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Derek Wright
9 Controlling Chaos
Alberts, Christman & Dowdy
10 Achieving Interoperability
Amb. W. Robert Pearson (Ret.)
11 State’s Crisis Coordination Office
John Schafer
13 When Security Causes Harm

James “Spike” Stephenson
15 Sharing the Humanitarian Space
Mark Lonsdale
16 Enhancing the Use of Contractors
Tim Grant & James Irvine
17 Keeping Track of Actors in the Field
Charles Sitkoff
18 Staying in Touch

Special Feature.

Trafficking in Persons.
David Phinney
23 Labor Abuse: Contractors on Notice
Sylvia Ellison
25 The Letter and Spirit of Compliance

Study of Peace Ops.
Part One of a Three-Part Series.
Michael Hoffman
19 Operationalizing the IPOA Code: Closing Gaps in International Law

Letter from Baghdad.
Lawrence T. Peter
31 How Private Companies Fit In

Global Attitudes.
Ylana Gracielli
34 Brazil Expands its Peacekeeping Role

Media Watch.
J. J. Messner
35 From One Extreme to the Other

Profiles.
IPOA Member Profile
5 MPRI

Industry News.
IPOA Lion
5 News from IPOA

Debate.
AFRICOM.
General Scott Gration (Ret.)
27 A Bright Future for Africa
Ian Parker
28 Opportunities and Challenges
Stephen E. Henthorne
29 Great American Hope for Africa?

Government Affairs.
Iveta Cherneva
30 U.S. Congress Focus on Contractors

Columnists.
Doug Brooks
4 Is Anybody Listening?
J. J. Messner
32 What’s it Worth to You?
Amb. Herman Cohen
33 Yar’Adua Emerges from Obasanjo’s Shadow

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Do not hallucinate.

The author is the President of IPOA.

**Doug Brooks**

Is Anybody Listening?

In the Search for a Spicy Story, the Good Job Being Done by Contractors is Ignored

I

ALWAYS make the statement to journalists who contact IPOA that it is due to innovative utilization of the private sector that coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are the best supported, best supplied military operations in history.

For the first time in the history of warfare, soldiers are at risk of becoming overweight in the field due to large quantities of food, good living conditions and having many non-mission related tasks handled for them. Obviously even this kind of support cannot guarantee success in such complex political missions, but when we evaluate the past four years to see what worked and what did not, the private sector showed amazing capability, capacity and robustness in the face of unprecedented dangers and, especially, casualties.

Unfortunately, the press by their very nature tends to be seeking a “big lie” not a “big truth,” so no one has yet denied — or published — my statement. Writing this story might not be a career-enhancing exercise, as it would fly in the face of the dominant media’s widely accepted canard of private sector breakdown. The actual achievements of the private sector would certainly be astonishing news to the general public and the U.S. Congress who have been served a lopsided diet of failures and problems. There is a ‘big story’ out there that needs to be told.

There are excellent journalists writing superb stories under incredibly difficult conditions and IPOA always does its best to support their work with information and contacts. We make a point to respond to everyone no matter their background or perspective. Nor do we take issue with the coverage of problems and setbacks — indeed, negative coverage helps our Association isolate key problems we need to address proactively. What has been problematic is when the larger story, that this is the best supported, best supplied military operation in history, is completely ignored in the rush to focus on the ‘spicier’ morsels. So, in this issue of the Journal we inaugurate a ‘Media Watch’ column to try to offer a constructive perspective on the Fourth Estate. While we intend to highlight some of the more egregious examples of journalists missing the point, we also hope to use it to support those that make the effort to ensure balance.

The focus of this Journal issue is coordination during international peace and stability operations, an unimaginably complex task given the vast numbers of entities operating in these operations — governmental, non-governmental, military, private sector, local authorities and others.

All these actors have their own goals, motivations, capacities, biases and interests, all of which could be helped by coordination and cooperation. In my own academic research in Sierra Leone in 2000, I learned that a number of organizations had official policies that kept them from working or even communicating with the other key actors operating in the theatre. Nevertheless, informal networks allowed organizations to exchange key information while avoiding any overt connections. Every evening in pubs and at private parties, people in military uniforms, blue jeans and sandals mingled freely and traded information and ideas. This kind of informal coordination is not uncommon, and can be extremely helpful, but much more can be done to create a formalized process or template that could be quickly instituted in future peace and stability operations. A formalized process would benefit the efforts of all the key actors — governmental, military, nonprofit and private.

While IPOA is a truly international organization comprising member companies from all over the world, one of the reasons we are based in Washington, D.C. is because it is the source of so much international policy and funding. U.S. Congressional legislation matters not just to the U.S. half of our Association, but often affects all of our companies providing services around the world. There is quite a bit of legislation coming down the pipe and most of it is driven by events in Iraq, for better or worse. While we welcome laws that clarify the private sector role and issues of transparency and accountability, at the same time IPOA is working with Congress to ensure that new rules and regulations do not inadvertently handicap the private sector’s ability to support international humanitarian operations in the future.

In the past month, IPOA sponsored a phenomenally successful forum on the serious issue of trafficking in persons. With the support of the U.S. Departments of Defense, Justice and State, as well as support from the academic community, the forum covered a broad range of issues on this critical point. One of the more interesting ideas to come from the exchange was how important the issue could be, not just from an ethical perspective, but from a commercial perspective as well. Sam McCahon, Vice-President and General Counsel of Agility, gave a particularly interesting presentation that highlighted the value a company gains by cracking down on labor brokers demanding illegal payments from potential hires. David Phinney has been more proactive than most journalists in covering the industry, and was kind enough to allow us to reprint his article on IPOA’s trafficking forum in this issue. We are looking forward to a follow up event in the future.

Finally, I would like to highlight IPOA’s upcoming Summit at the end of October. I often point out that one never meets anyone boring in this industry, and our annual IPOA gatherings certainly prove this axiom. As well as being quite enjoyable, these events showcase extremely relevant speakers and panelists offering ideas to enhance industry performance, as well as opportunities to network, share best practices and exchange ideas. More information on the IPOA Summit is available online at www.ipoaonline.org/conference07.

Email Doug Brooks at dbrooks@ipoaonline.org

The author is the President of IPOA.
IPOA Holds Second Annual Standards Simulation

Standards Committee, NGOs and Academics Meet to Test IPOA Code of Conduct

The IPOA Standards Committee held its second annual Standards Simulation on July 18th. The Committee was faced with four fictitious scenarios covering topics such as labor issues, third country nationals, rules for the use of force, and the use of underage employees.

The Simulation was observed by a number of industry stakeholders, including representatives from academia, NGOs, nonprofit organizations and the U.S. Government. The panel of observers provided great insight, and the Standards Committee will examine many of the key issues brought up by the observers when it next meets in September.

IPOA would like to thank Bill Clontz, Hank Allen, Jim Schmitt, Joe Mayo, Mel Smith and Tom Johnson for their active participation on behalf of the Committee. Thank you also to IPOA Associates, Ylana Gracielli, for putting together the scenarios and organizing the Simulation, and Jennifer Brooke, for assisting with the set-up of the event.

IPOA wishes to thank the Henry L. Stimson Center for providing an excellent venue for the event, and we look forward to a fruitful partnership between the Standards Committee and the Stimson Center that will continue in future years.

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The author is Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of International Peace Operations and is Director of Programs and Operations at IPOA.

International Peace Operations Association Member Profile

MPRI

An Industry Leader Operating in 40 Countries Worldwide

Headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia, MPRI provides comprehensive and integrated programs that address training, education, leader development, organizational design and implementation, simulations, democracy transition, and emergency management across a broad spectrum of functional areas. Its customers include the Department of Defense, Department of Justice and selected international government agencies.

With a vast array of experienced national security, defense, law enforcement, and international development veterans, MPRI is able to combine proven methodologies with dedicated personnel to accomplish a wide range of missions. The two most prominent missions today are underway in Iraq and Afghanistan, where MPRI has proudly partnered with Coalition forces to train security services and American forces in those countries as they grapple with terrorism and insurgency.

Institutional capacity-building is just one of many areas where methods and people synergize to leave MPRI’s customers better off than they were before. By expanding capacity and improving capability in various agencies, MPRI’s training is ensured to have long-lasting global impact. The firm operates in over 40 countries at any one time, demonstrating that when the private sector partners with the public to accomplish objectives, great things are possible. From the Balkans to the Middle East, from Nigeria to Korea, MPRI has established its reputation as a reliable industry leader.

MPRI Facts and Figures

Founded: 1987
IPOA Member Since: 2003
Head Office: Alexandria, Virginia
Web site: www.mpri.com
PRIVATE Contractors, due to their strategic position in conflict zones can do much to prevent trafficking in persons, raise awareness and when necessary, report and assist in investigations. Trafficking in persons is a reprehensible crime that violates the dignity, health and life of human beings. It is a modern form of slavery that must be combated. Conflict areas are characterized by a lack of rule of law and poverty. As traffickers prey on the most vulnerable groups in a society, individuals in conflict zones are much more likely to fall victims to traffickers. Victims of trafficking in persons are often women and children who are deceived, forced, coerced, beaten, degraded, humiliated, raped and often murdered.

Under the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs), companies are already under the obligation to report crimes to the contacting officer. As of August 2007, the FARs also include a subsection on Combating Trafficking in Persons, applying to all companies contracting with all the U.S. government agencies. Contractors will be required to develop policy to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons, the procurement of commercial sex acts and use of forced labor. Among others, that policy includes a provision for awareness programs.

Understanding this ground swell, IPOA conducted a training seminar, “Combating Trafficking in Persons: FAR Compliance Training” for Government Contractors on July 17, 2007. The event took place with the participation of the Department of Defense, Department of Justice and Department of State. Honorary guest speakers were Presidential Candidate Sen. Sam Brownback (R-KS) and Rep. Christopher Smith (R-New Jersey), both of whom have been key Congressional leaders on the issue, as well as the main sponsors of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. Both underlined the importance of companies in fighting trafficking in persons. As Rep. Smith put it, “IPOA is in a strategic position to protect current and potential victims from this cruel trade. It is clear that government and contractors alike have to fight in a way that is smart, compassionate, comprehensive and well-coordinated.”

The seminar was divided into three modules: the grave problem of human trafficking, the relevant laws and regulations, and the compliance policy that companies contracting with the U.S. Government are required to develop under the FARs. Companies provided examples of their own policies and raised emerging issues they have to address, such as illegal payments to labor brokers.

The Keynote Speaker at the event, Col. Jake Hansen, Director of the Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA) Combat Support Center with the Department of Defense, opened the training focusing on his experience dealing with labor trafficking as DCMA’s Commander in Iraq during 2005 and 2006. Martina Vandenberg, an attorney at Jenner and Block LLP, a key legal expert who has testified before Congress on trafficking issues and an aid to numerous companies in their FAR compliance legal policy, followed Colonel Hansen. Vandenberg provided an outline of the sex trafficking cases and the FAR clauses.

Laura Lederer, Senior Advisor to Under Secretary of State Dobriansky, reiterated the point that contractors are an indispensable part of the solution to the problem of trafficking in persons and commended the IPOA training initiative for being ‘groundbreaking.’

Mr. Robert Reed, Esq., Deputy General Counsel at the Department of Defense outlined the jurisdiction aspect with regard to criminal prosecution of human trafficking related crimes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He was followed by Andrew J. Kline, main prosecutor at the Department of Justice who explained criminal prosecution of trafficking crimes under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. Other speakers included various government representatives, lawyers, academics and IPOA member company representatives.

Sam McCalon, Vice President and General Counsel of Agility concluded the event with an outline of the proactive FAR compliance policy Agility has developed with regard to top-tier contract policy and policy towards sub-contractors.

Over 60 individuals, including media, as well as senior management from nine IPOA member companies, attended the seminar. Senator Barack Obama (D-Illinois) also sent IPOA a letter of support for the training program. After the event, Rep. Chris Smith issued a press release thanking IPOA for the initiative and its ‘deep commitment to combating human trafficking.’ “Today’s compliance training is not just about how to follow the letter of the law, but the spirit as well,” Rep. Smith concluded.
IPOA Accepts Six More Member Companies
New Companies from South Africa, United Arab Emirates and the United States

IPOA is pleased to welcome six new member companies to the Association: Compliance & Security Advisory Services, Gold Coast Helicopters, International Armored Group, Paxton International, Scott Insurance, and Total Intelligence Solutions. The addition of these new companies brings our membership total to 41, another record-breaking number of IPOA members, and tangible evidence of our Association’s ability to continue to attract companies from a wide variety of countries and specialties.

Compliance & Security Services Pty. Ltd. (CSAS) is a fully registered and certified South African labor brokerage and armaments manufacturer and seller. CSAS seeks to supply compliant private sector partners and international organizations with the people and tools necessary to enhance international peace and stability.

Gold Coast Helicopters (GCH) is a privately held global provider of aircraft operations and aviation support services, principally to government entities and civil customers. Based out of Glendale, Arizona, GCH offers turnkey rotary wing solutions worldwide to include passenger and cargo movement, air surveillance, and external load operations. GCH is experienced at operating in hostile environments and under austere conditions. Additional services include aircraft (fixed and rotary wing) maintenance, air terminal operations, airfield management and consulting services.

International Armored Group (IAG) is a manufacturer of custom armored vehicles and armor conversions for standard and executive-type vehicles. With a ten year track record of experience and excellence, IAG’s primary clients are governments (military & Embassies) and private security companies. IAG services Iraq and Afghanistan from their 45,000 sq.f.t. United Arab Emirates facility.

Paxton International is an international relocation company and freight forwarder specializing in the movement of cargo and personal effects shipments into the developing world and emerging markets by land, air and sea. Based in Virginia, Paxton International provides door-to-door transportation solutions for U.S. and non-U.S. Government agencies, the Department of Defense and the Department of State, USAID contractors, NGOs, and others.

Scott Insurance is committed to a full range of risk management offerings backed by a team of service professionals that is second-to-none. Scott’s unique combination of experience and expertise has helped build strong relationships with the world’s leading agency partners and insurers in order to provide customers with the best the industry has to offer. The depth, integrity and longevity of these partnerships have fostered a degree of trust that facilitates Scott’s access to the best coverage on behalf of their clients.

Total Intelligence Solutions LLC has evolved intelligence gathering and analysis. Based in the Washington, D.C. metro area, Total Intel brings together the experience and collective knowledge of three well-established intelligence and security organizations -- The Black Group, Terrorism Research Center, Inc., and Technical Defense - to provide clients with the only comprehensive and complete solution for private intelligence and security needs.

IPOA would also like to announce that one of its longest-standing members, Security Support Solutions (3S), has been purchased by The O’Gara Group. The acquisition of 3S returns the founders of The O’Gara Group to the armored vehicle market after a five-year absence. 3S will be part of The O’Gara Group’s newly formed Mobile Security Division.
Conference topics:

- Improving the Afterwar: Innovative Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
- Personnel Safety and Security in the Field: Safety in a Hostile Environment
- The PRT Model: Ongoing Lessons in Coordination
- Controlled Chaos: Challenges of Post-Conflict and Post-Disaster Logistics

Keynote Speaker:

Michael O’Hanlon  
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies  
The Brookings Institution

Conflict, post-conflict and disaster zones present many challenges, not only among parties to a conflict but also among those attempting to rebuild and engage in such vital tasks as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, development, reconstruction and stabilization, and others. IPOA has identified the five major stakeholders operating in the field in post-conflict zones: host governments, foreign governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector.

Unfortunately, the presence of so many actors often leads to inefficiencies such as duplication of effort, competition for resources and access, and blue-on-white concerns. With panel discussions, workshops, and keynote speakers, this conference will focus on:

- bringing together high-level representatives from these stakeholders
- exploring lessons from past and ongoing experiences
- improving coordination on the ground
- helping participants explore ways in which the private sector can facilitate these goals
- using the capabilities of the private sector, including rapidly available expertise and well-trained personnel
- increasing the efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and speed of response of peace and stability operations

Space is limited, so be sure to book soon!
Due to their very nature, conflict, post-conflict, and post-disaster environments are among the most complex and dangerous in the world. Inevitably, rule of law and governmental control are greatly reduced, security needs are overwhelming, commerce is slowed to a crawl and civil society begins to disintegrate.

Adding to the confusion and complexity of these environments is the diverse gathering of actors that assemble (often of their own volition) in theater to help establish or bring a return to peace and stability.

These actors are comprised of representatives from five distinct groups:

1. International Institutions and Organizations such as the African Union, International Committee of the Red Cross, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations and others;
2. Foreign Governmental Institutions and Organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and their various counterparts in the British, Canadian, French, German, Japanese, and other governments around the world;
3. Field-based humanitarian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as CARE, Doctors of the World, Save the Children, International Rescue Committee and others;
4. Host Country Governments such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Iraq, the Sudan, and others; and,
5. The private peace and stability operations industry, comprised of IPOA member companies and other for-profit firms that specialize in operating in peace, stability, and disaster relief operations around the world.

Ostensibly, each of these five stakeholding groups has the same goals; the cessation of hostilities, the reestablishment of governmental control and the successful transition from a state of violence and instability to a contributing partner in the world political economy. That the means and methods used by these groups are not uniform, however, creates a field reality that is often wracked by a great deal of suspicion, wariness and discomfort between and amongst the various groups.

Instead of working together, the five groups have sometimes ignored or, worse, undermined each other’s efforts in the field. In so doing, actors that are supposed to be working for the betterment of insecure and unstable communities are instead contributing to incidents of institutional bias, mistrust, duplication of effort, fratricide (including instances of friendly fire between international forces and private security details), unprofessional and irresponsible behavior, waste and so on.

Although the ramifications of this behavior are difficult to qualify, one can plainly see that something must be done to address the need for greater interaction between these actors in the field. Failing to do so will mean that at-risk communities will continue to suffer because their self-appointed rescuers are too busy bickering with each other to adequately focus on the tasks at hand.

A viable first step toward a solution to this problem is for representatives from each of these stability and peace-building communities to openly and practically conference about the challenges they are facing. An attempt must be made to establish mechanisms through which greater communication, cooperation and coordination is ensured in the field. Simply having the opportunity to meet and get to know the ‘other’ will go a long way towards creating the levels of trust and understanding necessary for these communities to effectively work with one another in the field toward their common goals.

The next step may be the significant expansion of civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) in conflict, post-conflict, and post-disaster environments. Defined by the Department of Defense as “the meeting place between military forces, U.S. Government agencies, civilian authorities, involved international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations and the population,” CMOCs have been embraced in joint doctrine as essential tools in the effort to terminate conflict and rebuild unstable communities.

Although CMOCs have been in use for over 20 years and already enjoy a high level of participation from most relevant parties, the targeted expansion of these centers could significantly contribute to the ability of the five groups of stake-holders identified in this article to improve communication, cooperation, and coordination in the field. Secure facilities with adequate meeting space, contact information, maps, Internet access, liaison officers and other network-building tools will offer peace builders unprecedented opportunities to improve their ability to collaborate and meet the dynamic challenges they face in the field.

Experience, research, and anecdotal evidence suggests that getting these disparate groups to trust, rely on, and work with one another is not going to be an easy task. Their differences in belief, practice and method are well documented, and may seem impossible to overcome. However, by recognizing their common goals and by taking time to actually learn from and understand one another, actors working in the fields of peace, stability and disaster relief can and will be able to end human suffering caused by conflict and natural disaster faster, better and more cost effectively than ever before.

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Achieving Interoperability: Information Sharing via DoD’s Extranet in Stability Operations

In recent months, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has approved major changes in policy with regard to Stability Operations. Such operations are now a core U.S. military mission with resourcing and planning priority equal to combat operations. All of the DoD's subordinate services, commands and agencies will need to explicitly address activities including doctrine, organization, training, education, exercises, materiel (programs), leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. Key policies influencing support for stability operations - from both the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD-NII) and the U.S. Government as a whole - should be of particular interest for the peace and stability operations industry.

While it has always been in the interest of the DoD to work closely with other actors including U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and private sector individuals and for-profit companies (private sector), the functional area of information sharing is often seen by many as a one-way street, with information flowing into the DoD without much "return on investment" to the contributors in the form of usable intelligence. The emerging information-sharing framework supporting stability operations will seek to bridge the civil-military boundary for improving cooperation and coordination while maintaining adequate information security capabilities.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Security, Stabilization, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations is the document that defines the policy and responsibilities for DoD activities that support the overarching U.S. Government plans for SSTR. It clearly states that while many of the stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign or U.S. civilian professionals, the U.S. military "shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so." Three critical tasks for ASD-NII in support of DoD Directive 3000.05 include:

- ensuring effective information exchange and communications among DoD components and the non-DoD players mentioned earlier;
- developing processes that shorten the acquisition period for communications capabilities in coordination with the Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and
- Assisting the Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in nominating science and technologies that support stability operations into rapid demonstration, experimentation, and fielding.

The recently signed DoD Information Sharing Strategy is promoting and encouraging information sharing with non-traditional partners, especially when responding together to Crisis Response Operations and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations. Pushing effective time-critical information exchange and communications out to the edge is vital to the success of integrating civilian and military efforts within these types of operations. However, as with all major changes, implementation faces many hurdles, especially from the less technical aspects of governance, policy, education, social networking, trust and resourcing. The ability to accommodate unanticipated partners and events places a heavy burden on the security domain, especially as the DoD seeks to establish trusted relationships taking into consideration the mission's environment and situation. As the DoD moves from a "need-to-know" security model to one that more openly shares with mission partners, the tools for developing situational awareness that support decision makers must now be able to be shared across multiple security domains. These tools must include unanticipated partners that either use the Internet for information sharing and/or are "offline" for extended periods.

ASD-NII is actively engaged with other DoD and Federal agencies and research laboratories, as well as academia and the private sector to evaluate information and communications technologies (ICT) that have high potential for supporting the DoD's engagement with non-DoD entities. Among these are tools that provide the capabilities for:

- content indexing (e.g. meta-data tagging) for increasing the discoverability of data;
- RSS & Geo-RSS feeds for moving and displaying content that facilitates building a user-defined common operational picture and mitigates the need for logging into multiple portals;
- collaborative authoring (e.g. wikis, blogs) for building and disseminating shared knowledge;
- image annotation that allows for free-form comments and mark-up (without being an imagery specialist);
- subscription based notifications;
- multi-lingual chat; and
- content creation that combines several of the other capabilities (e.g. uploading an image that is keyword tagged and georeferenced that can be sent automatically to a subscriber that has specified content relevant to their particular mission).

While these policies represent a strategic change in information sharing openness between DoD and non-DoD players in the stability operations community, it is only the beginning.

The supporting implementation plans are currently in development, and the devil is in the details. Changes to doctrine and operational concepts are laborious processes that traditionally have not been rushed. More importantly, public law may also need to be addressed and be de-conflicted along commercial sector lines of responsibility prior to attempting military doctrinal changes. While that takes place, the DoD will move in parallel to promote an expanded information sharing community that increases operational effectiveness. The DoD is looking to actively partner with members of the peace and stability operations industry to make these goals a reality.

After all, with the peace and stability operations industry enabled through information to perform its function, the military has a higher probability of success in stability operations, a greater chance that lives can be saved and property damage mitigated to the greatest extent possible.

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In 2003, global attention focused on U.S. stabilization roles in two key fragile states. In Iraq, it was apparent that the U.S. had no post-conflict plan ready to implement. The civil administration began with a quarrel between Washington and General Jay Garner, the dismissal of Garner, and the arrival of Paul Bremer to head the CPA. In Afghanistan, NATO began operations in Kabul, its first ever deployment outside Europe. While the move was applauded, in reality it was a coalition of the willing inside NATO, as the U.S. and its allies made individual decisions about the effort. Clearly, the U.S. was entering onto a new phase of experimentation in managing international crises, despite its long experience in dealing with such challenges.

That summer I left my post as U.S. ambassador in Ankara for a new assignment as director general of the Foreign Service in Washington, working for Secretary of State Colin Powell, whom I had known since 1986. I had served also at NATO during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s and at the National Security Council during the Central American conflicts of the mid-1980s. I had witnessed the debacle in Somalia in 1993, and the break downs in Haiti. I was determined to offer something new to give the United States a better set of tools for crisis management in foreign affairs.

In the fall of 2003, I organized a team of State Department officers to write a proposal for an effective civilian military post conflict reconstruction effort led by the State Department. There was no lack of obstacles. The State Department focused more on reporting, analysis and advice than on running programs. There were other major players, chiefly USAID, and the U.S. military, with impressive capabilities and which could be jealous of a new participant. Nevertheless, the State Department had important assets: a cadre of officers with excellent crisis management skills developed in Africa, Central America, the Andean drug campaigns, the Balkans, and even in two prominent failures, Haiti and Somalia. Moreover, Foreign Service officers for decades had worked in difficult posts and dangerous countries. Finally, it was clear that diplomacy was changing permanently, that whatever the outcomes of Afghanistan and Iraq, the State Department would be much more involved in the practical details of stability and reconstruction.

Just before Christmas in 2003, I presented a memorandum to Secretary Powell and the State Department’s Under Secretary for Management, Grant Green, to read over the holidays. Green returned the paper with Powell’s one-word reaction: “Go!” The National Security Council was working on a similar effort, focused on improving the police function of the reconstruction process. We convinced the White House that our approach would strengthen its initiative. The final product was approved at a National Security Council meeting in April 2004 chaired by Dr. Condoleezza Rice and attended by both Secretary Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The new office would be called S/CRS – Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization — reporting directly to the Secretary of State. Remarkably, the proposal reached agreement without any substantive objection.

What we envisioned was an organization to add value to current efforts, but not a substitute for existing roles. There were two general scenarios: with and without combat troops. When combat troops were engaged, there was a difficult transition to major civilian recovery efforts. Even without a combat factor, coordination of civilian relief efforts always was complicated at the beginning. S/CRS was to fill that early gap, to coordinate the military to civilian handover and to kick start complicated civilian recoveries. Either way, the Coordinator was to work closely with the respective State Department offices and with the other key national security agencies, with the relevant UN agencies, and with major NGOs to coordinate this part of the reconstruction. With a small staff, S/CRS did not threaten anyone. By simply existing, it would stimulate better preparation by all players and play a central role in developing recovery strategies.

The organization of S/CRS was to be flexible and rapidly expandable, depending on the scope of the crisis. In the center would be the core staff of S/CRS around the Coordinator, a small number of experts in...
crisis management, liaison officers (in some cases people seconded from other departments to the State Department), a few subject matter experts and functional experts (management). This group would be the “peacetime” complement, responsible for overseeing the necessary planning, training programs and budget preparations. Around this core staff would be additional pre-identified State Department experts from every geographic area, subject to immediate deployment. These non-core personnel would not normally work in S/CRS but would continue to do their assignments at the State Department, receiving additional training and playing in interagency gaming. The third circle of experts was the civil servants in all the other departments, also pre-identified, trained, and on call, but working in their own departments prior to call up.

This combination ensured that all government personnel relevant to crisis management response across the full spectrum of events overseas could be identified, trained and prepared in advance. The Coordinator would oversee the key interaction with military personnel both in Washington and in the field, working with regional commanders and State Department and agency leaders. The Coordinator would be a key interface with the UN, NGOs and financial institutions. S/CRS could request the Secretary of State to trigger the interagency process for any needed policy or operational issue.

S/CRS planned to reach out to skilled Americans outside the government able to help rebuild shattered states. It would identify these experts and ensure their readiness for any deployment. It could draw on the excellent experience of USAID, of NGOs, and in 2004 the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office. Finally, the State Department’s expanded employment history for a large percentage of its personnel, both civil service and foreign service, was a model to select those with the necessary skills from any population group, inside or outside the U.S. Government.

Secretary Powell wanted a contingency fund of about $200 million to allow S/CRS to react promptly with all its assets in case of need. Senators Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) and Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) strongly supported this fund, but the U.S. Office of Management and Budget repeatedly refused to include the request in the Administration budget. In the end, the Administration was content to live with the promise rather than the reality of a truly serious international reconstruction effort led by the U.S.

This shortfall forced S/CRS from the beginning to fight for both personnel and operating resources, limiting its intended purpose and focusing it on short-term survival tactics. Looking for a reason to prove its worth, S/CRS became involved in rebuilding efforts in Haiti and then in Sudan at the Department’s direction. These moves, though worthy on their merits, still detracted from the office’s original aims and roused the jealousy of USAID, now fearing that S/CRS might be intended to be a State Department ploy to replace USAID’s core mission. The commitment to training, gaming and overall widespread preparation for responding to overseas emergencies on a serious scale suffered badly. The result was a loss of focus on S/CRS’s original scope and purpose.

There is still a vital need for the kind of function S/CRS provides. We can be sure that new crises will require American leadership in broken states. We have the choice of better preparation, as S/CRS could provide, or we face again a costly process having to make up new mechanisms as crises occur. I am audacious enough to believe that while it is too late for the deployment of a robust S/CRS in this administration, the next president will be prepared to provide the resources required.
When the Security Profile Causes Harm
Three Components of Security

W

e find that there are key differences in the way that many private security companies execute their security strategy in comparison to most NGOs. Most frequently, we find that NGOs live amongst the people and employ a strategy attempting to balance the three components of security - Deterrence, Protection and Acceptance - as demonstrated in the graphic depicted to the right:

Acceptance Reduce or remove the threat by gaining widespread acceptance for one’s presence and work within the local community.

Deterrence Reduce the risk by containing and deterring the threat with a counter-threat.

Protection Reduce the risk, but not the threat, by making oneself less vulnerable with protective procedures and protective devices.

Each component of security cannot be utilized in exclusivity. In practice, a blend of the three components must be employed in the context of the operational areas, and should never consistently rely solely on one or two of the components.

However, most private security companies turn their compounds into fortresses with heavily armed personnel lining the outside of the facility. This shows the unbalanced and unfriendly PSC reliance on the components Deterrence and Protection components, and abandonment of the Acceptance component. Therefore, private security companies forsake the holistic balanced security profile and strategy, while alienating the NGOs, local society and community they are working in.

This fragmented effort (or profile of heavy reliance on just two of the three components) serves only the interests of those that the private security companies are hired to protect, not the interests of the community as a whole.

‘Do No Harm’
Security as a concept addresses all aspects of public safety - particularly the establishment of a safe and secure environment – emphasizing the primary concept of ‘do no harm.’ Security also encompasses the provision of collective and individual security to all citizens of a community. In conflict situations, Carl von Clausewitz proposes “… [Security] must be guided by a ‘moral power’… [and] have a greater affinity for the spirit of a corporate body than for anything else, protecting all citizens from violence.” [1] Therefore, each organization - humanitarian, private security companies, military – must have a primary goal of ‘do no harm’ to the community they are working in, as they employ their various security strategies. They must employ a balanced approach of all three components of security: Acceptance, Deterrence and Protection. If not, the effect - as in the anecdote above – of an unbalanced, fragmented effort solely relying on Protection and Deterrence will cause harm.

During the last decade, the amount of humanitarian and private security personnel working in conflict zones has increased exponentially. Both groups employ security components differently.

The end goal of both operations is to provide a stable platform for the indigenous peoples with whom they are working with temporarily. It must be the collective goal of each, whether a coalition, government/private partnerships or humanitarian effort, to enhance the livelihood of the struggling community. In the anecdote cited at the beginning, the question that remains to be answered is: Why was the private security company compound targeted, and not the UN or NGOs on the same street? Could it be that the other two groups established a better platform of Acceptance?
The Profile Problem

Just as the absence of conflict is not peace, the unbalanced reliance of protection and deterrence components alone, does not encompass security.

Later in 2006, riots ensued after a U.S. military truck lost its brakes and killed many Kabul residents. Afghans protested the attitudes and presence of the United States. A memo issued to all military personnel shortly after the event emphasized the importance of the Acceptance component, and how it related to the entire community:

“If your convoy or vehicle cuts off local vehicles, forces them off the road or out of a lane, leaves adults and children in a big cloud of dust, does not allow pedestrians to cross the road or makes people jump out of the way, you are effectively giving ammunition to the enemy. The disciplined use of weapons, in part means that you know when and where to point your weapon. If the gunners in your convoys do not understand this concept, I need you to get into the process and explain what constitutes a threat.” [2]

After the rioting, NGO contacts in Kabul noted that Afghans did not like the way that the private security teams aggressively drove their vehicles, did not like being treated as sub-humans, and most of all, did not like weapons constantly being pointed at them. It was suggested that these were reasons for the riots. Other western NGOs have also noted that they have received similar treatment from private security companies, while driving in plainly marked NGO vehicles and walking by private security details.

When such an aggressive approach to the Deterrence component causes harm to the entire community, and an individual security effort becomes a greater priority than the group security effort, we find that the community as a whole loses out. All efforts to provide security begin to undercut each component, rendering them redundant. Problems will continually arise when preferred security strategies fail to match the threats in the environment. If there is not a threat of force, there is no need for a counter-force threat.

Efforts of private security companies operating in all regions should understand that their security profile needs to address all aspects of public safety, particularly the primary establishment of a safe and secure environment that ‘does no harm.’

ENDNOTES

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Sharing the Humanitarian Space
Finding Balance Between the Military, NGOs and the Private Sector

IN T R A N A T I O N A L assistance — in the context of aid to countries engaged in war, emerging from war, or victims of natural or man-made disaster — has antecedents in what is often referred to generically as “foreign aid.” But conflict, post-conflict and humanitarian relief differ greatly from foreign aid in their urgency, demands on donors and recipients, methodology, and risks.

Prior to 2001, assistance in the midst of conflict — war, civil war and insurgency — was primarily undertaken by non-governmental humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, CARE and others, all generally viewed by combatants and noncombatants as neutral and, therefore, not legitimate targets of violence. This umbrella of “humanitarian space” generally protected other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and contractors working for donors to implement assistance programs. This protection evaporated in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as insurgents targeted anyone perceived antithetical to their interests, that is, anyone attempting to mitigate the chaos upon which insurgency thrives. It remains to be seen if this new paradigm will be exported to other conflicts, but the trend is not encouraging. Moreover, Afghanistan and Iraq pushed to the fore a major purveyor of international assistance whose role had hitherto been marginal — the U.S. military.

Prior to the 2001 war in Afghanistan, the Pentagon was adament that it did not engage in nation building, but relied on the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other civilian agencies to perform that function. However, U.S. and allied forces dismantled or ejected the Taliban so quickly that the civilian entities normally responsible for post-conflict assistance were unable to rapidly provide either the personnel or monetary assistance on the scale required. Consequently, the Pentagon jettisoned its aversion to nation building. In the subsequent planning for the Iraq war, it intended to lead the post-war efforts at stabilization and reconstruction, irrespective of any capacity to do so. USAID, other civilian agencies and their implementing partners — NGOs and contractors — suddenly found themselves under the aegis of the Department of Defense and its creation, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Concurrently, maneuver commanders and subordinates were given substantial funding under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities identical to those therefore carried out by civilian NGOs and contractors. In Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), mixed military-civilian units commanded by military officers and overwhelmingly staffed by armed soldiers, became the face of reconstruction in the provinces. In 2005, the PRT concept was replicated in Iraq.

The Pentagon’s experiment with nation building has not been a success. The CPA turned over its responsibilities to the State Department after fifteen months, and PRTs are expedient hybrids that require a relatively permissive security environment to be effective. Still, faced with virulent insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pentagon realized that it needed to dust off its counterinsurgency doctrine and place major emphasis on the political and social components of counterinsurgency. DoD Directive 3000.05 raised non-lethal combat operations to the same level of importance as lethal combat operations — replacing the doors is just as important as kicking them down. The directive states a preference for relying upon civilian agencies for stabilization and reconstruction, but is emphatic that the military must be trained and prepared to step in when civilian agencies are unwilling or unable to perform.

The NGOs and private contractors who have been the traditional implementers of foreign assistance are for the most part extremely uncomfortable with the new role of the military. Nevertheless, the trend is greater involvement of the military, particularly in humanitarian crises where its logistics capability dwarfs that of NGOs — witness the 2003 Asian Tsunami and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. After wrestling for six years with the conundrum of how NGOs interact in this new reality, InterAction, a coalition of NGOs that carry out foreign assistance, recently signed with DoD guidelines for relations between the U.S. armed forces and non-governmental humanitarian organizations in hostile or potentially hostile environments. The guidelines recognize the need for communication and coordination, but essentially endeavor to distinguish and distance NGOs from the military.

Civilian agencies are also struggling to adapt to the new reality. USAID now has an office of military affairs and is placing senior advisors in each of the major U.S. combat commands to facilitate communication, coordination and planning. The State Department’s coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization, tasked by the President to lead all such government efforts, attempts to keep up with DoD, in spite of the disparity in human and fiscal resources. It is something of a recent phenomenon, born of the Afghanistan and Iraq experience and the supposition that, for the foreseeable future, diplomats in hostile environments will be riding in Humvees, and soldiers will be doing much of the work of diplomats.

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s pursuit of “transformational diplomacy,” combined with the subsuming of USAID’s substantive functions into the State Department, is further cause for angst among NGOs and contractors who find themselves branded as the cutting edge of aggressive, highly politicized foreign policy. The March 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, a pact between the UN, multilateral lending institutions, developed and developing countries, and international organizations, seeks to harmonize and align the delivery of all categories of aid. The signatories, including the United States, pledge to coordinate and harmonize foreign assistance with recipients’ national development strategies. It is difficult to see precisely how the sometimes narrow imperatives of U.S. foreign policy will shoe horn into the Paris Declaration’s imperatives, particularly when the U.S. military is a prime deliverer of foreign assistance. If American NGOs and contractors are wary of military involvement in foreign assistance, allied donors and their implementers may be apoplectic.

The characterization of the global struggle against terrorism as “the long war” is valid, and there is little doubt that the military and developmental components of that struggle must be coordinated. However, even the military agrees that the struggle is not primarily a martial effort. The challenge for the donor community and the NGOs and contractors who are partners in the struggle is to be heard—not herded.

BACKGROUND: U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

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Enhancing the Military’s Use of Private Contractors

Improvements to Doctrine and Operating Procedures Urgently Required

As evidenced by the types of contracts being funded and awarded by the Department of Defense (DoD) in Iraq and Afghanistan, many mission critical services are being outsourced to civilian contractors.

These essential security, stabilization, reconstruction, and security sector reform services were traditionally handled by the military but with the current lean force structure of the U.S. military, and its primary focus on those tasks directly related to war-fighting, the civilian contractor has become an essential component of Phase IV operations.

Private security companies are being tasked as convoy escort teams, protective security details, close protection for key commanders and political figures, static security for military and governmental installations, mine and ordnance clearance, police and military mentoring and training, and intelligence collection, collation, and distribution as it pertains to the above operations.

It was envisioned that these functions would be handled in a permissive post-conflict environment, but the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have necessitated that contractors increase their supplies of arms and armor to operate in the battle space alongside the military.

This has created a situation where combatant commanders and U.S. troops are required to interface with armed contractors on a daily basis. Unfortunately, very few mechanisms are in place to facilitate this relationship between military and the security providers. Ground commanders are consistently confronted with numbers of issues, including where contractors fall into the chain of command, communication, tracking movements, standard operating procedures, rules for the use of force, weapons, identification and third country nationals and local nationals.

U.S. Commanders run into complex issues when strategically planning, as contractors do not show up on the Blue Force Tracker system, a computer system that allows the American military to locate all of its vehicles and personnel using tracking chips in order to reduce friendly fire. Moreover, U.S. tactical operations centers are not always notified of convoy escort teams and private security movements. U.S. Commanders run into similar problems of not being notified when convoy escort teams or private security details are operating in their area of operations, which lead to problems mounting quick reaction forces or casualty evacuations. Finally, the use of armed Iraqis as security guards has created operational security issues for U.S. camp commanders.

Private security contractors also have their share of problems in the battle space. Private security companies have complained of being fired upon by U.S. military convoys and being fired upon by soldiers manning vehicle check points, a problem known as “blue-on-white” incidents. Private security companies also consistently experience a lack of recognition of their identification cards (particularly non-DoD identification cards such as MultiNational Force – Iraq cards) which can result in being detained for hours at checkpoints where junior enlisted personnel had not been briefed on the presence of armed contractors in the area of operation.

The U.S. tactical operations centers may not be notified of the presence of private security companies in their area of operations, because private security companies are unable to contact the centers and make them aware of their daily schedule. Unfortunately, private security companies often therefore find themselves being denied access to military bases for security personnel injured by improvised explosive devices or small arms fire.

Many of these problems can be traced back to the shortfalls in the DoD’s formal plans for the execution of Phase IV operations. The role of private security companies and armed contractors operating in the battle space has not been written into doctrine, training or plans. It is of no great surprise that combatant commanders and ground troops are unclear how to handle contractors, or what their standard operating procedures or rules of engagement are.

The DoD, as the source of funds and contracts, is in the position to dictate the minimum necessary operating standards for private security companies seeking to support U.S. military operations. The DoD could aid the industry by creating and upholding minimum hiring and vetting standards, minimum pre-deployment training requirements and minimum uniform and visual identification standards. The DoD could facilitate the standardization of type and model of weapons (i.e., weapons of western, and not eastern-bloc, origin), along with the registration of weapons.

Moreover, the DoD could facilitate the streamlining of radio communications systems and procedures, and initiate private security company registration with the Project & Contracting Office — Gulf Regions Division, the Reconstruction Operations Center and the Logistics Movement Control Center, which would help prior notification of the U.S. Tactical Operation of all private security company movements within the U.S. area of responsibility. Finally, the DoD could enhance their positioning of Liaison Officers, and help determine rules for the use of force with private security companies.

Once these procedures and mechanisms are formalized at the doctrinal level, all units would receive pre-deployment briefs and training on the role of private security companies in the battle space and essential information necessary for interoperability – particularly identification and communications.

Because of the U.S. military’s need to focus on the primary missions of fighting and winning wars, combating armed insurgency and countering terrorism, civilian contractors have become an integral part of stability and reconstruction operations. As such, private security companies and armed contractors need to be written into U.S. operational plans and briefs. Just as the ‘Situation Paragraph’ is included in a five-paragraph brief and the U.S. Operations Order has lines for ‘Friendly Forces and Enemy Forces’ a line must be added for ‘Contractors in the Battle Space.’ In this way, every unit commander, from brigade down to squad level, will know how to address the issues relevant to these armed contractors supporting DoD operations.

Without security there will be no reconstruction; without reconstruction there will be no peace. Security sector reform and police training are critical to stabilization. Since all of these functions are now handled by DoD contractors, they need to be written into training and doctrine at all levels. As most security contractors are former military personnel, many with 10-20+ years of service, retiring as senior non-commissioned officers, warrant officers or officers, it should not be too challenging to create a matrix for interoperability between the active military and civilian contractors. IPOA and its member companies stand ready to assist the DoD in developing the minimum operating standards necessary for safer, more efficient operations in future conflict and post-conflict environments.
VALUABLE lessons can be drawn from the coalition’s efforts to co-ordinate movement in Iraq. The Reconstruction Operations Centre and the Logistics Movement Control Centre represent success stories in an extreme and uncompromising environment.

During the early stages of the reconstruction effort in Iraq, in which the number of private contractors increased rapidly, there developed the need to co-ordinate centrally the movement of the military and private sector. Since it became operational in October 2004, the Reconstruction Operations Centre’s aim has been to provide situational awareness and coalitions' effectiveness in coordinating assistance from government agencies and coalition forces. Without this credibility, assistance was only available on an ad-hoc basis.

All sides have thus benefited. Registered NGOs and commercial organizations have an added layer of risk management and can tap into higher-level resources. In the event of an attack, military assistance in the form of Quick Reaction Forces or medical evacuations is available to them, giving casualties a better chance of survival. In return, the military enjoy improved situational awareness of ‘white forces’ on the ground and a better understanding of the reconstruction work being undertaken. Government bodies have greater visibility over operational areas and this, in turn, complements the overall objective of stimulating private sector and NGO involvement in the theatre.

The concept of a centralized but voluntary participation in a C3 (Cooperation, Coordination and Communication) cell should be embraced in all theatres where a coordinated response is required and where cooperation will result in a more effective outcome. Although the ability to meet duty of care obligations through improved security and risk management is the prime driver of such a concept, enhanced efficiency is a natural corollary. Participating organizations can expect strategic benefits such as increased logistical coordination, improved capacity for quick decision-making, less duplication of effort and greater effectiveness in coordinating assistance from nearby call signs and organizations. Whilst a C3 operation such as the Reconstruction Operations Centre has cost many millions of dollars in Iraq, this need not be the case. An onscreen Common Operating Picture in an operations center can be set up at a minimal cost; the main expense being 24/7 monitoring (involving, for example, about five people covering shift rotations). The client organizations pay for their transponder systems for vehicles, personnel or static locations such as villas. A contribution from the monthly fees can then be used to fund the 24/7 monitoring and liaison capability. In this way, the costs are distributed proportionally across organizations operating in the theatre. Response processes will vary depending on the theatre of operations. The monitoring hub can interface into commercial response organizations such as medical evacuation aircraft as well as international military forces or, in some countries, with local government forces and agencies to the extent that they exist.

As the basis for an effective civil-military interface, a centralized C3 hub can be transitioned to the local government as the situation stabilizes, and form part of the ongoing post-conflict strategy for internal security and reconstruction.

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Staying in Touch
Ensuring Communication Capabilities in Conflict, Post-Conflict and Disaster Ops

The protection of critical infrastructure is a natural arena for collaboration between the public and private sectors. It is estimated that 85 percent of the United States’ critical infrastructure is owned privately, yet many of these critical assets are among the most tempting targets of a terrorist attack. As a result, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has undertaken a number of partnerships with the private sector to safeguard these vital industries. Among these sectors are electrical power, water, health care, transportation and telecommunications.

In many lesser-developed countries, however, key infrastructure assets are at considerably greater risk. Tragically, these regions can also be far more vulnerable to armed conflict and terrorism. The disruption of telecommunications infrastructure is a favored tactic of war, and proves to be especially devastating as the line between civilian and military lines blur.

In addition to the ravages of war, natural disasters pose an equally deadly threat to telecommunications infrastructure. Earthquakes, floods and fire can disrupt both communications hubs, such as broadcast towers, and distributed networks. Such disruptions, even when caused by minor damage to a communications network, can prove devastating as cyber traffic is re-routed and overloads backup systems, worsening congestion.

Governments lacking the resources to protect and fortify this infrastructure before conflict or disaster strikes will likely be equally ill prepared for their restoration after the fact. In addition, most expenditures for preventative measures for emergency communications, such as interoperability programs, do not integrate the NGO or private security communities, crucial partners in reconstruction. The restoration of telecommunications infrastructure and capabilities must be a priority in post-disaster and post-conflict environments.

Three functions of emergency communications in these environments underscore their importance. The first is the vital role played by telecommunications infrastructure for workers, both local and international, providing aid and security in the post-conflict environment. These groups rely on communications networks to communicate both among themselves and back to their leadership at home. As aid and emergency relief workers become increasingly reliant on technologically advanced communications equipment, the restoration of supporting infrastructure will continue to be a crucial factor permitting them to carry out their work.

Telecommunications functionality is also a priority for local, regional and national governments in these locales following a devastating armed conflict or natural disaster. At a minimum, governments must be able to provide basic security for their citizens. Whether carried out by civil or military authorities, security is impossible to achieve without functioning communications systems such as radio networks.

Functioning communications capability also permits governments to establish longer-term security and stability by fostering faith in government institutions. Infrastructure supporting mobile, distributed communications networks will help struggling governments extend their presence and influence in remote, rural areas far from the capital. This influence is crucial in order to establish faith in state institutions in areas susceptible to falling under the control of armed groups challenging state authority. The absence of national telecommunications connectivity can impede efforts such as the organization of national elections, a crucial test of government in a reconstruction phase.

Finally, the rapid restoration of telecommunications infrastructure in a post-conflict or post-disaster environment is a crucial enabler of economic growth. The loss of communications capability can have devastating effects on the restoration of economic capacity by curtailing the ability of businesses to advertise and coordinate the delivery of products to market. Even when local telephone networks are intact, regional and intercity links can remain severed because of their destruction during war, hampering regional and national-level economic development as markets are cut off from international flows of capital and information.

Recent efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and in the wake of Hurricane Katrina have highlighted the need for closer integration of government, NGO and private industry in post-disaster and post-conflict environments. Telecommunications underpins almost all facets of major rebuilding, acting as a key enabler of the efforts of aid workers and programs to foster security and economic development. Telecommunications infrastructure is a key factor in the successful operations of all actors in a reconstruction environment, and should be the target of prioritized planning and teamwork – the potential to save lives in the dangerous and challenging times that lie ahead is at stake.

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The IPOA Code of Conduct is a far-reaching instrument. The peace and stability operations industry can enhance its role, reduce risk of damaging criminal and civil liability, and accelerate acceptance in the international community by ensuring its effective operation. In fact, the Code requires that IPOA members abide by international rules and principles essential to an effective compliance program. IPOA members must use them to close three significant gaps mentioned below in this article, in international law and achieve full implementation of the Code.

To understand the methodology behind this approach it is essential to consider the wider legal and political context. Historically international law (in particular rules for war, post-conflict stability operations and complex emergencies) has developed in spurts. The accelerating complexity of emergencies has overtaken established international rules and their historical rhythm of change. There is no prospect that law-making processes will catch up. These rapid changes confront state and non-state actors alike.

As conflicts and emergencies become more complex, the dividing line between the international rules of war and peace become increasingly difficult to draw. Additionally, operational rules for non-state players such as the United Nations and non-profit humanitarian service providers remain unclear even as their roles grow. [1] In this respect, the peace and stability operations industry is an anomalous player. In most cases, no one else enjoys the assurance of clearly delineated rules either. However, in one respect the peace and stability operations industry does occupy legally anomalous ground.

Under international law, states have the inherent right to act in conflict and emergencies, even when operational rules are discordant with events in the field. International organizations also play a growing role in addressing these challenges. Their work is partially addressed by international law. Private humanitarian service providers are also politically accepted actors even if international law offers limited guidance on their role. The anomaly is that other non-state actors may operate in an incomplete legal framework, but only the peace and stability operations industry faces detractors who might argue international law actually precludes their work.

A principle of international law dating back to the mid-19th century establishes that only states (whether on their own or during peace operations) can employ military force. This principle, like so many applied in complex emergencies, has been overtaken by changing facts on the ground. States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations readily employ the peace and stability operations industry in major operational roles. To secure some legal clarity and enhance political standing, the industry needs to reconcile its emerging role with older rules that do not account for some of its more sensitive work. The IPOA Code of Conduct offers a way forward. The three gaps in international law confronting the peace and stability operations industry are as follows:

The Application Gap:
Legal standards that apply during complex emergencies were adopted primarily for use in interstate warfare. Some rules set out specific requirements (e.g. how to treat prisoners of war), but are intended for governments rather than private firms. Others (also intended for states) are drafted in the form of broad guidelines (e.g. targeting rules). They serve more as statements of principle than exact operational requirements and their scope of application is not an easy question. Nonetheless, the peace and stability operations industry must find an entry point for adoption of such rules and principles, in order to ensure compliance with international rules never intended for them.

The Status Gap:
International law inherently supports state action in complex emergencies. It also provides some accommodation for traditional relief operations carried out by non-governmental organizations. However, it provides no clear support or accommodation for the employment of private firms. The peace and stability operations industry needs to develop a legal framework that supports its work alongside that of states and traditional NGOs.

The Professional Standards Gap:
Professional codes and standards of...
conduct hold no legal standing under international law. They do not serve as official vehicles for implementation of international rules or serve a licensing function. In contrast, state actors apply standards that are derived from treaties and clearly founded in law. IPOA and its members have assumed leadership in developing field standards for the peace and security operations industry. They need to find ways to link them to treaty-based standards of conduct adopted by and for states. IPOA and its members can begin filling these gaps by using a three-phase process to operationalize the Code of Conduct.

Phase One:
Identify the mission’s legal and political context. If a firm contracts to perform services in an unstable environment, it is crucial to determine as clearly as possible whether that environment be characterized as a war zone. If so, legal rules differ from those that control in peacetime. During deployment, the legal and political context must be scrutinized properly. Getting it “right” enhances staff and vulnerable community security, while reducing legal risk. The contractor starts work with a realistic picture of likely-to-emerge legal issues and restraints.

Phase Two:
With the mission’s legal and political context determined, it is essential to establish workable rules for the field in ‘Phase Two.’ This is a daunting task, as even governments are challenged to determine which rules apply. Private firms have to work out what they can do, and how to do it, with even less legal guidance and precedent to guide them. However, a good starting point already exists in the IPOA Code’s table of legal sources.

The third article in each of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (sometimes called Common Article Three) is accepted as the absolute minimum standard that applies in any military conflict. Common Article Three is essentially a synopsis of the humanitarian principles found in the Geneva Conventions. In roughly five paragraphs, it sets out rules of restraint for domestic insurgencies and other intra-state warfare (the other articles of the Conventions apply to interstate warfare). However, the principles enunciated reach further than insurgencies, giving the industry a starting point to formulate legal strategy for security work in the field. This will continue to be difficult, since the rules of war were not intended for private firms, nor give private firms authority to use force. In many conflicts, the rules in Common Article Three are insufficient under any circumstances. When this is the case, a more extensive set of rules must be applied. However, it is a comprehensible starting point for planning, and marks a compliance bar that cannot be lowered. Start with Common Article Three and then build upon it based on instructions received from public authorities who themselves obey the laws of war.

Where rules of war do not apply in a complex emergency, other rules will (such as international human rights law). The IPOA Code of Conduct offers a starting point to navigate this unfamiliar legal terrain. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights also offers a map to many issues that could ensnare an unwary or indifferent actor in operational settings. Some provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are firm and indisputable rules of international law (e.g., prohibition of slavery). Others are controversial and there is no consensus on their legal force (e.g., those addressing social benefits). However, any issue raised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should serve as a warning marker when private firms conduct operational planning.

Phase Three:
In phase three, draw upon as many sources of legal authority and state acquiescence as possible in order to close the legal gap with other actors. Anchor the peace and security firm in a legal context, acceptable to governments and public international organizations. In some instances, domestic laws and regulations may help. The IPOA Code of Conduct takes this process further, by offering up an international roadmap. The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights are not legally binding but have wider implications, and were specifically formulated to consider private security and extraction firms. Firms should draw on this Code to develop standard operating procedures that align their mission and conduct to that of law-abiding public authorities. Precedent established in the field will not close this gap entirely.

However, the peace and stability operations industry can begin building its case for legal status in customary international law if it enjoys the full confidence of responsible public authorities.

These phases should be implemented sequentially, and as quickly as possible. The process should go on continuously until the assignment is complete and insights recorded for future use. The peace and stability operations industry should not wait for a treaty to fill these gaps because it is unlikely that one will appear any time soon. The IPOA Code of Conduct contains its own tools for operationalization. By ensuring that this happens, the industry will reduce its risks and earn a role in the enlightened development of international law.

ENDNOTE

OPERATIONALIZING THE CODE
Training in ethics and international codes of conduct for human rights workers, private contractors, UN peacekeepers, and others active in peace, stability, and disaster relief operations.

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Iraq Contractors on Notice About Labor Abuse  

Conference Discusses "Zero Tolerance" of Forced Labor

AM McCahon proposed a simple solution to convince U.S.-funded contractors working in Iraq to return passports to their migrant workers. Reaching in his pocket, the candid government contract lawyer pulled out a clip of folded U.S. dollars and held it up. “This works,” he said, speaking at a conference on labor trafficking in Washington, D.C., sponsored by the International Peace Operations Association, a trade group of private contractors specializing in peace and stability operations support services.

McCahon pointed out that when businesses in the Middle East realize that they will lose out on lucrative U.S. contracts, they get the message: employees have rights when working for American taxpayers, no matter what their nationality or salaries are.

“There are so many companies out there and this is a competitive world,” McCahon explained to the audience of contractors, Pentagon officials and human rights experts. “If the companies don’t want to comply, they can go somewhere else.”

Returning passports to workers became a big issue for Iraq contractors last spring after a Defense Department order demanded that employers stop the widespread and “illegal” practice of holding travel and identity documents to prevent low-wage employees from leaving jobs.

Aimed at preventing the trafficking of migrant workers and forced labor in Iraq, the April 2006 contracting order also found that employers had been engaging in a number of unacceptable employment policies — including deceptive bait-and-switch hiring practices, excessive recruiting fees, and the circumvention of Iraqi immigration procedures.

The order additionally noted that workers lived in substandard living conditions, which other military inspections found to include crowded housing, poor food, inadequate health services and poor sanitation. All of these findings amounted to conditions that could indicate incidents of forced labor under U.S. contracts in Iraq.

Tens of thousands of laborers from South Asia, Africa and elsewhere, known as “third country nationals,” work at U.S. military camps in construction, camp maintenance, and food preparation. Subcontractors working for U.S. companies in Iraq were among the most frequent offenders, especially the multibillion-dollar logistics contract held by Halliburton/KBR to build, maintain and service some 70 military camps in Iraq.

McCahon, Vice President and general counsel with Agility Defense and Government Services since September 2005, said in an interview that he implemented strict new policies to comply with the 2006 contracting directive: “One demands that all employees of Agility and its subcontractors maintain custody of their identity papers. There’s been a lot of worker exploitation,” said McCahon, who has worked with contractors in Iraq since the 2003 coalition liberation and subsequent occupation. “Workers can lose a lot of self-esteem if their documents are taken away and many subcontractors do that to make them feel powerless.”

A second, and perhaps more important policy, is to ensure that recruiters in host countries only be paid by the hiring company and not charge recruitment fees to workers — a practice that can cause heavy debt to the employee. McCahon estimates that 90 percent or more of the migrant workers in Iraq at one time were paying ‘illegal recruitment fees.’

“That creates indentured servitude,” he said. “We cancelled all recruiting fees and trebled the damages,” he said. “Our subs now pay all the recruitment fees and the recruiters can’t accept payments from the workers.”

To help spread the word of ‘zero tolerance’ on worker abuse, Agility now places anti-trafficking posters in all of its work areas in English, Hindi and Arabic with a hotline for anonymous callers to report complaints. The posters warn against “the use of force, fraud or coercion” regarding labor. Additionally, the company holds monthly meetings with randomly selected employees to review working conditions: “We want to know if the employees are happy.”

Speaking at the July 16, IPOA conference, the commanding officer for the Defense Contract Management Agency in Iraq said he was surprised when he heard about the conditions that some workers faced under contractors in Iraq. He said he had never heard about the passport issue until the April 2006 order. “My first thought was disbelief,” said Army Col. Jake Hansen who supervised the inspections of KBR’s logistics contract. “None of us saw this coming. We were all surprised.”

Hansen said that during his inspections, he never witnessed poor working conditions for the migrant laborers. “I wasn’t appalled by what I saw... They were better conditions than they had back home.” He also stressed that the low-wage labor force has provided some of the highest-quality food and camp services the military has ever had. “That’s important for retention.”

Hansen also noted that KBR has implemented strict anti-trafficking measures, which include monthly meetings with workers and training seminars.

Still, all may not be well in Iraq, according to anecdotal reports from American civilian sources that work at military camps with the low-wage labor force and who complain of poor medical care, crowded living quarters and questionable food.

The author is journalist based in Washington, D.C. This article first appeared on iraqslogger.com

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Following the Letter and Spirit of Compliance

The U.S. Experience in Combating Trafficking in Persons in Albania

WITH the break up of the Eastern Block, Albania (Eastern Europe’s most impoverished and isolated country) plummeted into a state of fragility where corruption and organized crime rapidly filled the ensuing political and economic void. Between the early 1990s and 2002, increasing numbers of Albanians were trafficked to Greece and Italy, among other destinations, for commercial sexual exploitation and other forms of forced labor. Lack of concerted political will and weak legal, social and economic structures limited Albania’s ability to respond to the trend. Albania was unable to ensure that the vulnerable could be protected and traffickers prosecuted.

Fortunately, the void gave ample fuel to the rise of a burgeoning civil society made up of concerned individuals who, with little experience or information about the nature of trafficking, created organizations to protect their communities. In 2003, the U.S. Government recognized the unique window of opportunity to reduce trafficking in Albania and create a vibrant civil society through specific, targeted programming.

The Coordinated Action Against Human Trafficking (CAAHT), is one of the largest and longest running USAID-funded anti-trafficking programs (2003–2009). Since its inception, CAAHT has played a compelling role in galvanizing civil society to reduce the incidence of trafficking and increase the number of victims successfully reintegrated into communities.

The approach of the CAAHT has emphasized a culture of transparency and collaboration among civil society organizations and local government officials. The impact of a decentralized, civil society strategy for anti-trafficking has improved country-wide programming, increased coordination between civil society and local government, and instigated a 2006 legislative order by the prime minister to create Regional Anti-trafficking Committees modeled after CAAHT’s own Regional Coordinating Committees.

The project’s strategic design and emphasis on collaboration and inclusiveness across social sectors to combat trafficking also reflect ethical values and business practices. The project is founded on conducting its activities morally, ethically, and in the spirit of public accountability. The strong government regulations and policies emanating from the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 and 2005 are well supported by the project.

Government rules that have had a particularly direct impact on CAAHT since the start of the project in 2003 include USAID’s 2004 Acquisition and Assistance Policy Directive prohibiting the use of government funds to support or advocate the legalization of prostitution, and the recent Acquisition and Assistance Policy Directive prohibiting any U.S. Government funded contractor, subcontractor or employee from engaging in trafficking activities.

The CAAHT project naturally extends these rules to its 23 grantees, which have received over $2 million to implement programming. Contractual language related to grantees’ activities is explicit, requiring that they be able to certify compliance in all cases. It is simple enough, on the one hand, to be contractually compliant and insert required language into grante agreements and leave it at that. However, there is much more to be gained by the way of promoting the spirit, in addition to the letter, of our anti-trafficking legislation.

CAAHT’s large grant component and signature approach to capacity building and coordination have had a significant impact on Albania’s civil society organizations and local government stakeholders. Because these anti-trafficking stakeholders are also grantees themselves required to assure compliance with U.S. anti-trafficking laws, the prospects for sustaining these principles within the fiber of Albanian civil society become more likely.

CAAHT trains grantees and other anti-trafficking stakeholders in developing systems in human resources, financial management, and monitoring and evaluation – as well as helping them develop and clarify organizational mission statements, goals and supporting policies. The program’s interrelated coordination, data collection and analysis, and grant activities have helped fill a void within Albanian civil society organizational capacity while creating a level playing field for grantees, to compete for funds and implement activities.

Annual conferences and Regional Coordinating Committees encourage all anti-trafficking stakeholders (including government officials) to partake in CAAHT capacity training, and engage in networks that provide for victim referral systems, and an exchange of best practices. Through a significant investment in training, CAAHT helps grantees understand the importance of contractual compliance and gives them tools to implement appropriate policies and procedures. The language and spirit of the U.S. Government’s anti-prostitution/anti-trafficking laws and policies implicitly and explicitly become part of the dialogue around which Albania improves anti-trafficking services – while also emphasizing that responsibility for success is shared by all, from the smallest civil society organizations to the upper echelons of government. 

TRAFFIKIN E GENIEVE NJERECORE

A poster produced by the International Organization for Migration warning against trafficking in persons in Albania.

PHOTO: IOM

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The author is a Management Associate at Creative Associates International, Inc. Creative Associates is the implementer of the CAAHT project.
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A Bright Future for Africa

New AFRICOM Command Will Enhance U.S.-African Partnership

The more I’ve learned about Africa, the more I’ve learned that I need to learn more about Africa. My interest in Africa goes back to 1952 when my parents moved to the Belgian Congo when I was one year old. I returned to the United States for college then joined the U.S. Air Force. In my last military assignment, I served as the Director of Strategy, Policy, and Assessments at the European Command and was deeply involved with U.S. military activities in Africa. In this role, I was involved in the early conceptual discussions exploring the possibility of establishing a unified command specifically focused on Africa — Africa Command.

During my frequent visits to Africa, I became even more convinced that the continent’s security issues are linked to its significant stability challenges. Extreme poverty, the youth bulge, insufficient job opportunities, corruption, and weak governance continue to fuel feelings of hopelessness and despair. This is an environment hostile to effective security programs and it limits Africa’s chances of achieving its enormous human and resource potential.

Despite significant obstacles to sustained development, natural disasters and poor leadership in some countries, the United States and international partners must continue to help African countries meet their near-term challenges. We should try to collaborate on and complement activities of partners with similar objectives in Africa, particularly in the context of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). America must consult and cooperate with African and international partners to resolve the situations in Darfur, Somalia, D.R. Congo, and the Western Sahara. We must help to coordinate a plan to deal with countries like Zimbabwe, especially for the post-Mugabe period. The United States and its allies must confront terrorist threats where we find them and help African countries eliminate terrorist and criminal safe havens throughout the continent.

I’m delighted to see that Africa Command (AFRICOM) becoming a reality. I believe we need one unified command to coordinate and synchronize our military activities in Africa. The United States will get an even greater benefit when this command is truly integrated with all the other elements of U.S. power and diplomacy — and with staff elements from donor and African countries. Only then will America be able to build the strong partnerships that will be required to eliminate poverty and accelerate Africa’s integration into the global economy.

It might be useful for the new Africa Command to consider three ideas as it establishes its capabilities and initiates its programs. First, proactive and preventative programs using all the elements of national power are significantly cheaper and more effective than reactive and corrective measures. America’s experiences in countries like Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan are obvious examples. We’ve got the Kofi Annan Center for Peacekeeping. Maybe it’s time for the United States to help Africans establish the Nelson Mandela Center for Good Governance and the Julius Nyerere Center for Political Leadership.

Second, I believe we should focus on helping Africans help Africans. We must work with the African Union, the five regional economic communities, and individual countries to ensure our assistance meshes with their regional and national programs. U.S. initiatives must have the approval and support of our African hosts if they are to work, if they are to last. Since we are the guests, we must listen to our hosts and understand their views and requirements. The United States must build relationships based on mutual trust and respect. We must form strong partnerships based on shared understanding of security requirements and a common vision for the future.

Finally, to the maximum extent possible, our assistance programs must be sustainable, replicable, and scaleable. “Train the trainer” programs should be a critical component of any initiative. We need to be working ourselves out of a job; there should be a “sun-down” clause in our training and assistance programs.

I believe Africa Command is off to a good start conceptually. I applaud the DoD’s efforts to use an interagency model — to include other U.S. government departments’ and agencies’ inputs in its decision-making process. Our goal not only should be to put a stronger hyphen between “pol-mil,” it should also be to create an organization that truly integrates unique political, military, economic, and developmental strengths. U.S. and European militaries have made great strides in promoting security cooperation at the African Union and national level through substantive and successful training programs. This effort must be matched by a similar commitment to enhance and resource a robust “stability cooperation” program. Increased security depends on better governance and plans for long-term stability that foster a believable hope among Africans that tomorrow will be better. This means cleaner water, adequate food, better schools, available and affordable healthcare, improved infrastructure and communications, more employment opportunities, human rights, and total gender equality.

I believe our ultimate success will stem from our attitude and approach as we have a larger presence and footprint in Africa. AFRICOM must be perceived by Africans as being a good and respectful guest, and a valued partner. AFRICOM must be about Africans helping Africans. Based on what I’ve seen, AFRICOM is off to a good start.
ON February 6, 2007, President George W. Bush announced the establishment of a U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), endowed with a mission to “enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth” throughout the continent. While many debate the ability for a military command to facilitate social development, none would argue that the realization of such efforts requires a clear vision, realistic programs, and improved coordination.

Africa boasts the world’s fastest rate of population growth: by 2020, 1.2 billion Africans will number more than the combined populations of Europe and North America. At the same time, the United Nations Development Program’s 2006 Human Development Report determined that of the thirty-one countries found to have “low development,” 29 were African states. Such disparities underscore the need for sustained involvement in promoting political and economic stability to meet the challenges of the future.

Enter AFRICOM. Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf views the U.S. command as an opportunity to improve African security capabilities through military training and governance reform initiatives throughout the continent, where AFRICOM’s value will be its focus on conflict prevention over conflict intervention. Sirleaf believes the Millennium Challenge Corporation could serve as a model, where grants are provided based on the performance of a recipient nation’s ability to meet benchmarks in areas such as anti-corruption initiatives and healthcare. She claimed, “AFRICOM is the recognition that African growth can only occur in an environment where security, development and good governance are integrally linked. There is no substitute for boots and eyes on the ground.”

While AFRICOM presents opportunities, several risks threaten to dilute its effectiveness. Stephen Morris of the Center for Strategic International Studies recently warned that the creation of AFRICOM, while laudable, implies a militarization of U.S. engagement with Africa, and de-legitimizes diplomatic and development initiatives: “At the end of the day, the test of AFRICOM’s sustainability will be whether it establishes durable and mutually advantageous partnerships with African interests, both governmental and non-governmental.”

Additionally, the United States must provide a detailed action plan that explains how AFRICOM’s creation will benefit U.S. security initiatives in Africa. Efforts by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa Theresa Whalen, Admiral Robert Moeller and Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry in steering the process have been important. Yet the political waters remain turbulent.

Critics claim AFRICOM’s creation signals the emergence of an aggressive U.S. stance on energy and terrorism in Africa to the detriment of humanitarian and social development. Such concerns are especially relevant along the Horn of Africa, North Africa and the Swahili Coast, where Somalia and Ethiopia could be at risk of further internal unrest through associating with U.S. military commands. Similarly, Sudan and Eritrea view AFRICOM as a direct threat to their interests, while Kenya and Ethiopia risk domestic instability through association. Additionally, the U.S. State Department and USAID share concerns that military prerogative may overwhelm civilian leadership in Africa. In this regard, Ambassador Herman Cohen’s call for a senior State Department official as a Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) could be a step in the right direction.

Former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah famously lamented, “Africa is a paradox which illustrates and highlights neo-colonialism. Her earth is rich, yet the products that come from above and below the soil continue to enrich, not Africans predominantly, but groups and individuals who operate to Africa’s impoverishment.” A perception that a military driven U.S. engagement with Africa reflects desperation to control increasingly important African strategic resources (including oil, gas, and uranium), counter international terrorism, and blunt an asserted China, could intensify claims of ‘imperial’ interests in the region.

By establishing targets for improved UN peace operations, robust dialogue with the African Union, Economic Community of West African States and local NGOs to strengthen civilian interagency processes in public health, environmental protection and corruption, the U.S. could assure concerns both within the U.S. and among African nations. Furthermore, U.S. planners should establish AFRICOM HQs throughout Africa in an effort to diffuse the centralization of military power, in contrast to traditional U.S. command structures.

Theresa Whalen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and a key architect of AFRICOM, argues that the State Department’s funding for African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance will form a core of U.S. efforts to support peace operations capacity in Africa. Targeted grants from the State Department’s International Military Education and Training program have already been effective in building the capacities of America’s African partners. For instance, FY 2006-07 allocated $15.6 million to train 1,400 African military officers and personnel at U.S. military schools. Additionally, the Global Peace Operations Initiative, an expansion of the Clinton administration’s African Crisis Response Initiative and the Bush administration’s earlier Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program, aims at training and equipping 75,000 military troops for peacekeeping operations on the continent by 2010.

In order to fully realize the goals outlined above, the State Department’s Africa Bureau and USAID programs in Africa must be better staffed and better funded. Otherwise, Whalen warns, “an emerging AFRICOM will inevitably be seen as domineering.” Ultimately, AFRICOM could advance African and U.S. interests simultaneously through streamlined humanitarian aid, enhanced management of natural resources, curtailed corruption and improved African-led peacekeeping capabilities. Key challenges to AFRICOM’s success include managing perceptions, improving interagency coordination, regional dialogue and establishing a unique modus operandi for U.S. presence.

The Pentagon’s recognition of Africa’s strategic importance, coupled with its focus on economic and social development, could facilitate AFRICOM as a critical step in redressing Africa’s marginalization through improving stability throughout the continent, in the hopes of realizing Mandela’s dream of “an Africa which is in peace with itself.”

IA N P ARKER

AFRICOM: Opportunities and Challenges

The U.S. Military Places High Hopes and Plenty of Pressure Upon AFRICOM

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The Great American Hope for Africa?

Despite Great Hopes and Big Promises, the Success of AFRICOM is Not Assured

I
n the recent testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Mark Malan, of Refugees International, stated that, "for an initiative that represents the culmination of a 10-year thought process within the Department of Defense, there is a surprising lack of detail on how AFRICOM intends to bridge African peacekeeping capacity gaps; gaps which are enormous and growing." [1] I would add that AFRICOM, along with the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) and the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), will bring its own enormous and growing capacity gaps in money, leadership, planning, logistics, manpower, and – most importantly – the ability to provide peacekeeping training.

AFRICOM, ACOTA and GPOI all clearly state that their core effort will be to “plan, fund, and execute the training of 75,000 troops worldwide in peacekeeping tasks,” with the bulk of these peacekeepers to be trained in Africa for future African needs.[2] To do this, the Department of Defense will employ trainers from the U.S. military and contractors to plan and conduct peacekeeping training for selected partner countries’ militaries, in close cooperation with the UN. Detailed training plans will be crafted in conjunction with the military leadership and will be designed with UN peacekeeping requirements in mind.[3]

There are several monumental flaws in this proposed process. First and foremost the United States cannot train other national military organizations to secure the peace, because the U.S. is not training its own forces, especially the Army, for that mission. The U.S. Military conducts no peacekeeping training at all, by UN or any other standards. The U.S. does not send any significant numbers of troops through any of the UN Peacekeeping Training Centers, nor does it encourage its soldiers to take any of the UN training modules offered online, as most of its allies do. Finally, the U.S. is the only country in the world that espouses civil-military operations. All other countries actually train for civil-military co-operation, a completely different animal.

It has long been apparent that there are several significant factors preventing U.S. Forces in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, from conducting successful stability operations. These factors also prevent civil-military operations and civil affairs from being the force enhancement tools that they truly can be. There is a ‘war-fighter’ insurgency within the U.S. Army that is amenable only to conducting kinetic operations. Despite DoD Directive 3000.5 and other previous directives, pre-deployment training in stability operations has minimized to the point where the U.S. finds itself unable to transition to Phase IV stability operations in Iraq, or anywhere else for that matter. The end result is that while the U.S. Army ‘war-fighters’ pay great lip service to DoD Directive 3000.5, and its requirement for the Army to greatly improve its capacity to conduct stability operations, the Army instead continues to avoid providing the caliber of training necessary to plan, stand up, or execute successful stability operations. Not only do current U.S. training centers not provide adequate stability operations training, but the ability to plan for stability operations simply does not exist Army-wide. Rather, the U.S. Army command and staff is only interested in training combat brigades for kinetic operations.

If AFRICOM represents a real switch from kinetic to stability operations, the U.S. Army will be presented with a second monumental problem. The issue that will face the U.S. Army is finding enough specialist troops that can provide sufficient training in stability operations. This seems unlikely, considering that the U.S. Army Civil-Affairs and Psychological Operations Command has imploded upon itself, and has very few truly qualified civil affairs soldiers who can be effectively deployed.

What does this mean for training peacekeepers in Africa? The bulk of the trainers provided will either be active duty or retired Army ‘war-fighters’ that have never trained or served in UN peacekeeping missions. They will train Africans using the skills that the U.S. Army knows best – ‘war-fighting’ and not peacekeeping. These AFRICOM-trained soldiers will come in handy for helping U.S. Forces in the global war on terror, and in furthering U.S. foreign policy in Africa.

As Mark Malan stated in his testimony, “[n]o one part of the world, like Iraq and Afghanistan, the face of U.S. foreign policy is clearly a military one. In Africa, the U.S. Department of Defense appears to be putting a civilian mask on the face of a combatant command, with its marketing pitch for AFRICOM. This disingenuous strategy is not working. The veneer of the mask is simply too thin, and attempts to patch the holes that have emerged. By telling us what AFRICOM is not about and re-emphasizing a humanitarian and development role for the U.S. military in Africa — the face of U.S. foreign policy becomes shadier. The notion of a benign U.S. combatant command is an enigma to those who clearly understand (and accept) the need for the U.S. to secure access to Africa’s natural resources, especially oil; and to establish bases from which to destroy networks linked to Al-Qaeda. When the U.S. promotes a combatant military command in terms of development and humanitarianism, Africans will inevitably suspect that the true story is being kept from them.” [4]

A major attempt is being made to keep the true story from the African constituency. Indeed, perhaps that is why AFRICOM Headquarters is currently situated in Germany, and may never move any further south than Italy. AFRICOM, ACOTA and GPOI all clearly state that planning for this new training initiative will be done in conjunction with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, even though it has no meaningful, productive, day-to-day, training relationship with the main stream of the U.S. Army at large. The real ground truth is that this organization still survives, notwithstanding that the U.S. Army’s consistent attempts to eliminate it, because it demonstrates to our allies that the U.S. Army shares their interests in peacekeeping – when nothing is further from the truth.

When AFRICOM comes to Africa, it will come many days late and many dollars, personnel and resources short. Many believe preparation for African peacekeeping forces would be far better served by a NATO or EU training program, for a true peacekeeping role in Africa.

ENDNOTES
[1] Excerpt from Testimony by Mark Malan, Refugees International, before the U.S. Senate Sub Committee on African Affairs, August 1, 2007
[3] Ibid.

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HE months of June and July this year witnessed major legislative developments related to the peace and stability operations industry. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA) is currently on the floor of the Senate. In the House version of the NDAA (H.R. 1585) Congress requires the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State and USAID to sign a Memorandum of Understanding regarding matters relating to contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan: SEC. 831. On and after January 1, 2008, no contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan may be awarded by the Department of Defense, the Department of State, or the United States Agency for International Development unless the memorandum ... has been signed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, or the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, respectively; and (B) the department or agency concerned has initiated use of the common database identified in such memorandum to track contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Among others, the agencies must report to Congress on 'rules of engagement,' training and vetting requirements and numbers of contracts. Similarly, although not referring to a Memorandum of Understanding, the Senate version S. 1847 provides in Sec.871 that: "Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations on the selection, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions."

July witnessed a large number of significant amendments to the NDAA introduced by the Senate. Among them, amendments by Sen. Barack Obama (D-Illinois) and Sen. James Webb (D-Virginia) call for increased oversight and development of stricter operational requirements. Related to operational terminology, Sen. Webb introduced an amendment which correctly changes the term 'rules of engagement' to 'rules for use of force.'

Another bill with a great significance to the industry is H.R. 3222 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3222) which passed the House and has now been referred to the Senate.

Bill 3222 requires the Secretary of Defense to develop minimum standards for all security contractors and clear 'Rules of Engagement.' It additionally reaffirms the Fiscal Year 2007 Iraq Supplemental report requirement, which requires the DoD to submit a report on the contracting process, numbers, personnel and costs (section 8108). Additional provisions exist for Congressional control over multi-year contracts in excess of $20m (Sec. 8009) and provisions specifying that all funded intelligence information must be ‘lawfully’ collected (Sec. 8088).

In mid-July, Sen. Webb (along with over 20 other Senators) introduced S.1825, which provides for the establishment of an investigative Commission of the contracting process. The Commission would be a legislative-executive body based on the model of the World War II Truman Commission. Among other functions, the Commission would define ‘inherently governmental functions’ when it comes to drawing the line in outsourcing to the private sector. The proposed Commission would have subpoena and audit powers and the power to refer cases and incidents to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. In the short span of two weeks, the bill received the support of the major Senate Committee Chairs, such as Judiciary Committee Chair Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), Armed Services Committee Chair Sen. Carl Levin (D-Michigan), Human Rights and the Law Judiciary Subcommittee Chair Sen. Richard Durbin (D-Illinois), as well as other high-ranking Democrats including Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-California), Sen. Chris Dodd (D-Connecticut), Sen. Diane Feinstein (D-California), Sen. John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) and Sen. Obama.

In the final week of July before summer recess, the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill authored by Rep. David Price (D-North Carolina). The MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007 (H.R. 2740) requires greater accountability and seeks to further enforce the application of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. Amongst other provisions, the bill includes a provision on creating FBI investigative offices in areas where contractors operate. Another bill related to the industry, which passed the House Judiciary Committee is H.R. 400 War Profiteering Prevention Act of 2007 introduced by Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-Hawaii). The bill criminalizes a range of fraudulent activities relating to military action, relief and reconstruction efforts. Both bills are awaiting further action on the House floor, following the August recess.

Finally, a very significant development to the industry is the passing of the Price-Obama bill. In January this year Rep. Price and Sen. Obama each introduced companion bills aimed at improved regulation of the industry - Transparency and Accountability in Security Contracting Act of 2007 (H.R. 369) and Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007 (S. 674). Now H.R.369 has 45 co-sponsors and congressional action is likely in Fall of this year.
How Private Companies in Iraq Fit In
In a Complex Environment, the Private Sector is a Major Stakeholder

A

S August comes to an end, private security companies continue their hard work across Iraq, delivering supplies, transporting personnel and guarding facilities. The environment, however, is not benign. Since I last wrote, the private security community has regretfully lost additional men doing their very challenging and difficult work. We grieve for their loss as we do that of every soldier, Marine, sailor, airman or civilian that pays the ultimate price in this campaign.

I am often asked “what does the Private Security Company Association of Iraq actually do?” Briefly, the PSCAI acts as the C2 for the industry. In military parlance, C2 is Command and Control. For the PSCAI, C2 means Communications and Coordination. PSCAI embodies the need for constant communication and coordination between industry members and other external entities. It was this need that convinced a handful of company leaders to create the PSCAI over three years ago. These leaders stated, “we are going to be involved in Iraq for quite a while. We do not know where the future will take us, but we do know we need to act upon items of mutual interest and concern, in a comprehensive and coordinated manner.” Recalling the words of Benjamin Franklin, they all agreed, “We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.”

Three years later, the PSCAI finds itself part of a complex environment, existing alongside the Coalition forces, the Government of Iraq and in particular, the Ministry of Interior, whilst always under threat from the enemy. The enemy has proven to be as lethal in 2007 as it was in previous years. Over the course of the last four years, the enemy has inflicted significant injuries on private security company personnel. As the enemy has adjusted tactics and procedures, private security companies have responded by changing their operational profile. With Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) renewed commitment to success, and as the surge continues to confound enemy operations, expect to see a reduction in private security contracts.

Moreover, as governing institutions develop, private security companies will find themselves faced with an ever-increasing array of rules and regulations. It must be noted that these are rules and regulations to which the enemy does not adhere.

The continuous Coalition presence has evolved significantly over the last four years, due to rotation of units and changes in leadership. Rotations bring in fresh troops and new approaches, along with many new ways of thinking about operational environments. Often, a new leader may not have time to investigate existing rules and regulations,nor do they want to hear about “how it was done before.” Soldiers are different from Marines, and both groups interpret a commander’s guidance through their own organizational filters. Every Forward Operating Base Commander has ultimate authority over his base, and the rules he chooses to use. It has been observed that this can lead to uneven application of standard operating procedures. The Coalition military has its hands full fighting and winning the campaign and those responsibilities are manifest. Uneven application of procedures is an unnecessary impediment to those doing such important work.

Working with the new MNF-I leadership, the PSCAI is building a stronger connection with Coalition forces. During General David Petraeus’ Senate Confirmation hearings, he called private security companies part of his “counter-insurgent” force. General Petraeus’ characterization shows his understanding that every private security company operator conducting defensive efforts, delivering supplies, transporting personnel, and guarding facilities, means one more soldier or Marine is available. This relationship between private security companies and the military is vital.

We also find western private security companies increasingly employed in Iraq (either as contractors or subcontractors), operating without contracts which tie them directly to the United States Government. As this contractual environment evolves, the rationalization and harmonization required to operate in the same battle space is paramount. The PSCAI exists, in large part, to fill the coordination gap between Coalition military authorities and private security companies. Finally, the Government of Iraq, through the Ministry of Interior, is the recognized legal governing authority for private security companies. Too often I hear or read the critique “…there are no regulations…” governing private security company operations in Iraq. This is incorrect. I would recommend anyone relaying that statement, to join the PSCAI on one of our numerous weekly meetings downtown with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. The PSCAI consistently meets with the Colonel Director who is in charge of the Private Security Companies Registration Directorate, or his Deputy Minister Major General who is in charge of Domestic Intelligence. These two men will explain how seriously they regard proper registration of private security companies.

In order to dispel the myth that there is no regulation for private security companies. I also invite critics to view a routine inspection conducted by the Iraqi Ministry of Interior on a Private Security Company. Every company is inspected at least twice a year, and is subject to ad-hoc inspections. Serial numbers of each weapon are compared to the weapons themselves. Iraqi inspections of private security companies are incredibly rigorous.

The PSCAI works with the Iraqi Government at every stage of a company’s registration — from initial introductions to attending inspections. Iraqi officials that we work with tell us that they look forward to strengthening the Iraq-PSCAI relationship. While I understand there are areas of the Iraqi government that are disparaged, the Iraqi government that the PSCAI works with is competent and cohesive. We work together on items of mutual interest and concern. It is a relationship being built on trust.

As a final note, if any readers find themselves in the Zone formerly known as Green, please come by the PSCAI office. As H.C. Lawrence “Lawrie” Smith, the PSCAI Deputy would proudly (and truthfully) say, “We’ve got the best coffee in the Zone.”

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Expatriates, Third Country Nationals, Local Nationals and Pay Disparity

Aside from the experience aspect, there is the issue of economic differential. In the U.S., average per capita income is around $42,000 a year. Meanwhile, in Fiji, the average per capita income is about $2,700. Every year, the average American will earn about 15 times more income than the average Fijian. However, if the average American private security contractor earns (even at the high end) $150,000, and the average Fijian private security contractor earns $48,000, this income disparity is actually far less than the average overall per capita income disparity. So, in terms of their home economy, Fijians are doing far better than their American counterparts in private peace and stability operations.

We should also compare against other jobs within the country. While an average Iraqi private security contractor earns up to $6,000 a year, the average Iraqi policeman or soldier earns less than $2,500.[2] So even within the economy of the conflict zone itself, local nationals are similarly doing very well. Of course, in an environment of reconstruction, it is critical that such contractors do not earn too much. In any such environment, there is inevitably a core of educated citizens who flee conflict; where they do remain, it is counter-productive if teachers, for example, quit their profession to instead make more money in security contracting, thereby sucking talent out of a teaching sector already struggling to recover and yet vital to the rebuilding of a peaceful, educated and sustainable society.

But the question still remains: is this fundamentally unfair? If Fijians, Iraqis or any other nationality were being forced against their will to accept these jobs, then maybe this would be unfair. TCNs from all over the world are weighing the risk-benefits demand and the voluntary decision to fulfill their efforts are still worth only a fraction of their western counterparts.

Why? Again, it is a matter of qualifications and economic differential, the very same issues faced by the private peace and stability operations industry. It should be noted that the newspaper mentioned above pays its fixers and drivers up to $3,600 a year and its security guards between $2,400 and $18,000 a year, which is well below the average pay rates for Iraqi employees of U.S. private peace and stability operations companies for the same jobs.

At first glance, the pay scale disparity between expatriates, TCNs and LNs is substantial and can even seem unfair. But in reality, this disparity is only a reflection of economic reality. Though many decry the perceived economic disparity, it is not confined to the private peace and stability operations industry. It is simply a reality of the global economy in which we live, and ultimately it is a system based on economic demand and the voluntary decision to fulfill that demand.

ENDNOTES
[2] IPOA research demonstrates that Iraqi private security contractors earn between $1,800 and $3,600 a year; however, the Fainaru article puts this figure much higher, closer to $8,400.
In his first three months as President Yar’Adua has maintained a low-key posture. It is apparently a reflection of his true personality. Nevertheless, behind his modesty, there are signs of a steel core and a determination to move Nigeria away from its reputation as the sick man of Africa.

As he moves quietly to replace Obasanjo’s cronies with his own advisers, Yar’Adua is demonstrating a good understanding of Nigeria’s most urgent priorities.

The insurrection in the oil-producing Delta needs to be addressed through political, economic and security initiatives. Obasanjo allowed it to fester and get worse. In addition to the loss of 25 percent of Nigeria’s oil production, the Delta crisis is poisoning the entire nation’s political consciousness. One of Yar’Adua’s first acts was to begin a political process of dialogue with the Delta’s different factions. His initiative has met with initial receptivity on the part of non-criminal elements in the Delta. His key objective is to end the rebel activity through nonviolent means. If he is successful in achieving a political accommodation based on real economic development initiatives, he will still need to deal with the criminal aspects of the crisis through a well-planned and well-executed security program.

The decline of Nigeria’s vital infrastructure over four decades has driven the majority of Nigerians into deeper poverty despite the abundance of oil wealth. The decline in electric power production, and the high cost of diesel fuel for private generators are causing private production to close down. Textile factories in Kano, Nigeria’s second most important industrial location, are almost all closed down. Yar’Adua has made public his understanding of the urgency of increasing electric power availability. He has wisely continued Obasanjo’s obscenely late last minute policy decision to turn power production and distribution over to the private sector. In this sector, Yar’Adua’s biggest challenge will be the development of a regulatory regime that will allow power production to be both profitable for the investors and affordable for the consumers. There is also a challenge in developing priorities for natural gas distribution, which will be the main source for electric power. At present, there appear to be more promises for gas sales than there is foreseeable gas available.

Having been elected illegitimately, Yar’Adua needs to assure that his bid for re-election in 2011 will be based on a reformed electoral system. The independent electoral commission will need to be truly independent, with full powers to prevent PDP manipulation. In addition, the anti-corruption mechanism that Obasanjo established, to his credit, needs to be depoliticized. Yar’Adua has taken the first step by placing the anti-corruption commission under the control of the Attorney General to initiate prosecutions.

Finally, there needs to be a deepening and widening of the process of financial transparency. What goes on in the Nigerian National Petroleum Company with crude oil revenue is still not transparent and is certainly rife with illegalities. Also deeply troubling is the lack of financial accountability in the majority of the 36 states. With a few exceptions like Bauchi, Katsina, Lagos and Sokoto states, the substantial revenues devolving to the states from the federal government provide few or no benefits to the citizens.

It is clear that for Yar’Adua there cannot be business as usual, and instead he is moving with determination, quietly achieving results. As for Obasanjo, it is clear that he failed to address Nigeria’s major problems. Nigeria’s great economic potential remains unfulfilled. Nevertheless, Obasanjo, the retired army general, deserves tribute for having buried forever the danger of military intervention.

Former President Olusegun Obasanjo. Photo: U.S. State Department
Brazil Slowly Expands its Peacekeeping Role

From Angola to Timor-Leste to Haiti, Brazil Comes Out of Isolation

OCCER, carnival and tropical beaches compose the popular image of Brazil. For those who look beyond the stereotypes, they will know that Brazil is seen as a Latin American leader. Brazil is the B of the BRICS countries – nations that the international community has deemed most likely to be major global leaders in the next few years. Nevertheless, the largest South American country is not often considered a military leader, and is instead viewed as a pacifist, discreet and apparently not engaged in any international security issues.

However, this image does not correlate with Brazil’s practices. Despite its somewhat isolationist attitude, Brazil has in its own way consistently contributed to attaining world peace. In 1991 the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) was established and for the first time, Brazil provided military observers. The Brazilian role would only increase as UNAVEM II and III came into effect later in the decade, with the country also extending its participation by sending troops and civil police to Angola. Brazilian troops actively participated in demining operations, peace maintenance, and in their spare time troops would aid locals by distributing food, medicine and even providing medical assistance. Overall Brazil’s participation was viewed by the UN as successful.

Brazil answered the UN call for help once again in 2002, and participated in the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). Brazil sent civilian and military police personnel to escort convoys, control traffic and investigate accidents that involved UN force personnel. While Brazil supplied a smaller force, the country provided an important presence in Timor-Leste and continued its peacekeeping efforts.

Some Brazilian officials have said the participation in these two missions “seemed natural” as Portuguese is spoken in both Angola and Timor-Leste. While this is a common explanation for peacekeeping used by many nations, it is a superficial justification. Brazil’s motivations become clearer when it is realized that the nation has been consistently working on strengthening its democratic institutions since the mid-1980s, after its 20-year-long military dictatorship met a slow and painful death. 

It has become clear that the Brazilian government has been pursuing a more internationally-focused foreign policy while maintaining a neutral global position.

The United Nations Mission of Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was adopted after the ratification of UN Security Council Resolution 1529 in February 2004. Since then large numbers of troops from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Jordan, the U.S. and many other countries have been deployed to the poorest nation in the western hemisphere, all contributing to the peace and stability of Haiti. In August 2004 Haiti hosted a goodwill soccer match against Brazil. The initiative was praised by the media and the UN itself, who noted that it was an innovative and unique way to promote peace in Haiti - a country struggling with outrageous economic, social and security problems.

Despite what many believe, it has become clear that the vast majority of peacekeeping troops come from developing countries. MINUSTAH is a prime example. Out of the 18 countries contributing troops either currently or in the past, only Canada, France and the United States do not fall into the “developing world” category. This raises an interesting and obvious question: Why are developing nations interested in helping? Are they responding to a higher calling? Why is it that countries like Brazil would go out of their way to be involved in a peacekeeping operation in Haiti?

No nation chooses to take part in a United Nations peacekeeping operation out of goodwill alone. It is understood that the per diem the United Nations pays personnel-contributing countries have proven to aid the defense budgets of poorer nations significantly. However, for nations like Brazil, the number of soldiers involved in peacekeeping — and therefore earning UN per diem — is not large enough to create a large influx and interest in peacekeeping operations.

One impetus to consider is that taking part in a peacekeeping operation allows the participants to gain field experience in military operations, while expanding their influence. It is not difficult to realize how profitable that experience can be, even to a country that traditionally does not engage in military activities outside its own borders. This is exactly what Brazil seems to have realized since Angola, and is now clearly driving their involvement in Haiti.

By accepting the challenge of actively leading MINUSTAH, Brazil has profited in many ways. It has been able to give its soldiers better training — a Brazilian Navy official stated “a day of war is worth a year of training.”

Prior to MINUSTAH, Brazil’s presence in the Caribbean region was rather limited. As a result of MINUSTAH, Brazilian President Lula da Silva’s administration has been able to more effectively deal with Caribbean nations and establish better relations with them. Brazil appears to be ultimately seeking international recognition for its capabilities, which could lead to an influential position not only in Latin America, but also within the UN itself.
This year alone, 19 journalists have been killed in Iraq. On a daily basis, many journalists around the world put their lives on the line to bring the true horrors of conflict to public attention. Many journalists in conflict zones work in the same environment and face the same adversity as professionals working in the private peace and stability operations industry, and as such many people in both industries truly appreciate the challenges of operating in such harsh and dangerous environments.

There is at the same time considerable opposition to the role of the private sector in conflict and post-conflict zones among the general population at large. Much of this opposition is due to a campaign among a small portion of the media to skew public opinion, often ignoring key facts and arguments that may actually make people think twice about their perceptions of the industry. It doesn’t help that much of this negative reportage against the industry is a thin mask over a broader criticism of the current U.S. administration, its foreign policy and the war in Iraq, issues over which the private sector itself has no control.

A recent study by IPOA determined that over a three month period in early 2007, almost 71 percent of media coverage of the industry was unnecessarily negative. That is not to say that only bad journalists write bad reports. Indeed, a reasonable proportion of balanced articles, but the input of the industry too often falls on the cutting room floor. It is the industry that should be higher. IPOA – and member companies – are often interviewed for these articles, but the input of the industry too often falls on the cutting room floor. It is the industry that should be higher.

The article portrays the industry as thoroughly unregulated, and notes that contractors are “exempt from prosecution.” Furthermore, she claims that contractors are exempt from the Uniform Code of Military Justice (which is not true), and that “a special provision secured by American-occupying forces [exempts] them from prosecution by Iraqis.” In response, this is a clause that the Iraqi government has the power to change, and a major reason it has not already been changed, is likely because the government has a more realistic sense of the development of the Iraqi justice system than Ms. Hastings. She does however recognize that contractors could be tried under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, “[b]ut so far, that law has not been applied to them.” Of course, if Ms. Hastings had taken the time to place a call to the Department of Justice, she would have learned that almost 60 investigations under MEJA have taken place since its inception. Since most of her interviews took place in May and the article was published in August, it is understandable that Ms. Hastings faced a time crunch of three very short months.

In her article, Ms. Hastings quotes seven different individuals, only one of whom is not opposed to the industry, and even then, it is a company spokesperson speaking in defense of her own company. If there was any balance in this article, it was particularly well-hidden. It is also worth noting Ms. Hastings’ vocabulary in this article, using words like “swarming” and “secretive” in referring to the industry.

Meanwhile, Simon Chesterman, writing in the International Herald Tribune on August 13, has a very different take on the industry. Dr. Chesterman writes, “[o]ne common misconception is that such companies operate in a legal vacuum. This is simply not true. Local criminal law and the law of armed conflict continue to apply, but there is frequently little willingness to investigate or prosecute abuses.”

Here, Dr. Chesterman identifies a critical issue: the willingness of authorities to investigate or prosecute infractions. Some journalists fault the current legal framework, however this is a superficial argument that ignores deeper problems. Those more aware of the issues identify the problems and shortcomings of enforcement. Dr. Chesterman even goes so far as to note that the industry is often victim to “extreme reactions” and that “[m]any countries claim ignorance of the role of private military companies; others grossly overreact to it,” citing the example of controversial South African legislation. He also recognizes the important strides in regulating the industry, and that “the most interesting recent developments have been industry-led” noting the role of IPOA. It is Dr. Chesterman’s contention that the private sector be tapped to help fill the planned 26,000-person UN mission to Darfur.

Chesterman noted that the alternative is a continued reliance on South Asian contingents and the perpetuation of “peacekeeping apartheid.”

Much can be done to improve our industry and much can be done to improve the legal and regulatory frameworks governing it. One reason IPOA has such a phenomenal growth rate is because it has been proactive in addressing these issues – good rules and regulations are beneficial for good companies. Some observers of the industry pragmatically put forward ideas on how best to utilize the private sector in order to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations worldwide. This approach is far more constructive than simply rehashing old, discredited arguments and repackaging them as news.

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Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles

JENNIFER BROOKE

MRAPs Have Become a Popular and Life-Saving Acquisition for the U.S. Military

THE OshKosh slogan “Because the highway to freedom isn’t paved!” is the exact reason that Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles have become the primary item of military acquisition of late. The increase of MRAP vehicle procurement by the United States Army is a testament to the need for protecting its forces against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), small arms, heavy machine gun fire, and mines, while increasing survivability. The MRAP vehicles offer numerous advantages over previous vehicles.

The MRAP vehicles are seen by many as a replacement for the Humvees currently used in Iraq and Afghanistan. On August 8, 2007, the US Department of Defense asked Congress for emergency funding to send MRAP vehicles urgently to its troops facing roadside bombings in Iraq. The $750 million emergency funding request would allow the military to airlift the vehicles there in 13 hours, rather than sending them by ship.

The biggest selling point of the MRAP is its design: MRAP’s possess a v-shaped hull designed to deflect blasts away from the truck, to minimize impact around the crew area. “The key is the truck’s V-shaped steel body, which flares like the hull of a boat,” said OshKosh Truck spokesman Joaquin Salas. “The shape channels the full force of a blast up the sides of the vehicle rather than through the floor,” Salas said. “It’s all physics. Vehicles with that shape are extremely effective.” Force Protection, another producer of the MRAP vehicle also stands behind the design, stating: “not a single U.S. soldier has been killed while traveling in a Force Protection-produced [MRAP] Buffalo or Cougar armored vehicle.”

The V-shaped hull design is not the only reason why these vehicles are increasingly attractive. Boasting wheels that can be driven on when flat, raised chassis and wide ranges of sizes, purchasers are reassured that all terrains are conquerable, and varying numbers of soldiers can safely be transported. The trucks come in three categories, from the small (a seven ton truck that holds six passengers) to the colossal, a 22½ ton mammoth that carries 12 passengers. By comparison, General Motors’ Hummer H3 weighs about three tons; a military tank, meanwhile, weighs around 71 tons. Despite the new trucks’ protective strength, military officials said they do not believe they will completely displace lighter, more maneuverable vehicles. Contractors that are currently producing MRAPs are BAE Systems, Force Protection, General Dynamics Land Systems and OshKosh Truck, Protected Vehicles Inc.

A Cougar MRAP, featuring a V-shaped hull, which deflects, rather than absorbs, the blast of an IED.
Never Again
As Genocide Ensued, the UN Found Itself Sideline in Rwanda

On October 5th 1993 the UN Security Council, through resolution 872, mandated a Chapter VI mission to Rwanda. The objective of the mission was to re-flee the Arusha Peace Agreement that was signed by the Rwandan parties on August 3rd of that year. The Arusha Agreement was supposed to end the civil war which started in 1990 when the Armed Forces of the Hutu led government and the Tutsi led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) started fighting along the northern border between Rwanda and Uganda in October of that year. Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntaryimira of Burundi were killed in a plane that was shot down on its final approach to Kigali Airport, ending the promising talks they had been engaged in, regarding the Arusha Peace Agreement in Dar-es-Salaam. Hutu propaganda aired through the national radio, blaming the Tutsi RPF for the crash. The plane crash, and subsequent assassination of the Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and President Cyprien Ntaryimira of Burundi, sparked the Rwandan zone and demobilization procedures; establishment of an expanded demilitarized security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including assistance in humanitarian activities, conducting investigations in alleged non-compliance with the peace agreements and providing security for Rwandan refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. UNAMIR was supposed to have initial force strength of 2,548 military personnel, however only 400 Belgian soldiers and a contingent of 400 Bangladeshis logistical staff were deployed. The command of the forces was in the hands of the Canadian General Romeo Dallaire (who later wrote about his experiences in the book Shake Hands With the Devil). Although General Dallaire had repeatedly asked for a change to his mandate to include Chapter VII and the use of force, along with an increase in size of UNAMIR, lack of political will of the UN member countries to commit troops and material to the mission saw a distressing decrease in mission size.

Dallaire’s troop contingent dedicated to a contingent to 550 troops; moreover, these troops were unable to use force, and were therefore ill equipped to prevent the mass atrocities. Dallaire and his minimal forces had to watch a genocide unfold around them, which saw the massacre of 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus killed. The limited UN forces were able to save the lives of some 30,000 people.

The UN Security Council, by resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994, authorized the use of force and a multi-national humanitarian operation. French-led multinational forces carried out Operation Turquoise, which established a humanitarian protection zone in south-western Rwanda. Operation Turquoise was highly controversial, however, and accusation of French soldiers supporting the Hutu ‘genocidaires’ did not add to the end of the conflict. Operation Turquoise ended in August 1994 and UNAMIR took over in the zone.

In July, Tutsi RPF forces led by Paul Kagame took control of Rwanda, ending the civil war, and established a broad-based Government. The new Kagame government declared its commitment to the 1993 Arusha peace agreement and assured UNAMIR that it would cooperate on the return of refugees. In response to the Rwandan government request to do so, UNAMIR ended in March 1996 with the withdrawal of the UN troops.

The UN Independent Inquiry into the mission concluded in its report that the overall reason for the failure of the mission was the political unwillingness of the Member states to contribute. Underlying reasons of failure include poor political analytical capacity of the United Nations Secretariat and Security Council, that allowed the genocide to go unrecognized. The inadequacy of the mandate, which did not allow for a ‘worst-case-scenario’ capacity, or adjustment to include the use of force, was the primary reason that Dallaire was unable to prevent planned atrocities or stockpiling of arms. The failure of UN Headquarters’ to respond to urgent cables from Dallaire, confusion over the Rules of Engagement, and an inability to protect political leaders added to the inability of the international community to stop the Rwandan genocide. Finally, the presence of Rwanda as a rotating member of the Security Council represented, by a Hutu, meant that the ‘genocidaires’ party had full access to the deliberations of this key international body.

Despite Dallaire’s efforts, UNAMIR will be remembered as a peacekeeping mission that failed. The establishment of a Broad-based Transitional Government as intended by the Arusha Peace Agreement never took place.
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