seek to integrate capabilities of all relevant sectors of U.S. Government, International Organisations, NGOs, and the private sector.

The directive acknowledges that the stability and order created through STTR Operations is crucial to advancing U.S. interests around the globe.

The overall effect of these evolutions should be a major boost to reconstruction and stabilization efforts and the funding devoted to these activities. Also, the recognition of the need to integrate the valuable knowledge accumulated by the civilian and private sectors over the years is a welcome move towards more effective stabilization and reconstruction policies.

Matteo Fachinoti is a Research Associate at IPOA

From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding

On December 20, 2005, the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations approved resolutions establishing an international UN Peacebuilding Commission. Recognizing recent trends, the UN seeks to implement efficient and effective programs to decrease the likelihood that states emerging from conflict will relapse into violence within just five years. The purpose of the inter-governmental institution would be to encourage sustainable peace in post-conflict environments and promote economic, political and social development in these areas.

The Commission is designed to take over the efforts of international peacekeeping missions after cease-fire agreements have been reached and countries begin to rebuild. While many UN agencies have historically been involved in post-conflict situations, these efforts have never been coordinated by a central body. With the establishment of the UN Commission, peacebuilding and stability operations will be able to focus directly on reconstruction, capacity building, and institutional development and will enjoy an increased degree of expertise. Increased cooperation between UN agencies and non-governmental organizations on the ground will also decrease the duplication of work.

The Commission will have 31 members: 7 from the Security Council, including the 5 permanent members; 7 from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); 5 from the top 10 financial contributors to the UN; 5 from the top 10 troop contributors to peacekeeping missions; and 7 chosen from different regions to ensure geographical diversity. Additionally, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund will be encouraged to attend meetings and offer a different perspective. The body will ideally bring together representatives from all the major international players involved in conflict resolution and post-conflict development operations worldwide.

The President of the General Assembly, Jan Eliassen of Sweden, called the resolution historic, arguing that, "post-conflict does not mean post-engagement of the international community."

Carrie Stefansky is a Research Associate at IPOA

UPCOMING EVENT

Peacekeeping, Reconstruction and Stability Operations in Africa

IQPC's Peacekeeping, Reconstruction and Stability Operations in Africa Conference will bring together parliaments from African, European and North American countries, representatives of governments, and the military from all three continents and international and non-governmental organizations. The conference will provide an opportunity for detailed discussion of past and present peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Tuesday, March 28—Thursday March 30, 2006

Location: Indaba Hotel, Fourways, Johannesburg, South Africa.

To register, call: +27 11 669 5000, fax: +27 11 669 5069, or e-mail: registration@iqpc.co.za

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Editor: Catalina Lemaitre, David Schuster

Many thanks to all who contributed to this publication, especially Jack Goldstone for his article on Stabilization and reconstruction, Allison Frenck for her article on the CMPO Model, Stacy Rabin from PAE for her interview, Doug Brooks for his reflection on his recent trip to Iraq and Carrie Stefansky and Matteo Fachinotti for their report on recent peace operations initiatives.

To receive an electronic copy or hardcopy of this publication, please contact us at IPOA@IPOAonline.org or +1 202-464-0721.

To submit an article or advertise for an upcoming newsletter, please email the editor at CLemaitre@IPOAonline.org.

The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent the opinions of IPOA, its officers, board of directors, members, or affiliates.



International Peace Operations Association

1900 L Street, NW, Suite 320

Washington, D.C. 20036