




JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

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International Peace Operations Association
1900 L Street, NW, Suite 320
Washington, D.C. 20036
United States of America

Telephone..... +1 (202) 464-0721
Facsimile +1 (202) 464-0726
E-mail..... ipoa@ipoaonline.org
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must be accompanied by a photograph and a
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
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Valuing the Contribution of the Private Sector

Assisting International Missions from Sierra Leone to Afghanistan and Beyond



DOUG BROOKS

THIS ISSUE of IPOA's *Journal of International Peace Operations* focuses on the United Nations and its role in peace and stability operations. The UN's past weakness in this area was one of the inspirations for the creation of IPOA in the first place. Our organization assists international peacekeepers to understand and to harness the vast capabilities of the private sector.

My own academic research in Sierra Leone in 2000 was pivotal to my understanding the astonishing value that the private sector brings to peace operations. Employed to support the larger international mission, companies worked either directly for the United Nations or indirectly for donors and NGOs in support of the UN mission. This small number of private firms provided an incredible array of services and specialties which underpinned a UN force more than 17,000 strong. More surprising considering their results, the companies required only a small number of Western experts and managers, and most of the work was in fact done by Sierra Leonians trained and managed by the expats. The result was a UN force more able to focus on its mandate. It also meant jobs, skills and inherent capacity building that continues to provide long term benefits to Sierra Leone.

I noted this same process at work in Afghanistan, on a much greater scale. While

many have correctly pointed out that this important mission needs far more resources from the international community to ensure success, Kabul is a haven of optimism and activity — with NGOs and the private sector providing enormous assets to help with reconstruction, development and training. My meetings with IPOA member companies again reinforced my understanding of how critical the private sector is to international peace operations and how much expertise and capability they can bring to enable missions to succeed and fulfill their policy objectives. The past six months have been grim in Afghanistan, and despite the enormous development efforts and new construction in the city, one is struck by the fragility of the progress. The NATO presence is everywhere in Kabul but the bombings and the increasing scale of violence in some southern provinces are testimony to the determination of the Taliban to undermine the process.

ETHICAL SECURITY

During September, IPOA partnered with the Fund for Peace to hold the 2006 Ethical Security Conference in Gaithersburg, Maryland. The event brought together key stakeholders in the Voluntary Principles on Human Rights and Security and IPOA's own Code of Conduct for two days of meetings, debate and discussion. The key focus was on operationalizing these ideals and discussing the various constraints that the private sector encounters in the field.

From the IPOA perspective, our companies work around the world in peace and stability operations, often on remarkably short notice and with little time for preparation. For these companies the key issue is to ensure that their personnel on the ground are doing the right thing and are in compliance with the IPOA Code of Conduct. Ultimately, the companies recognize the importance of ensuring that all their employees are operating ethically and professionally, even when the time for preparation and training is minimal.

The private sector is giving policy makers new tools and marvelous new capabilities to help them end conflicts. And companies — such as those that support IPOA — are ensuring that such capabilities are provided ethically and with professionalism.

What I observed in Sierra Leone was a part of what Fund for Peace's Patricia Taft calls 'second generation peacekeeping' — the provision of essential niche services to make peace operations actually succeed. We are seeing this trend blossom on a vast scale with very positive results. Every large operation has issues that need to be hammered out, and it is vital that organizations such as IPOA take the lead to work with the United Nations, NGOs and policy makers to ensure that ethical problems are addressed. But we must not lose sight of the enormous benefit that the private sector brings to these operations. The private sector is not a problem, it is a solution.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING LICENSES HINDERS OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

Dear Sir,

I appreciate the article you published concerning my visit to Washington, DC, "PSCAI Director Addresses IPOA Roundtable" (*Journal*, v.2, n.2). I would be grateful if I could clarify my remarks. The article stated that "Mr. Jones highlighted recent improvements in the ease of obtaining licenses for private security companies from the Interior Ministry of Iraq." Unfortunately, the Interior Ministry has only issued three licenses since July 2005 out of the more than 150 PSCs operating in Iraq and the PSCAI has been working to rectify this ever since. While the Ministry has been keener to actually discuss the process, we are still working to ensure transparency and

accountability within so that licenses are issued efficiently and without bias. In short, we have a long way to go but we are finally moving forward after almost a year of stagnation.

With respect to the comment of "ongoing concerns of coordination with the Departments of Defense and State and with U.S. Government Contract Officers..." the PSCAI has no concerns with the level of coordination; in fact, we work closely on topics related and unrelated to PSCs in Iraq with just about every governmental and non-governmental entity out here. The coordination efforts we have seen, especially concerning blue on white issues, have saved lives and reduced fratricide incidents. If anything, the PSCAI would like to thank all of those entities for their help and cooperation throughout the years, it is most

appreciated and I hope will continue well into the future.

Johann R. Jones

Director

*Private Security Company Association of Iraq
Baghdad, Iraq*

Letters to the Editor must be no more than 200 words, and must be accompanied by the writer's full name, address, e-mail and telephone number. Only the writer's name and city will be printed.

Letters to the Editor

International Peace Operations Association
1900 L Street NW, Suite 320
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
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mjamian@olivegroup.com

P E A C E O P E R A T I O N S U P D A T E S

Diplomatic Stalemate Continues in Darfur

THE UN Security Council has authorized a peacekeeping force of 20,000 troops for Darfur, but the Sudanese government refuses to accept the blue helmets and has insisted that the African Union remain in charge of peacekeeping in the region. The African Union has agreed to extend its presence in Darfur through the end of the year, but the mission remains under-resourced and under-funded, and has been unable to halt continued violence against civilians. An offer from the Arab League to send additional peacekeepers was also refused by Sudan.



PICTURE: UN
Jan Pronk, UN SRSG to Sudan, makes his point to the Security Council.

RAPID EXPANSION OF UN PKOS

In a press conference on October 4, Jean-Marie Guehenno, the Undersecretary-General for peacekeeping, announced that

the UN peacekeeping operations had expanded to 93,000 troops, police and civilian personnel in 18 operations around the world, the largest number in the organization's history, and that this number could potentially jump to 140,000 within a year if current troop authorizations in Lebanon, Darfur and Timor-Leste are realized.

ECOWAS SEEKS PERMANENT BASE

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has asked for donations from the UN, the European Union, China and the United States to fund the creation of a permanent base for regional peacekeeping operations. The permanent facilities, comprised of a coastal base outside of Freetown in Sierra Leone and a land depot in Bamako, Mali, would be used to support the ECOWAS standby force, elections

monitoring and civil police operations around the region.

NATO STRUGGLES TO FIND TROOPS

The Secretary-General of NATO, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, has called on more member states to participate in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, where Britain, the Netherlands and the United States have supplied the majority of the fighting forces so far. NATO estimates that it will need at least 2,500 more troops to secure southern Afghanistan, where Taliban resistance remains fierce, but major alliance partners like France, Germany, Italy and Spain have expressed reluctance to commit more troops.

COURT DISMISSES HALLIBURTON CASE

A U.S. court has dismissed a suit against Halliburton that alleged the company was responsible for the deaths of seven employees following an attack on one of its fuel convoys outside Baghdad in April 2004. A federal judge threw out the case after determining that the Army, and not Halliburton, bore primary responsibility for the safety of the fuel convoy.

Updates by Kerstin Mikalbrown

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Acquiring a Fire Engine Before the Fire Breaks Out

A Proposal for a UN Emergency Peacekeeping Service



DON KRAUS

ONCE AGAIN the international community is acquiring the backbone to address the deteriorating situation in Darfur, Sudan. However, if the United Nations had a rapidly deployable Emergency Peace Service in place, this delay in helping Darfuris would have never occurred.

Presently, the UN's tool for responding to emergency situations is with peacekeeping forces. This is insufficient for a number of reasons. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has described current UN peacekeeping as "the only fire brigade in the world that has to acquire a fire engine after the fire has started." In the past, UN peacekeepers took three to six months to arrive at a conflict. While response time has improved, "rapid deployment" is still defined as 30 days for a "traditional" peacekeeping mission (where all parties agree to allow in peacekeepers) and 90 days for "complex" missions (where spoilers attempt to derail a peace agreement). This delay can not only prove fatal for civilians whose lives depend on fragile accords, but also for the accords themselves.

Additionally, UN Peacekeeping often struggles to rapidly secure enough personnel for the job. Current Security Council resolutions authorize over 115,000 peacekeepers for 16 missions at a cost of about \$8 billion. When sufficiently staffed, UN missions are hampered by troops from multiple nations who speak different languages, have different levels of training, and use different communications and weapons systems. Further complicating the situation is the lack of coordination between the military and essential non-military elements of a peace operation including humanitarian relief experts and international civilian police.

The international community needs a new tool in its toolbox to fill the gap between need and capacity, something a UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) could provide. It is envisioned as a 12-18,000-strong unit of military personnel, civilian police, legal experts, and relief professionals from various countries who are voluntarily employed by the UN. This force would be carefully selected, expertly trained, and coherently organized, so it would not fail due to a lack of skills, equipment, experience in resolving conflicts, or gender, national, or religious imbalance. UNEPS would operate out of a permanent UN base and could

deploy mobile field headquarters within 48 hours of a Security Council authorization.

UNEPS would complement existing peace operations capacities and operate according to a first in, first out deployment philosophy. It would be equipped to respond to serious threats to security and human rights, to offer secure emergency services to meet critical human needs, to assist in the establishment of institutions to maintain law and order, to initiate peace building processes with focused incentives and to restore hope for local people in the future of their society and economy.

One major hurdle facing UNEPS is cost. Yet, early deployment of UNEPS in an emergency situation would still be more cost-effective than the expense accrued from a prolonged disaster brought on by delayed deployment, like in Darfur. In addition, post-conflict reconstruction efforts from such a disaster would add to the expense — something an early UNEPS deployment could avert. According to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the international community could have saved nearly \$130 billion of the \$200 billion it spent on managing conflicts in the 1990s by focusing on conflict prevention rather than post conflict reconstruction. Last year bipartisan legislation was introduced supporting the proposal. It is estimated that UNEPS would cost the UN \$2 billion to

create and under \$1 billion yearly to sustain.

Critics in the developing world worry that the great powers will use UNEPS as leverage against weaker countries. Despite this concern, new Global South voices are speaking up in favor of UNEPS. Professor Hussein Solomon from the University of Pretoria believes that UNEPS could collaborate with the African Union. He said that a "definite need has arisen for the implementation of a permanent UN Emergency Service, not as a solitary solution for security challenges, but rather as a complementary approach to other regional, national, and UN efforts."

The responsibility for breathing life into UNEPS now lies with civil society, working with allies in the UN and interested governments. A growing number of NGOs are determined to follow the examples of the ICC and the Ottawa Land Mines Treaty and develop a global network of NGOs and like-minded nations to kick-start UNEPS.

"There is one overwhelming argument for the United Nations Emergency Peace Service," says former UN Under-Secretary General Sir Brian Urquhart. "It is desperately needed, and it is needed as soon as possible." While no peacekeeping force can assure an immediate peace, UNEPS would give the UN a long overdue rapid response capacity. For the people in Darfur, and throughout the world, this cannot come quickly enough.



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The author is Executive Vice President of Citizens for Global Solutions.

Finding Suitable Peacekeepers

Who Do You Want to Keep Your Peace?



CARRIE M. SCHENKEL

WHEN THE UN Security Council voted to establish a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel and to create a buffer zone of international peacekeepers in the region, nearly every Security Council member reiterated the importance of continued support and assistance in achieving a durable peace. Yet as Richard Cohen's op-ed, "Mideast Echoes Of 1938" (*The Washington Post*, August 22, 2006) points out, the shaky ceasefire is likely to be the first victim of severe credibility issues among certain actors. If a durable peace is to be achieved, it requires an acceptable, credible peacekeeping force to keep the sides apart. But who can do it?

U.S. and European forces are among the most professional, well-resourced and capable in the world. But nowadays, U.S. deployment in *any* UN peacekeeping mission is fanciful, and in any case, the United States' credibility as an honest broker in the Middle East has been significantly damaged and to the extent that a deployment would likely be unacceptable to Lebanon. While Europe still maintains a certain amount of political acceptance in the region, with a few exceptions, Europe's willingness to put boots on the ground has amounted to mere lip service. Belgians, for example, remember all too well the murder of ten of their peacekeepers at the beginning of the Rwandan genocide, and they, like many European governments, are becoming increasingly gun-shy and risk averse, preferring to keep their troops out of harm's way and hence out of potentially dangerous peacekeeping missions. So, the choices for the UN among the capable nations are limited at best.

What of countries that *are* willing to deploy? Now we enter the dangerous territory of who is acceptable to the parties. Three countries in particular have either considered contributing to the force or have actually made official offers, but have raised concerns about their potential deployment. German forces, burdened with their Nazi, World War II past, generated concern both in Israel and at home to the prospect of German peacekeepers perhaps being put into a position of having to engage with Israeli — read, Jewish — troops. Meanwhile, Israel has objected to the proposed deployment of Malaysian and Indonesian troops. Neither Malaysia nor Indonesia (both Muslim nations) officially recognizes Israel's

existence, and thus Israel has questioned the ability of peacekeepers to fairly police a ceasefire between two sides, one of which they don't believe really exists.

The Lebanon mission is a key example of the difficulties posed in deploying a peacekeeping force. The UN is already beset by a lack of political will among many member states to commit to UN peacekeeping missions. However, when the participation of some of the very few nations willing to deploy is then questioned by one of the parties to the conflict, the situation is complicated even further. And by no means is Lebanon an isolated example.

Despite these problems, the UN does not have to sit wringing its hands waiting for state leaders to cough up troops to the dismay of their electorates, nor does the UN have to be so concerned about the suitability of certain nationalities to serve in particular missions.

As governments have turned to the private sector to provide services more quickly, less expensively, and more flexibly than they can on their own, such companies also bring the benefit of being relatively "stateless" and hence nonpartisan in the nationality of personnel they deploy. These companies are able to draw from a much larger pool of personnel, and are capable of recruiting well-trained, qualified people worldwide. In fact, many of these security companies attract employees from South Africa, the Philippines, South America, the Pacific and South Asia. As a result, they tend not to suffer from national bias issues the same way that governments do.

Furthermore, private companies are *willing*. If asked to set up an initial peacekeeping mission on the Israeli-Lebanese border, many private companies feel that they could have personnel in place within two weeks — well in advance of UN estimates. This is not to suggest that private companies should replace UN peacekeepers. Rather, the private sector could best be used to set up an initial presence on the ground until UN forces could be assembled and coordinated, and could then be reduced to a support capacity.

The clock is ticking on the brokered truce, and waiting for the west to all of a sudden become more interested in deploying peacekeepers again or to wait for Israel to decide which nationalities it does or does not want in any such peacekeeping mission may not be the best way to ensure peace in the Middle East.

But in a much larger sense, the UN risks the destruction of not only the ceasefire in its failure to act quickly, but also its own legitimacy in the world system. As international organizations like the UN and NATO demonstrate less of an ability to respond to threats to world peace, the less likely rogue states and non-state actors are to abide by international norms and standards. If the UN is unable to gather the manpower it needs in the Middle East within a reasonable time frame or if NATO continues to experience staffing shortages in Afghanistan, perhaps they can look to the private sector to provide an interim solution. Let's make peace a realistic option.



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+ 1 703 356 0002

agnainfo@armorgroup.com

The author is a research associate at IPOA.

The Poor Countries' Burden

Blue Helmets Have Gone Out of Fashion in Western Nations



PAVITHRA BANAVAR

ACCORDING TO A recent report by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), there has been more than a 400 percent increase in peacekeeping operations due to the widening responsibility the United Nations has assumed for post-conflict and peacebuilding missions.

Since the world body was established in 1942, it has deployed 61 peace-keeping operations. Two-thirds of the missions have taken place in the post-Cold War era, with the UNDPKO being created in 1992 to support the growing civil and non-military aspects of peacekeeping and the implementation of peace agreements. Deployment levels for military and civilian police have undergone major fluctuations since the early 1990s based on the scope and urgency of the conflict.

In recent years, industrialized nations have chosen to reduce their involvement in peacekeeping operations in favor of financially supporting the troop contributions by developing countries. The United States has scaled down its military involvement in UN missions since its significant role in leading the UNITAF and UNOSOM II missions in Mogadishu, Somalia from 1992 to 1994. Following the failure in Mogadishu, the United States was criticized for its slowness in reacting to the genocide in Rwanda and the massacre in the Bosnian safe area of Srebrenica in the mid-1990s. Since the failure of these missions, the U.S. has strong objections to becoming involved in missions which do not serve their strategic interests.

The United States is ranked 33rd for the amount of military and police troops they have contributed to UN peacekeeping missions. Although the United States does not contribute a large number of troops, they supply developing countries with the necessary resources to succeed in their missions. The United States has been the largest financial contributor to the UN since its creation in 1945, and currently provides 27 percent of the budget for peacekeeping operations. In fiscal year 2007 President George W. Bush has requested \$1.13 billion

in the budget for UN peacekeeping but the actual cost may be much higher.

In recent years the list of top ten troop contributing countries has been dominated by developing nations while the list of top ten financial contributors has been mostly industrialized countries with no overlapping countries. One of the main reasons for the

training, equipment and logistical support in order to maintain long-term missions. The deployment of troops is a heavy burden on developing countries because the troops may require retraining for each mission depending on the conflict. There has also been a lack of commitment in formulating sufficient mandates for the operations which will create a lasting peace in war torn countries. The main objective of most peacekeeping operations is to monitor a ceasefire agreement in order to ensure that the factions will respect the agreement while peacekeepers fulfill the mandate.

The future of UN peacekeeping seems to be growing with the creation and expansion of missions which require large troop levels. The UN currently has 93,000 staff members in the field and predicts that there will be 140,000 by next year. In recent months the UN has deployed thousands of troops to Lebanon under UNIFIL to monitor the peace agreement and support the Lebanese armed forces. The UN is also working to deploy a peacekeeping mission into the Darfur region to begin implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement which was signed in May 2006. The Sudanese government has refused peacekeepers into the country as a breach of their sovereignty, and the UN needs full consent from the parties.

In recent years regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and NATO have assumed command of missions under UN mandate. The AU mission in Darfur

currently has 7,000 troops in the region but has pledged to send an additional 4,000 troops due to the extension of its mandate. With the UN peacekeepers unable to enter Darfur, many of the major developed nations have offered large financial contributions to the AU mission. The EU has increased their support for the UNIFIL mission by pledging €100 million for humanitarian aid and also deploying additional troops to the region. The ISAF mission in Afghanistan has also extended its mandate to allow NATO forces to take direct control of the military operations. The use of regional organizations in fulfilling UN mandates allows western nations to regain military control of peacekeeping operations while continuing to fund the missions which removes some of the burden from developing nations.



PICTURE: UNFICYP

UN peacekeepers on parade in Cyprus.

heavy involvement of developing countries in peacekeeping operations is for the financial compensation from the UN. Currently the UN reimburses the governments \$1,100 per peacekeeper per month, which covers their pay, clothing, gear, equipment and personal weaponry. The individual governments may decide how much to pay their peacekeepers based on their national salary scale. This often means that the country can make a profit by deploying vast numbers of troops. In addition, troops from developing countries are often seen as neutral parties in a conflict zone while some developed nations are sometimes seen as the enemy.

The lack of troop contribution by many of the developed nations has left a gaping hole in the level of efficiency in peacekeeping missions. The troop contributing countries often lack the resources to provide adequate

The author is a research associate at IPOA.

A Secretary-General Acceptable to All

South Korean Foreign Minister Elected Next UN Secretary-General



TONY FLEMING

THE UNITED NATIONS Charter, adopted in 1945, provides what appears at first read a rather uncomplicated selection process for the Secretary General — appointment by the General Assembly upon nomination of the Security Council. This succinct text has since been supplemented by other procedural rules and accepted practices. Nonetheless, the process of selecting the world's top civil servant has remained for most of the organization's 61-year history opaque and lacking in transparency.

Previous Secretaries-General were often compromise candidates chosen through protracted, politicized and largely secretive bargaining among the permanent Security Council members. Purported candidates remained unknown to most governments — and even to themselves in many cases — and the final selection was made very shortly before the individual took office. The General Assembly would receive the Council's choice with little prior knowledge of the nominee's background, vision or agenda, before appointing him — after all, it has always been a 'him' — to the post.

In contrast, this year's UN Secretary-General selection has been unprecedented in its openness and transparency. An atmosphere of reform encouraged discussion on predetermined selection criteria, active campaigning by candidates and substantive monthly engagement between the Presidents of the Security Council and General Assembly as the process unfolded.

To be nominated, a candidate for Secretary-General must receive at least nine positive votes in the Council, barring a veto from any of the permanent members. This year, that includes permanent members China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States and rotating members

Argentina, Congo, Denmark, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Peru, Qatar, Slovakia and Tanzania.

An informal tradition in the selection process calls for regional rotation in the nationality of the Secretary-General. This year, the near universal consensus (the United States being the principle exception) was that the next Secretary-General should hail from Asia. This view, along with recognition of China's growing regional and global influence, convinced many observers



PICTURE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
New UN Secretary-General and former South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon meets with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

that the candidates would have to impress Beijing as much if not more than they would the United States.

The field of candidates eventually came to include South Korea's Ban Ki Moon, India's Shashi Tharoor, Sri Lanka's Jayantha Dhanapala, Thailand's Surakiart Sathirathai, Jordan's Prince Zeid, Afghanistan's Ashraf Ghani and — the only non-Asian and only woman in the race — Latvia's Vaira Vike-Freiberga.

Unlike in previous years, candidates were encouraged to openly discuss their views on global issues and approach governments for support. Responding to this new environment, candidates presented campaign platforms, created Web sites and spoke at public events around the world. Discussion on the revitalization of the General Assembly included calls by Canada, India and other middle-power states for a stronger role for the General Assembly in

proposing and vetting candidates under consideration. To their credit, the Security Council — expected to maintain an unrelenting grip on the nomination phase — responded by limiting its consideration to only formally (read, publicly) nominated candidates from member governments. The overall impact has been that governments outside the Security Council, as well as the public, know more about the individual who would guide the UN through the next five-to-ten years than they had any previous nominee in the organization's 60-year history.

Before a formal vote is taken by the Security Council, a series of "straw polls" are usually taken to weigh each candidate's level of support among member governments. In the past, this allowed permanent members to eliminate those potential nominees to which they were clearly opposed. Color-coded ballots were used to differentiate permanent members from non-permanent ones. Disapproval of a candidate by a permanent member was likely to equal a veto in the formal vote. If further straw polls or negotiations failed to change the opposed government's position, the candidate was dropped from consideration.

This year, however, the Security Council held three straw polls in which all 15 members either "encouraged," "discouraged," or offered "no opinion" without regard to their permanent or non-permanent status. The means of narrowing the field down to acceptable candidates shifted to the candidates themselves (or their sponsoring government). Weaker candidates — those who received the fewest "encouragements" from the full Security Council — were encouraged to withdraw themselves from the race.

During the straw polls, Ban Ki Moon led each time, but always with one "discouragement." Without the differentiating ballots, however, it was impossible to tell if that vote was from a

Dhanapala

Jayantha Dhanapala Sri Lanka

Senior Adviser to President of Sri Lanka; Formerly Secretary-General of the Sri Lankan peace process; Director UN Institute for Disarmament Research; Under-Secretary General UN Department of Disarmament.



Ghani

Ashraf Ghani Afghanistan

Chancellor of Kabul University; Formerly Finance Minister of Afghanistan.



ALL PICTURES: UNSG.ORG

Tharoor

Shashi Tharoor India

UN Under-S-G for Communications & Public Information; Formerly Executive Assistant to UN S-G; Special Assistant to the UN Under-S-G for Peacekeeping; Director of Communications and Special Projects in the Office of the UN S-G.



permanent member and therefore a possible veto. Speculation abounded as to which government cast the disparaging vote, with China, Japan and Qatar each being suggested, among others. Nonetheless, Ban was considered the front-runner, his tallies indicating strong support among the Council as a whole and with significant encouragement by a number of permanent members in each round.

Tharoor posed the only apparent challenge to Ban, consistently earning second place in each of the straw polls. Like Ban, however, he also received discouragements which may or may not have been cast by permanent members. Thailand's nominee, Surakiart Sathirathai, who had launched his campaign a full two years before and secured the full endorsement of several Southeast Asian governments, never secured more than the minimal required encouragements in any round. Even prior to the military coup which deposed his government, most observers, and even the major Thai media, wrote off his candidacy as a long-shot. Sri Lanka's Jayantha Dhanapala's poor showings surprised many, with even Foreign Policy magazine in June predicting he would be the eventual nominee. Zeid, Vike-Freiberga, and Ghani were all seen as entering the race much too late to make an impression on member governments.

Ban's consistently strong showing was accepted by many as indicative of achieving the necessary support. With the undifferentiating ballots, however, it was still possible that he was being discouraged by a permanent member. The importance to governments of reaching consensus in the nomination prompted the Security Council to provide for differentiation between permanent and non-permanent members. In the fourth straw poll, held on October 2, permanent members cast votes using blue ballots, and non-permanent marked their preferences on white ballots. Again, Ban and Tharoor came in first and second place, respectively. However, only Ban secured the support off all permanent members; all other



Ban

Ban Ki-Moon
South Korea
 Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs;
 Formerly National Security Adviser to the President of South Korea; Foreign Policy Adviser to the President of South Korea; Chef de Cabinet for the President of the UN



PICTURE: KMOFAT

candidates received at least one discouragement from a permanent member.

The result of this poll confirmed Ban's unanimous acceptance by the Security Council, and more importantly, by the permanent members. The Council immediately set Monday, October 9th as the date for the formal vote. Following the announcement, Tharoor delivered a concession speech and expressed congratulations to Ban as the inevitable

neighbor has escalated a threat to international peace and security. Japanese Ambassador Kenzo Oshima suggested that "the fact that the candidate is the current Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea is an asset in dealing with the situation in the Korean Peninsula that we are now facing." In a news conference in Seoul, Ban reflected, "This should be a moment of joy, but instead I stand here with a very heavy heart. Despite the concerted warning from the international community, North Korea has gone ahead with a nuclear test."

Ban's nomination was taken up by the General Assembly the following Friday, where he was appointed by acclamation, accompanied by applause by the assembled delegates. In accepting the appointment, Ban affirmed he would continue the reform efforts begun under current Secretary-General Kofi Annan.






During the campaign, Ban was viewed by many as the least visible and offering the least objectionable views in order to not offend any governments. Unlike Tharoor or

Dhanapala, he rarely made public appearances or spoke in specific terms of his vision. He also chose not to respond to questions from civil society groups on his campaign or contribute along with other candidates for a *New York Times* series. He responded to this criticism, noting his own reputation and humble demeanor as well as the

virtue of modesty in Asian cultures.

This view of modesty and performance may portend what can be expected from Ban's administration. During Kofi Annan's two terms, the international community has made significant advancements and adopted new norms in human rights, development commitments and international justice. With Ban at the helm, we may see the United Nations return to a more traditional "intergovernmental" role, working to consolidate the "supranational" gains achieved in the last decade.

The author is publisher of UNSG.org, which covered the candidates and government positions on who would become the next UN S-G.

| UN SECRETARIES - GENERAL THROUGHOUT HISTORY | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|---|--|--|
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trygve Lie <i>Norway</i> 1946-1952 | Dag Hammarskjöld <i>Sweden</i> 1953-1961 | U Thant <i>Myanmar</i> 1961-1971 | Kurt Waldheim <i>Austria</i> 1972-1981 | Javier Pérez de Cuéllar <i>Peru</i> 1982-1991 | Boutros Boutros-Ghali <i>Egypt</i> 1992-1996 | Kofi Annan <i>Ghana</i> 1997-2006 |

ALL PICTURES: UN

choice. Over the next several days, each of the remaining candidates also withdrew. (Dhanapala had withdrawn prior to the fourth straw poll, having consistently secured the lowest support.) This left Ban as the sole candidate for the post.

Ban was nominated by the Security Council to a five-year term, to run from January 1, 2007 until December 31, 2011. In a historical twist, the Council's formal vote for Ban occurred mere hours after a purported nuclear test by North Korea. Among others, U.S. Ambassador John Bolton noted the irony of the Council nominating the South Korean Foreign Minister to head the UN as his government's



Surakiart

Surakiart Sathirathai
Thailand
 Formerly Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand, Finance Minister; Minister of Foreign Affairs.





Vike-Freiberga

Vaira Vike-Freiberga
Latvia
 President of Latvia; Formerly Director, Latvian Institute, Professor Emerita, University of Montreal.





Zeid

Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Husseini
Jordan
 Jordanian Ambassador to the UN; Chair, Consultative Committee for UNIFEM; Formerly President of the ICC; Chair of Experts for the UN S-G Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes.



Steps Toward Greater UN-Private Sector Partnerships

UNDP Leads Effort to Engage the Private Sector in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments

DAVID ATEN

KOFI ANNAN has noted, "It is the lack of broad-based business activity, not its presence, that condemns much of humanity to suffering." While businesses do face special challenges when working in emerging markets, the UN is investing resources through programs like the Growing Sustainable Business (GSB) initiative to help companies overcome them.

Nearly four billion people live on less than \$4 a day. The case for business to take an active role in changing that is simple. Rather than viewing them as passive objects of development, these "bottom of the pyramid" consumers represent a potential \$6 trillion a year economy. And, because of a widespread lack of infrastructure they also have a massive demand – and consequently offer a high return – for capital investments.

From El Salvador across the Atlantic to Croatia, south into Angola and Mozambique, and east through Cambodia, dozens of countries emerging from civil war are taking advantage of the peace dividend. With a wealth of underutilized human and natural resources, their newfound stability is creating breathing room for emerging fields of entrepreneurship and the potential for the sustained poverty-busting growth not recently seen outside China.

In 2003, investment into developing countries totaled over \$233 billion, nearly three times greater than the amount of official development assistance provided by governments. And while philanthropic endeavors like the Gates Foundation and Clinton Initiative have begun to play an important catalytic role in defeating poverty, the reality remains that the vast majority of the innovation and investment that lead to

development is undertaken by the private sector.

Recognizing the importance of companies to global growth and filling these gaps, the UN has expanded its work with the private sector. After consulting the private sector in 2003, the UN Development Program (UNDP) launched the GSB to provide a range of services to companies strengthening supply chains and making investments that promote job growth and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

That two billion people lack access to clean water simply means there are two billion consumers in need of the procurement, installation, and delivery of clean water. Though the numbers vary, these same opportunities exist in energy, construction, logistics, consumer products, and many other sectors. The challenge for business is two-fold: figuring out how to provide these goods and services at a competitive price, and navigating the local environment to implement profitable programs.

GSB provides solutions to these problems by building on UNDP's 166 country teams, strong ties with national and local governments, its impartiality, and a unique ability to convene, facilitate, and create space. In Ethiopia, the GSB is supporting Mekiya Enterprise's investment in a for-profit system to begin bringing water to the 94 percent of commercial farmland that, despite lacking access to irrigation systems, contribute over 40 percent of the country's GDP. There, a dedicated in-country GSB advisor works to convene stakeholder discussions, mediate disputes, find local partners, and identify concrete investment opportunities.

In addition, UNDP's global network of experts is able to support feasibility studies and assist in the scaling up of successful

investments. All of these services are meant to help companies reduce uncertainty and move investment opportunities from "too risky" to "too good to pass up."

One of the first GSB partnerships was in Tanzania. Throughout Africa, there is huge untapped demand for telecom services, particularly in rural areas. However, because a business model that assumes one user per phone is not economically viable there, this market has gone untapped.

Unsure how to take advantage of this opening, Ericsson approached UNDP for help in 2003. Using their local knowledge and Ericsson's technical expertise, they produced a market study that formed the basis of a new way of doing business. With the opportunity now in clear view, UNDP helped broker the local and national relationships necessary for the \$23m infrastructure investment.

Today in Tanzania the digital divide is a bit narrower, as millions now have reliable access to wireless services. With the improved infrastructure and ability to communicate, local entrepreneurs are able to engage in a range of businesses that five years ago would have been unimaginable. And, by being an early mover and working with UNDP to figure out how to reach these consumers, Ericsson has established a foothold in a new market where demand is growing by over 90 percent a year.

Emerging markets will continue to play an increasingly vital role in the world economy and the success of many individual companies. The UN is committed to working with businesses to harness these opportunities for the good of the world.

ENDNOTES

1. C.K. Prahalad. 2004. *The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty through Profits*.
2. For more information on the GSB visit www.undp.org/business/gsb.

The author is Communications Director for the U.S. Committee for UNDP (UNDP-USA).

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Uncle Sam Wants You to Reform the United Nations

But the U.S. Needs the UN as much as the World Body Needs its Largest Benefactor



SCOTT PAUL

IN 2003, President George W. Bush warned that the United Nations would become irrelevant if the Security Council refused to back the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Yet, to no one's surprise, the U.S. has returned to the UN time after time to deal with international crises.

Last June, UN Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown criticized the U.S. for praising the UN in private while criticizing it in public and called for more constructive engagement with other member states. U.S. Ambassador John Bolton, calling it the worst mistake of a UN official in a decade, promised severe consequences. Less than two weeks later, then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick met privately with Mr. Malloch Brown to ask for help in drawing up a new compact for reconstruction in Iraq. By then, Mr. Malloch Brown's remarks had already become ancient history.

The temperature between the U.S. and the UN is certainly hotter than usual, but both parties always come back to the table. The 60-year U.S.-UN marriage has proven to be extraordinarily resilient, its benefits too great for either party to abandon over petty squabbling. Might it be time for counseling? Absolutely. Splitsville? Not anytime soon.

No matter how little love the UN feels from the U.S., Mr. Malloch Brown's brand of constructive criticism and gentle prodding is likely as aggressive and confrontational as any UN official is prepared to be with Washington. After all, even at this low point in U.S. influence, what other country can marshal support for reform or bring the world together to condemn human rights abuses? Last June in the *Los Angeles Times*, James Traub offered a window into the UN's reliance on the U.S.: "Crisis brewing in the Horn of Africa? Let's bring in the State Department because only the U.S. can talk sense to both the Ethiopians and the Eritreans." And let's not forget the dollars and cents: the U.S. picks up 22 percent of the regular UN bill and an even bigger percentage for its peacekeeping operations.

Still, the UN is a cheap date for the U.S., whose share of the regular budget, \$418 million, amounts to substantially less than it pays each year to operate the Smithsonian museums in Washington, D.C. In addition,

The author is the Campaigns Manager for Citizens for Global Solutions.

the U.S.'s \$2 billion contribution to UN peacekeeping – less than three percent of annual expenditures for Iraq – supports operations in 18 war-torn or unstable regions. Recent studies by the RAND Corporation and the U.S. Government Accountability Office confirm that UN peacekeepers are not only the most effective at securing the peace they're also the best bargain in town.

None of this is to suggest that the UN



PICTURE: DEVRA BERKOWITZ/UN
U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Bolton has made clear that he wishes to reform the UN.

doesn't need to change to keep the relationship happy. Two years ago, Secretary-General Kofi Annan hatched a plan to update the organization so it can respond to the challenges of a new century and made important improvements over the past year. For example, the U.N.'s ethics and oversight bodies have been revamped, and Member States established a Peace Building Commission to help countries emerging from war become stable and prosperous (over the past decade, roughly half have relapsed back into conflict).

But the glass of UN reform this year has only been half-full, in large part due to America's seemingly wavering commitment to the institution. As with any marriage, threatening to walk out the door and turn off the lights is not the most effective way to induce change, yet that is exactly what the Bush Administration has tried to do. Predictably, other

member states, unwilling to yield to these threats, rejected management and operations upgrades that would make the U.N. more responsive to everyone's needs.

There is a significant split in the Bush Administration over this hostile approach to the UN. Some in the Administration support the threats and have ramped up the anti-UN rhetoric. These officials would have us focus on the institution's shortcomings and its ongoing tension with the U.S., and then file divorce proceedings.

Yet, they represent the minority view in government. Most U.S. policymakers recognize the UN's shortcomings side by side with its substantial benefits and rewards, and when conservatives in Congress contemplated withholding UN dues, the Bush Administration went on the record in opposition. This majority in government understands the critical but often unheralded role of the UN in U.S. foreign policy.

As the U.S. confronts nuclear threats in North Korea and Iran, global terrorism, a reconstruction mess in Iraq, and genocide in Darfur, it will need broader support than it can muster from traditional allies or through ad-hoc coalitions. For bringing the entire world together to discuss global threats and challenges, the UN is the only game in town.

Moreover, the unfinished reform agenda and friction between the U.S. and U.N. are symptoms of infidelity, not incompatibility. Full U.S. support and cooperation not only strengthens the marriage, it brings a stronger and more effective United Nations easily within reach. Recommitting to our longstanding partner is the best way to realize a more fulfilling and rewarding relationship with the United Nations.

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Nordic Nations Struggle to Moderate Sri Lanka Conflict

Already Stretched to Capacity, Norway and Iceland Are Left to Keep the SLMM Alive



M. R. NARAYAN SWAMY

THE ETHNIC differences that later turned into an armed conflict in Sri Lanka, a teardrop nation south of India, came to the surface almost as soon as the British rule ended in 1948. The end of colonialism catapulted to power political parties led by the majority and mainly Buddhist Sinhalese community, leading to tensions with the Tamil minority. Brute Sinhalese domination in governance and in areas such as language, employment and education fuelled complaints of discrimination from the predominantly Hindu Tamils. Amid periodic outbreaks of ethnic violence targeted at Tamils, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP), which between them ruled the country, failed to make peace with the Tamil moderate leadership, stoking the embers of militancy in the community.

The 1970s and early 1980s saw a mushrooming of Tamil militant groups whose leaders concluded that violence was the only way to combat ethnic discrimination. One such Tamil radical, Velupillai Prabhakaran, shot dead the pro-government Tamil Mayor of Jaffna in the island's north in 1975 and went on to set up the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1976. Over the years, besides taking on the state, the LTTE decimated all other Tamil groups, both militant and moderate. It has today grown to be the world's most feared and most well armed insurgent outfit with tentacles spanning the globe. Its avowed aim is to break away the Tamil-majority northern and eastern wings of Sri Lanka as an independent nation to be called Tamil Eelam. The conflict has thus far killed some 65,000 people, not including nearly 1,200 of the Indian soldiers who fought the LTTE in Sri Lanka's northeast in 1987-90.

Just four years after the Norwegian-brokered 2002 ceasefire agreement between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE raised hopes of a lasting peace, the country has again slid to near anarchy marked by a dramatic and bloody revival of assassinations, suicide bombings, killings, counter-killings, abductions and military operations in which the key victims are innocent civilians, primarily Tamils.

Sri Lanka's new president, Mahinda Rajapakse, took power in November 2005 on a belligerent agenda. Though he mellowed

subsequently, the LTTE - which had continued to kill its rivals even during the ceasefire - stepped up attacks on the military personnel from December 2005. Attacks on Tamil civilians by security forces triggered a panic flight to India from January 2006 that shows no signs of ending. The LTTE's



PICTURE: SRI LANKAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
The destruction left by an attack by the LTTE at Dalada Maligawa.

attempted assassination of Sri Lanka's army chief in April dramatically raised tensions. Since July, ferocious fighting in the northeast has left hundreds dead, many more wounded, and over 200,000 displaced from their homes, making Sri Lanka — with a population of about 20 million — one of the world's leading conflict zones. The truce exists only on paper and the Norwegian-driven peace process is barely alive.

When the ceasefire was signed, the need was felt for someone to oversee the truce. This gave birth to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), a Nordic body originally made up of monitors from Norway, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Denmark. The SLMM, in whose birth India played a quiet but behind-the-scenes role, is the only such grouping functioning outside the mandate of the United Nations. Its aim is to prevent and defuse escalations, advise and assist the two parties in implementing the ceasefire agreement and help bring about normalization in the northeast.

Headquartered in Colombo, the SLMM maintains six District Offices (open around the clock) in the northeast and a Liaison Office in the LTTE-held town of Kilinochchi. The mission also has Points of Contact in the region to interact with the local population.

The District Offices run mobile units and until recently did extensive patrolling. The SLMM also has naval patrol units based in Trincomalee and Jaffna. There are also Local Monitoring Committees, each made up of two members, nominated by the government and LTTE with a SLMM representative as chairman. The committees record and process complaints about truce violations. The monitors enjoy diplomatic privileges, with both the government and LTTE agreeing to provide security to them.

Since the 2002 ceasefire, the SLMM has recorded thousands of violations and played a crucial role in preventing violent clashes innumerable times. They were not carrying out an easy job, made more difficult by Tamils opposed to the LTTE accusing the mission of being biased towards the Tamil Tigers.

Things took a turn for the worse for the SLMM after the European Union banned the LTTE as a terrorist group in May this year. India was the first country to outlaw the Tigers, in 1992, and was followed by Britain, the U.S. and Canada. But after the EU decision, the LTTE refused to accept monitors from Denmark, Finland and Sweden, all of which are EU members, saying they could no longer be neutral. This has left the SLMM struggling with monitors from just Norway and Iceland, sharply reducing its strength from 67 to just 30. This is a blow to Sri Lanka's peace process because the LTTE veto came when the SLMM was contemplating increasing its staff to tackle growing incidents of violence and ceasefire violations.

SLMM officials admit that with fighting now erupting on a large scale all over the north and east of Sri Lanka, monitoring the virtually non-existent ceasefire has become not just difficult but dangerous too. SLMM monitors, who are unarmed, no longer rush to spots of turbulence every time simply because they cannot afford to commit their limited personnel. The high levels of violence have undoubtedly reduced the effectiveness of the Nordic body but they continue to perform a key function. Efforts are on to increase personnel from Norway and Iceland (some who had gone home after serving in Sri Lanka have since returned) to bolster its strength and, if possible, rope in other countries that have not banned the LTTE.

Amid intense international efforts to save Sri Lanka's tottering peace process, it is vital to resurrect the SLMM, whose monitors play the role of independent judges without whose presence whatever is left of the ceasefire will simply wither away.

The author is an Indian journalist who writes extensively on Sri Lanka and is the author of two books on the ethnic conflict -- "Tigers of Lanka" and "Inside an Elusive Mind."

Sri Lanka's Drift Back into War

European Peace Mission Fights for its Very Survival



C. CHRISTINE FAIR

FOR MORE than two decades, Sri Lanka has been gripped by a bloody civil war that has claimed as many as 70,000 lives. The conflict is rooted in the failure of the Sri Lankan state, with its ethnic Sinhalese Buddhist majority, to accommodate the ethno-nationalist aspirations of the minority Tamil Hindus concentrated in Sri Lanka's north.

While Tamil separatist struggles began in the 1970s as a largely non-violent movement, the 1980s marked the beginning of a full-fledged civil war. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran, ruthlessly eliminated any rival organization and emerged as the dominant Tamil militant outfit.

After major LTTE military successes in 2000 and 2001, the group sought to exploit its military advantage and pressed for political negotiations. At the same time, the People's Alliance coalition government — burdened by economic depression, rising military desertion and deepening popular disapproval of its 'war for peace' approach to the conflict — also sought a way towards peace. Despite these developments and two visits to Sri Lanka by Norwegian Special Envoy, Erik Solheim, to broker peace in May 2001, no substantive movement towards peace occurred until the People's Alliance government fell. After the December 2001 elections, Ranil Wickremasinghe's United National Front party ascended to power, having campaigned on a platform of peace.

Following several months of Norwegian shuttle diplomacy, the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE agreed on a one-month ceasefire on December 24, 2001. The peace process was accelerated on February 22, 2002, when Norwegian facilitators secured an extended ceasefire agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The ceasefire agreement created the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to be comprised of staff from five Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland) reporting to the Norwegian government. The SLMM's mandate includes monitoring adherence to the ceasefire agreement and investigating violations of it. Both sides are bound to ensure the freedom of SLMM's movement and provide

immediate access to areas where violations are alleged to have occurred. The SLMM's final authority in interpreting the agreement and adjudicating violations, however, is not paired with a commensurate enforcement mechanism. Violations are widely observed but little can be done beyond documentation.

Between September 2002 and March 2003, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government convened six rounds of peace talks to widespread international support. The talks fostered a sense of optimism about a possible end to the civil war, but the LTTE dampened these hopes when it vacated negotiations in April 2003 and demanded, in October 2003, an interim administration arrangement for the Northeast under which the LTTE would control the judiciary and police, as well as oversee land and revenue concerns.

In response, President Chandrika Kumaratunga declared a state of emergency and seized control of the Ministries of Defense, Finance, and State Media, crippling Wickremasinghe's administration. After suspending the parliament and declaring elections in April 2004, a coalition government was cobbled together which adopted a confrontational posture towards the peace talks and rejected LTTE demands for an interim administration.

The credibility of the SLMM has been continually questioned, with many Sinhalese vigorously opposing the Norwegian role. They assert that Norway decisively tilts towards the LTTE, an assertion strenuously rejected by the SLMM and Norway. Even though there are four other states involved in the SLMM, Norway has taken the brunt of the criticism. Others complain the SLMM does nothing but observe the violations and can do nothing to prevent or discourage them.

While the ceasefire has been upheld nominally by both parties, the SLMM has verified numerous appalling violations by both sides. The SLMM has also declared repeatedly that the mission has been denied appropriate access by both parties to the ceasefire agreement, thus placing further operational limits on its already restricted mandate. The facts on the ground suggest that both sides are moving towards all-out war.

Sri Lanka was hit hard by the 2005 tsunami, in which 38,000 Sri Lankans perished and another million were impacted through loss of property or livelihood. The tsunami struck when relations between the

LTTE and President Kumaratunga had begun to sour. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, Sri Lanka's varied ethnic groups showed signs of working together amidst the calamity. However, both the Sri Lankan government and LTTE moved quickly to ensure that neither side could garner political advantage over the other, which hindered the distribution of much-needed relief. The tsunami galvanized the dispersed Tamil diaspora to resume sending funds to the LTTE for humanitarian aid. Moreover, the LTTE gained considerable recognition in national and international media for its reportedly efficient distribution of aid to the tsunami victims. With renewed funding sources and credibility, the LTTE began forcibly drafting children and stepped up its policy of selective assassination of state operatives, including Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in August 2005.

With the rapid and decisive deterioration of the peace process and concomitant return to war, the embattled 56-person SLMM needs all of the resources and support it can get. Unfortunately, the SLMM was delivered another blow in May 2006 when the EU banned the LTTE. In response, the LTTE demanded that the SLMM expel the 36 monitors from Denmark, Sweden and Finland (all EU countries). As of September 1, 2006 the much-diminished mission is staffed only by personnel from Norway and Iceland.

Adding to its ever-evolving inventory of challenges, the SLMM now worries about its monitors' safety. In May 2006, the LTTE attacked a Sri Lankan transport ship with SLMM monitors aboard. The LTTE has categorically stated that it will not ensure the safety of EU monitors after September 1, 2006. The Sri Lankan government has also imperiled the lives of monitors. In August 2006, the Sri Lankan Air Force aerially bombarded the Muttur area despite the presence of SLMM personnel there.

With neither the Sri Lankan government nor the LTTE committed to securing peace, the mission and efficacy of the SLMM are very much in jeopardy. Each day brings both sides nearer to all-out undeclared war. As Lars Solvberg, head of the SLMM, himself explained, the mission of the SLMM has been reduced to that of observing "... how massively the parties are violating this agreement."¹

ENDNOTES

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The author is a senior researcher at the United States Institute of Peace

India's Enthusiastic but Cautious Approach to PKOs

Lack of National Strategic Interests and Use of Indian Nationals in Iraq Raises Concerns



RAMA LAKSHMI

INDIA, a fractious multi-religious democracy of a billion people, is one of the largest contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations around the world. It has participated in 29 UN peacekeeping missions and demonstrated its commitment to international security by sending more than 65,000 soldiers to countries like Korea, Congo, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Lebanon, Sudan and Somalia. Today, it has about 8,000 troops around the world.

What is in it for India? Despite a burgeoning economy growing at eight percent, about a quarter of its people continue to languish in acute and abject poverty; it has nuclear weapons but struggles to eradicate polio; it is a global peacekeeper but is engaged in several bitter battles against domestic insurgency.

Why does such a country, beset with multitudes of problems of its own, keep sending its men and women abroad to put out somebody else's fire?

Its deep desire to influence world affairs and to be counted as a strategic power in the community of nations is the reason for its continued engagement with peacekeeping missions. India prides itself as a glorious 5,000-year old civilization, but its dream to be a powerful modern, nation-state remains unfulfilled.

India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who co-founded the Non Aligned Movement in the 1950s, had tremendous faith in the UN's role as an impartial peacekeeper and envisioned his newly-independent nation as influencing global order. This led to India's chairmanship of the Indochina commission set up in 1954, following the Geneva Agreement, to implement the ceasefire between Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and France; and participation in the UN Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea between 1950 and 1953.

Over the decades, India continued to regard international peacekeeping as a legitimate tool for achieving global power status. It is a matter of great prestige for the Indian soldier to be sent on a UN mission. Indian peacekeepers are chosen carefully from those with experience in battling Islamic militants, underground guerrillas and Maoist rebels in various parts of India.

In a representation to the UN, Indian

parliamentarian, Pramod Mahajan said that the "main problems that beset peacekeeping are not a lack of resources or even personnel, but an unrepresentative Council". He also called for the inclusion of the views of 'troop contributing countries' like India, before the Council adopts or renews a resolution.¹

India's long time aspiration of gaining a permanent seat in the UN Security Council often runs parallel to its desire for playing a decisive role in the formulation of the UN mandate for peacekeeping operations.

Analysts like Dipankar Banerjee and Ramesh Thakur have also argued against the "creeping apartheid in UN peacekeeping, where the poor countries contribute troops

phase of peacekeeping in Somalia in 1992, because it was led by the U.S., and not the UN. India's refusal to send troops to Iraq was also because the deployment was not under a UN umbrella.

Following the death of two Indians engaged in security duties in Iraq in 2004, India announced a ban against sending labor to Iraq. There were speculative reports that unscrupulous recruitment agencies were luring India's ex-Army men under false pretenses and sending them to fight in Iraq. But the retired Indian Army soldiers, many of them struggling with measly pensions, were not going for military duty. They were guarding Indian installations or providing industrial security for Indians working on infrastructure projects in Iraq.

Recently, India considered pulling out its soldiers from Lebanon in the face of Israeli strikes and amidst criticism that the UN Interim Force had not deterred Hezbollah.

What is ironic is that for all of its commitment to UN peacekeeping, India frowns upon any UN intervention in its own backyard. Pakistan, its neighbor and nuclear rival, would like to see a UN referendum in the disputed Kashmir province, a trigger for two wars between the two nations. The presence of UN Observer Mission on Kashmir is symbolic, something that India merely tolerates.

India has resisted any talk about external intervention not only on its own soil, but also in the subcontinent. The murmurs about the UN overseeing the surrender of arms by Maoists in Nepal have caused much displeasure to India. The only peacekeeping that India has undertaken without the UN umbrella has been to Sri Lanka in 1987, which proved disastrous with the loss of almost 1,200 Indian lives.

In fact, this kind of keep-off attitude runs counter to India's criticism last October against the UN's "tendency to lean towards regional solution in peacekeeping, particularly in the context of Africa". India says that regionalization amounted to the UN shirking its "global responsibility for peace and security."⁴

ENDNOTES

1. Speech by Pramod Mahajan, October 24, 2005. www.un.int/india/woo5/ind1165.pdf
2. Dipankar Banerjee and Ramesh Thakur. 2006. India and UNPKO. Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.
3. Margarita Mathiopoulos. 2006. Lebanon and Israel: The war from where I stand. International Herald Tribune, July 24.
4. Speech by Pramod Mahajan, October 24, 2005. www.un.int/india/woo5/ind1165.pdf



PICTURE: JORGE ARAMBURU/UNMEE
Honor Guard of Indian soldiers deployed to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

while the rich Western countries provide logistical support and dominate the senior policy-making ranks in the UN system."²

If UN peacekeeping is indeed the ticket to global power, then one wonders why the bulk of the international peacekeeping burden is shouldered by poor Third World countries, with almost 45 percent of the personnel contributed by South Asia. In fact, the UN peacekeeping force itself is seen as a motley crew of impoverished nations with substandard armies that are in it for money.

In a recent essay, Margarita Mathiopoulos, chief executive of the European Advisory Group, called the forces "the usual suspects of UN peacekeeping, the impoverished third-world armies who only deploy their soldiers for their per diem."³

Although there is a wide political consensus in India for sending troops to foreign theaters, there is now a growing call to send troops only to those countries where India has a clear, tangible, national interest. It generated domestic political debate only on two occasions -- when Indian troops were deployed in Somalia and Sierra Leone.

India refused to participate in the first

The author is currently on sabbatical leave from The Washington Post's New Delhi bureau.

Switzerland to Consider New Anti-Mercenary Legislation

Despite Strong Private Military Tradition, Swiss Legislature Jumps on the Bandwagon



FIONA MANGAN

THIS NOVEMBER, the Swiss Government will host a conference aimed at establishing a coherent legal framework to regulate the operation of private security companies. The conference, which will be co-hosted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), will scrutinize both national and international legislation governing the sector in an effort to clarify state obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law and to foster debate and information exchange on the subject.

Given Switzerland's neutrality, the government has been keen to investigate

The author is a research associate at IPOA.



PICTURE: THE VATICAN

Under the proposed Swiss law, private military contractors will be permissible only if they guard the Vatican.

whether allegations of violations against humanitarian law may threaten their non-aligned stance on international conflict.

Swiss mercenaries have historically been famed for their service in foreign armies during which their superior combat skills made them the most sought after mercenaries in the world. Since 1859, the Swiss Constitution only permits the existence of one mercenary unit – the Vatican's Swiss Guard.

The private peace and stability operations industry has now developed into a broad-ranging pool of technical expertise, with a client base which includes governments, the private sector and NGOs. As demand for such services has increased so too has the call for increased regulation of such contractors. The Swiss conference aims to address this by drawing together international state representatives to assess the efficacy of the law as it stands and its implementation.

Senators Smith and Kennedy Propose Peace in Darfur Act

Proposed Legislation May Affect Activities of Private Companies in Darfur



ROBERT VAINSHTEIN

ON AUGUST 3, Senators Gordon Smith (R-Oregon) and Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) introduced S. 3801, the *Peace in Darfur Act of 2006*. The bill represents the most recent U.S. legislative activity on the Darfur crisis, and the most forceful bill to date. The bill calls on the Government of Sudan to immediately allow a UN peacekeeping force to deploy into Darfur, in order to replace the African Union (AU) mission that is currently undermanned and under-resourced in the region. The bill also prompted President George W. Bush to appoint a special envoy to Sudan, Col. Andrew Natsios, to further support the peace process – namely, by working to secure the implementation of a ceasefire and the disarmament of the government-backed Janjaweed militias.

This bill comes in response to the Sudanese government's unwavering refusal to accept the proposed UN peacekeeping force, which has already been sanctioned by the UN Security Council in resolution 1706 (passed on August 31, 2006). Led by President Omar el-Bashir, the Sudanese government has repeatedly denounced the proposed UN force as a violation of its national sovereignty, even as it conducts a massive military onslaught in northern

The author is a research associate at IPOA.

Darfur that openly violates the terms of the Darfur Peace Agreement signed in May 2006.

To counter the Sudanese government's continued defiance of the UN, the Smith-Kennedy bill sets forth a comprehensive embargo that its sponsors hope will become multilaterally enforced. Drawing on previously endorsed sanctions, the bill would prohibit all American export activity to and from Sudan. The bill stipulates that "any goods, technology, or services" from the United States, or involving the use of U.S. registered vessels or aircraft, would be banned from entering Sudan. U.S. nationals would likewise be prohibited from handling property originating from Sudan, and from exporting property from Sudan to other countries. In addition, the bill would freeze the assets of the Sudanese government in the U.S. and block any American financial assistance to Khartoum.

Nevertheless, ambiguity surrounds the framework of exceptions built into the bill, raising questions about how the sanctions could affect the services currently provided by private peace and stability firms within Darfur. According to the bill, sanctions may not apply to humanitarian assistance for the people of Sudan, or to commodities that are only temporarily present in Sudan for transshipment purposes. Moreover, any sanction can be waived by the President if a waiver is deemed necessary to help facilitate a resolution to the conflicts in Darfur and

other regions of Sudan.

It is clear that these exceptions are intended to prevent any obstacles to the ongoing humanitarian efforts in Darfur. However, it remains unclear what activities would constitute "humanitarian assistance," and who would determine whether a particular service or transaction is exempt from the sanctions. While it is hoped that the person or body tasked with enforcing the sanctions will take a broad view of the "humanitarian assistance" exception in order to ensure that all means of assistance can be accomplished, future predicaments can be avoided if more specific definitions of "humanitarian assistance" are developed now, while the bill remains under review by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Over the last three years, the private sector has played a significant role in addressing the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. In particular, private companies have provided crucial services to the AU mission based in Darfur, including logistical support, base construction, medical services, and providing helicopters and vehicles for the AU peacekeepers. These services have bolstered the AU force's capacity to remedy the humanitarian emergency, and maintain a modicum of security in the embattled region. So long as the *Peace in Darfur Act* allows the private sector to continue to support the AU mission, the legislation will be a positive development in the Ongoing process of bringing peace to Darfur.

Promoting Regulation and Accountability in Iraq

The Role of the PSCAI in Raising the Standards of the Private Sector in Iraq Operations



JOHANN R. JONES

ON A HOT June 2004 evening, managers of a handful of Private Security Companies (PSCs) met at the 'Chinese Restaurant' in the International Zone in Baghdad. The agenda was to establish a trade association that could represent the security industry — member companies in particular — among the multitude of industry commentators, critics, clients, regulative and governing agencies and other stakeholders. From that meeting the Private Security Company Association of Iraq (PSCAI) was founded.

Since then the PSCAI has worked to be the respected voice of the private security industry in Iraq, representing over 50 of the major PSC's currently operating in Iraq. More importantly, the PSCAI uses that voice to influence, advise and assist in all matters concerning the PSC community to provide an environment of trust and understanding that best allows for successful PSC operations in Iraq. Other PSCAI Objectives are:

- To assist member companies and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI) with Private Security Company Registration and Regulation.
- To promote cross-institutional understanding and confidence (between member companies, Iraqi and other government entities, Coalition authorities, PSC clients, media and other stakeholders) in the best practices and industry standards for the delivery of security services in Iraq.
- To establish and maintain a cross-institutional network that allows for discussion and resolution of security-related issues, along with transparency, accountability, mutual understanding and trust.
- To advise or represent PSCAI member companies on issues related to PSC operations in Iraq.
- To respect the commercial confidence of member companies and their clients.

One of the key issues is that of PSC registration and regulation. The PSCAI has worked closely with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to ensure PSC's are licensed. This has been challenging as MoI licensing stopped in October 2005, was reintroduced in March 2006, and has been amended some 20 times since then with only five licenses legally issued at the time of writing. The lack



PICTURE: BLACKWATER USA

Private security companies are key actors in the reconstruction of Iraq.

of regulation has ensured that no PSC could legally operate in Iraq from July 2006 and therefore makes the task of determining a 'legitimate PSC' from a rogue or possibly terrorist armed group near impossible when on the road. PSCAI has a lot of work left to do on accountability and regulation, with only 60 PSCs engaged in the licensing process out of 160 known PSC's operating in Iraq (see www.psc.ai.org for a full list) and quite possibly more armed groups doing 'security' work in the country. The PSCAI's top priority is to get the licensing process working, thereby allowing legitimate PSCs to operate within the law. PSCAI is keen for the MoI to exercise oversight and ensure accountability so that the Iraqi Government can enforce the rule of law on rogue entities. Regulation of the security industry is paramount to the safe reconstruction of Iraq and the PSCAI is at the forefront of this task.

When drawing comparison to other industries, the role of the trade association in defining the industry standard has been highlighted for the security industry in Iraq. Indeed, the U.S. Government Accountability Office has twice reported to Congress that there are no industry standards for delivery of security in Iraq and therefore clients may not actually know the difference between PSCs.

The PSCAI Board has worked with member companies to establish the 'best practice' for the delivery of security services in Iraq with 19 different standards ranging from meeting legislative requirements, coordination issues, selection, training and equipment. The PSCAI are also working to develop the process by which PSCs can judge their services against the standards and have PSCAI certify these standards.

Aside from these areas, the PSCAI meets with a network of over 25 agencies within the

Iraqi Government, Multi National Force-Iraq, and foreign embassies to address topical issues such as weapons cards, arming, border issues, security concerns, and visas for contractors in Iraq. The PSCAI represents member companies and the PSC industry in general on these issues and has been instrumental in working with the entities above to increase coordination and cooperation.

The PSCAI widens the network to include all comers for the monthly plenary sessions held at the National Reconstruction Operations Centre (ROC) in the International Zone. This allows all relevant parties to gain knowledge on critical security issues, with attendance being drawn from a distribution list of over 145 PSCs, as well as governmental, non-governmental, and commercial agencies.

The span of the PSCAI membership, networks and issues addressed makes the Association a must for advice and coordination of PSC operations in Iraq. While PSCAI focuses on Iraq, we continue to work with global organizations such as the International Committee for the Red Cross, NATO, the UN and the International Peace Operations Association to increase the standards of the security community and raise the bar across the board for all PSCs operating in any part of the world. It is imperative in order to garner the trust and understanding of the Iraqi people and the global community that a high-level of transparency and accountability exist within our industry and the PSCAI are working every day to increase the levels of each.

PSCAI will continue to work closely with the Iraqi Government and U.S.-led Coalition to foster trust and understanding along all parties to help rebuild Iraq in a safe and secure environment.

The author is the Director of the Private Security Company Association of Iraq.

UN Targeted Sanctions: Problems and Possibilities

Though Broad Sanctions May be Problematic, Targeted Sanctions Can Work



DANIEL STRANDOW

UNITED NATIONS Security Council (UNSC) sanctions have been accused of being ineffective and of being imposed merely to show the goodwill of the international community when it is not prepared to send troops to troubled areas. It has also been the notion that sanctions do not really affect the decision-makers but instead cause suffering in the civilian population. As a response to the latter critique UNSC have increasingly shifted from comprehensive economic sanctions to targeted measures. Following this shift, which was supported by different reform-processes,¹ the question is whether these targeted measures have concrete effects or if they are merely symbolic? This question is addressed below and illustrated with two cases of internal armed conflicts: Liberia, since 2000, and Côte d'Ivoire since 2002. There were individual sanctions (asset freezes and travel bans), and arms and other commodity embargos (diamond and timber) present in both cases.

The general sentiments among civilians and experts in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia are that the arms embargos (and to a lesser extent other commodity sanctions) are good and that they should be kept in place. It is acknowledged that the flow of small arms is impossible to stop but that the arms embargo nevertheless is important to keep the situations calm. In Côte d'Ivoire, one particular problem with the arms embargo is that it has been noted that the committee charged with the oversight of the sanctions has been unclear regarding whether certain dual-use items can be imported, and whether foreign private contractors are allowed to repair government attack helicopters. This problem has been known for some time but the uncertainty still remains.

Another problem brought up by experts in the Côte d'Ivoire concerns individual sanctions. There were numerous threats of imposing travel bans and asset freezes but when they were finally imposed in February this year they were a disappointment to many since only three people were put on the list. Many people consider those targeted as "small fish" and that the UN was reluctant to

target "bigger fish" out of fear that the situation, particularly the security situation for UN personnel, would deteriorate further. An issue brought up by many targets of sanctions in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire is that they feel that it is very difficult to appeal against being targeted. There are of course channels for this that had been used successfully by some people but additional measures should be taken to make sure there is a more transparent and efficient way of



PICTURE: U.S. COAST GUARD
A U.S. Coast Guard vessel enforcing the sanctions imposed against Saddam Hussein-era Iraq.

appealing. The reason for this is not necessarily the wellbeing of the persons targeted but rather the credibility of the sanctions instrument: If a target thinks that it is impossible to appeal, and that being taken off the list is accomplished only through some arbitrary process, the incentives to abide by the resolutions are decreased. The carrot — the probability of being taken off the list by changing the behaviour — must become more easily perceived.²

It is possible that a number of factors, other than sanctions, affect the likelihood of conflict resolution in civil wars; one such factor is the outcomes of the actual battles between the warring parties. If the outcomes of battles result in a situation on the ground that is conducive to peace, for instance a stalemate where the distributions of the territory is mutually acceptable to the warring parties, that effect might be more important than sanctions, no matter how well implemented they are. In a recently finished report, where more than a hundred months of conflict in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire were analyzed, it was shown that, even when controlling for mutually acceptable stalemates, well-implemented arms embargos had a statistically significant effect. It could however not be established that other commodity sanctions and

individual sanctions had significant positive influences on the likelihood of conflict resolution.³

The reason for these results is that when there are few violations of arms embargos the warring parties are more certain that nothing unforeseen will greatly influence the distribution of military capabilities, and they can hence agree on their relative power more readily. If they have similar beliefs concerning the distribution of power, be it symmetric or asymmetric, their incentives for fighting will be reduced because they can more easily agree on how much territory or how many government positions they should be entitled to in a postwar settlement. If the implementation of the settlement is flawed, and for instance an attack helicopter is brought to the conflict area, the parties' evaluations regarding who would win future battles might begin to differ to the point where they no longer share the same beliefs regarding their relative power.

Learning has taken place within the UN from previous cases of sanctions but as is illustrated by the shortcomings in Côte d'Ivoire, and to a lesser extent Liberia, there are still matters to address. As for the private peace and stability sector: During times when for instance the sanctions committees suffer from slow decision-making concerning inconsistencies in the implementation of arms embargos, organizations like IPOA could have a key role in informing the industry to prevent the exploiting of such weaknesses.

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The author is the Director of the Swedish consultancy S.G. Solutions Group

C O L U M N I S T S

Shining a Tainted Light on the Industry

Movies Symptomatic of Hype Surrounding Private Peace and Stability Operations Industry

J. J. MESSNER

IN RECENT months, two documentary movies concerning the world's private peace and stability industry have debuted on America's movie screens. Both movies point to a major problem facing the industry, not only in movie theaters, but in the world's legislatures. The problem is the tarring of the whole industry by perceived misdeeds of a small few.

The first of this summer's industry blockbusters, *Shadow Company*, by Vancouver-based filmmaker Nic Bicanic, presents — at least in this author's humble opinion — a relatively balanced appraisal of the industry. Although, a “relatively balanced appraisal” in the private peace operations industry tends to be defined as not beating the industry up *too* much.

Much of Mr. Bicanic's management of *Shadow Company* is to be admired. He shied away from seeking vast sums from political movements and even shunned approaches from large movie distribution conglomerates. If this author were a movie critic, he would give a high rating to *Shadow Company*. Though, he would have to preface such a rating with the warning that his taste in cinema has often been questioned.

Speaking of questionable taste, the '80s blockbuster, *Xanadu*, starring Gene Kelly and the author's compatriot, Olivia Newton-John, has regularly been rated as one of the top ten worst flops of movie history. Fortunately for movie-goers everywhere, its director, Robert Greenwald, has since turned his attention to more serious fare than roller discos and hot pants.

Mr. Greenwald now spends his time concentrating on exposing the evil underbelly of corporate America. First came the very successful *Outfoxed*, an examination of the reporting style of Fox News, followed by a series of other movies of the same genre including *Wal-Mart—The High Cost of Low Prices*. Now it is the turn of the private peace operations industry to be placed under Mr. Greenwald's microscope in *Iraq for Sale*.

Very much in the genre of Michael Moore documentaries such as *Bowling for Columbine* and *Fahrenheit 911*, this movie is as much about attacking the Bush Administration as it is about attacking private contractors. But, of course, it is no coincidence that this movie should be released immediately before a very hotly-

contested Congressional election season. Indeed, the movie is backed by the likes of MoveOn.org, perhaps the most obvious icon of the activist left. Whereas Mr. Bicanic, who was independently funded, had the flexibility to be balanced, Mr. Greenwald, it seems, was constrained a little more and felt under pressure to provide meaty fodder for activists everywhere. (At this point,

the author would like

who have already made up their minds and passed judgment on the industry, so why is this important?

Well, this goes to a deeper issue. There is considerable angst at everything that goes wrong in the private peace operations industry — and while such problems, where they do exist, *must* be addressed — they ignore the good work that is completed by the vast majority of the industry and conversely conveniently ignore the calamitous missteps by other entities in conflict/post-conflict environments.

During a recent speech to students at Catholic University in Washington, D.C., the current anti-mercenary legislation in South Africa was discussed. A South African student argued that the law was justified as it would hopefully prevent any future armed coup attempts like that witnessed in Equatorial Guinea.

But herein lies the problem with the South African legislation. The soldiers behind the plan to topple President Obiang were hired by a private consortium to take armed, illegitimate offensive action. Yet, some of the earliest casualties of the new legislation were South African employees who worked for Erinys in Iraq on lawful government contracts in exclusively defensive activities. Yet, the South African legislation makes no distinction between each group. Indeed, both the legitimate and illegitimate actors are tarred with the same brush.

Perhaps the South African legislation may prevent a future Equatorial Guinea. But by the same token, it would harm the many legitimate and positive operations around the world aiding conflict-ridden countries. When there are drunk drivers on the road, we don't ban driving. Instead, we pursue those who drink and drive. Similarly, when individuals are hired to take part in covert, illegitimate actions that lack any semblance of legality, then it is *they* we should pursue and punish, not the entire industry as a whole.

Iraq for Sale is symptomatic of a lack of understanding of what the peace and stability operations industry really stands for and more significantly, actually achieves. The peace and stability operations industry, like any industry, is bound to contain a few issues to address and areas of concern. But let us address those concerns and weed out the bad apples instead of subjecting the entire industry — which is full of honorable people with honorable intentions doing meaningful, positive work in some of the world's toughest environments — to a legislative and media-driven scorched-earth policy.



to point out that he is himself an avowed liberal. It's just that playing to an audience is pretty obvious and tends to hurt the objectivity of any “documentary,” no matter its political color.)

Some key issues came out of *Iraq for Sale*, including some we can all pretty much agree upon. Yes, there should be accountability as to where taxpayer money is spent. Yes, we should avoid no-bid contracts. Yes, contractors should take all reasonable steps to ensure the safety of their employees. But then there is the inescapable hype and sensational side of it all. Plus, the small matter of the “other side” of the debate receiving five, maybe six, seconds of airtime in a 75 minute production.

But why does all this matter? After all, they're just movies. As *Fahrenheit 911* proved, much of the audience consisted of people who pretty much agreed with the point of the movie beforehand. Surely *Iraq for Sale* will primarily be viewed by people

The author is the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of International Peace Operations and is the Director of Programs and Operations at IPOA.

The United Nations and Africa: A Symbiotic Relationship

Twenty-Four UN Peacekeeping Missions to Africa and Counting...



AMBASSADOR HERMAN J. COHEN

DURING THE period 1953-1961, the U.S. Administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower devoted considerable attention to the development of policies toward the newly independent African nations. The declassified archives of that period contain records of many National Security Council (NSC) meetings devoted to Africa policy.

As the result of NSC deliberations, President Eisenhower made three seminal policy decisions about Africa that continue to resonate today, four decades later.

- The U.S. would honor and respect the independence and sovereignty of every newly independent African nation, no matter how small, by establishing diplomatic missions in every country.
- The U.S. would accept African neutrality in the Cold War. We would not insist on each newly independent country choosing between the United States and the Soviet Union. Neutrality would not be punished by the withholding of foreign aid.
- In situations of dangerous instability that might threaten the existence of African states, the primary instrument for the restoration of peace and the rebuilding of state structures would be the United Nations.


Eisenhower's third decision was challenged very early in the African independence process when the former Belgian Congo collapsed into near anarchy shortly after it became a sovereign nation on June 30, 1960. When it became clear that this very large resource-rich nation was the object of growing communist infiltration and subversion, President Eisenhower said that he would utilize force, if necessary, to prevent a Soviet takeover. He even requested the establishment of a Congo planning group within NATO.

When it became absolutely clear in the Fall of 1960 that external intervention was absolutely necessary to save the Congo from total collapse as an independent nation, Eisenhower decided that the appropriate response was not NATO, but the United Nations. Eisenhower and his national security team concluded that a NATO intervention would constitute a negative signal to Africa of the return of colonialism.

The UN peacekeeping and nation-

building effort in the Congo that began in 1960 was the first such operation planned and administered by UN Headquarters in New York. The earlier UN "police action" in South Korea was mandated by the UN Security Council in 1950, but was led and controlled from Washington. The Congo operation ten years later was the first total UN show.

The UN operation in the Congo involved military personnel from over ten nations, with considerable financial and



logistical support from the U.S. The UN also sent thousands of civilian experts to the Congo in order to fill the administrative vacuum left by the abrupt departure of the Belgian colonial power. When the UN operation wound up at the end of 1966, the Congo was a relatively peaceful country with a functioning government whose writ extended throughout the territory. The UN, of course, did not solve all of the Congo's problems, far from it. The process of economic development and institution building only began with the end of the UN stabilization operation. But the UN was able to bring the country out of chaos and place it on a path toward normality.

Over the next four decades, especially after the end of the Cold War in 1989, the UN became an increasingly important part of Africa's coming of age. There are many examples:

- Namibia: Between December 1988 and March 1990, UN military, police and civilian personnel guided Namibia's transition from seventy years of South African administration to independence.

Fifteen years later, Namibia is considered one of Africa's success stories.

- Sierra Leone: UN peacekeepers from a variety of nations, both African and non-African, brought a fragile stability to this west African nation after several years of a particularly nasty civil war between 1998 and 2002.
- Democratic Republic of the Congo: Thirty years after the end of its first operation in the Congo, the UN came back to help enforce a cease-fire that ended a long war of foreign intervention. The 12,000 blue helmet UN military constituted the largest UN peacekeeping operation anywhere in the world. As of October 2006, the UN had not only enforced the cease-fire, using lethal force from time-to-time, but supervised a successful presidential and parliamentary election.

Peacekeeping and transitions to democracy have been major activities of the United Nations in Africa. But there have been other equally important activities. The United Nations Development Program has been a key element of international development assistance to African nations. The World Health Organization has been a key actor in the wiping out of smallpox and in the fight against AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in Africa. The Food and Agriculture Organization has been important in the struggle for food security and agricultural development in Africa.

During Africa's short post-colonial history, it is clear that the UN has been a vital element in guiding the continent toward the paths of stability, development and eventual democracy. It is also clear that President Eisenhower's vision for U.S. policy toward Africa reflected a sound analysis of U.S. interests. In Africa, the United Nations has served as an excellent instrument of U.S. policy.

KEY TO GRAPHIC

UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: 1. ONUC 1960-64, MONUC 1999- (D.R. Congo); 2. UNEF II 1973-79 (Egypt, Syria & Israel); 3. UNAVEM I 1989-91, UNAVEM II 1991-95, UNAVEM III 1995-97, MONUA 1997-99 (Angola); 4. UNTAG 1989-90 (Namibia); 5. MINURSO 1991- (Western Sahara); 6. UNOSOM I 1992-93, UNOSOM II 1993-95 (Somalia); 7. UNOVER 1992-93, UNMEE 2000- (Ethiopia & Eritrea); 8. ONUMOZ 1992-94 (Mozambique); 9. UNOMUR 1993-94 (Burundi & Rwanda), UNAMIR 1993-96 (Rwanda), ONUB 2004- (Burundi); 10. UNOMIL 1993-96, UNMIL 2003- (Liberia); 11. UNASOG 1994 (Chad & Libya); 12. MINURCA 1998-2000 (Central African Republic); 13. UNOMSIL 1998-99 (Sierra Leone); 14. UNOCI 2004- (Cote d'Ivoire); 15. UNMIS 2005- (Sudan). GRAPIC: IPOA.

The author is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, and is President of Cohen & Woods International. Ambassador Cohen's column appears regularly in the Journal.

IPOA Elects New Executive Committee

ArmorGroup's Jim Schmitt Assumes Chair of IPOA from Blackwater's Chris Taylor



J. J. MESSNER

AFTER A SUCCESSFUL year, outgoing IPOA Chairman Chris Taylor of Blackwater USA seamlessly handed over the reigns of the organization to Jim Schmitt of ArmorGroup at the 2006 IPOA Annual Board Meeting. Joe Mayo of EODT was elected Deputy Chair of IPOA for 2007, and under IPOA's current system, shall assume the Chair of IPOA in 2008.

After the Board itself was enlarged to include many of the slew of new members who joined IPOA during the previous 12 months, the Executive Committee was also expanded from its current size of four

The author is the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of International Peace Operations and is the Director of Programs and Operations at IPOA.



PICTURE: IPOA
Jim Schmitt.

2007 IPOA EXECUTIVE

| | | |
|--------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| Chair | Jim Schmitt | <i>ArmorGroup</i> |
| Deputy Chair | Joe Mayo | <i>EODT</i> |
| At-Large | Bill Clontz | <i>MPRI</i> |
| | Pieter de Weerd | <i>MSS</i> |
| | Simon Falkner | <i>Hart Security</i> |
| | Judith McCallum | <i>Olive Group</i> |
| | Chris Taylor | <i>Blackwater USA</i> |

members to seven. The members of the 2007 Executive Committee were elected unopposed, and represent a cross-section of the peace and stability industry as well as being representative of both sides of the Atlantic. Besides ArmorGroup and EODT, Blackwater USA, Hart Security, Medical

Support Solutions, MPRI and Olive Group will also be represented on the Committee.

The nomination of company delegates to IPOA's 2007 Membership, Standards, Government Affairs and General Counsel Committees will take place over the coming weeks.

NGO PROFILE

Arzu: Weaving Hope

Social Entrepreneurship Venture Empowers Women in Afghanistan

SINCE EARLY 2004, Arzu has worked in Afghanistan to expand market access for Afghan women carpet weavers and strengthen their role in communities. This work has included technical and financial assistance to the women weavers, social assistance to their families, increased access to healthcare for mothers, and education and literacy programs.

Economic empowerment provides women the means to move beyond subsistence and envision a future — a significant step in stabilizing and strengthening communities in post-conflict environments.

Though crucial in the chain of making a rug, women were traditionally marginalized by others who had control over how much they got paid and how much they worked. Now the payments and work are standardized by Arzu, a Dari word meaning "hope".

Women are paid market rate for their work, plus a 50 percent bonus for each well-woven carpet. In exchange families agree to send all of their children under age 15 to



PICTURE: ARZU
Arzu seeks to empower women in Afghanistan.

school full-time, and for women in the household to attend literacy classes provided by Arzu. (Afghanistan has the highest illiteracy rate for women in the world, approximately 86 percent.)

Consistent income, access to education and healthcare services provide a foundation of stability for the women. In a number of cases, the steady income provides women greater status within households to make decisions and negotiate for their needs.

Arzu designed its program to be self-sustaining and is working to reach the "break-even point" where the proceeds from the sale of the rugs reach a level where they pay for the program in Afghanistan. A portion of sales for each rug sold is returned to Afghanistan to pay for the education and healthcare benefits for the weavers. Another portion of the sales goes directly to the weavers to pay for their work.

Currently 250 families (approximately 2,000 individuals) are enrolled in Arzu's programs in Kabul, Bamiyan and Andkhoi. In keeping with the cultural norms of the country, Arzu weavers work from home. This allows the women to take care of their children while being a wage earner as well as avoids any cultural stigma for the women for working outside of the home. As 20 percent of adult women in Afghanistan are widows, it is crucial to provide environments where their roles as mother, caregiver and breadwinner can be performed easily.

Profile contributed by Arzu.



ARZU

Founded: 2003
Head Office: Chicago, Illinois
On the Web: www.arzurugs.org
Contact: Allison Levy

Address: 541 N. Fairbanks Ct., Suite 1700
Chicago, IL 60611
Telephone: (312) 321-8665
E-mail: alevy@arzurugs.org

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Workshops & Learning Centre:

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Display & Demonstration Zones:

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- Henri Leu, President, (FSD)
- Dr Hussein, (UNESCO)
- European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO)


Demining and security moving towards sustained development

- Tim Carstairs, Mines Advisory Group
- Henri Leu, President, (FSD)
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