The Future of Iraq

U.S. Policy ● Security ● Development ● The International Perspective
Innovation Begins With EXPERIENCE

Aviation Logistics

www.blackwaterusa.com

08-S-0573
Contents.

The Future of Iraq

U.S. Policy.

Michael Shank
9 U.S. Policy in Iraq: A Plague on Both Houses
Juliette R. Shedd
10 Iraq Policy in the Post-Bush Era: Clinton, McCain and Obama

Development.

Michael O’Hanlon
13 Don’t Forget the Economy
Jessica Kruvant-Wilson
14 A Tough Road to Educating Iraqis

Security.

Christian Lowe
15 A Surge in Confidence in Iraq’s Security Situation
Graham Kerr
17 Security in Iraq: The Private Security Perspective

The International Perspective.

Joseph Lacey-Holland
19 The Coalition of the Whoever is Left
Bethelhem Moulat & S.L. Rathgeber
20 Uniting Behind the UN in Iraq

Special Feature.

Zimbabwe’s Election Crisis.

Dr. Nel Marais
24 Zimbabwe: Stability Under Threat

Q & A.

Michael Shank
20 Poppy, Poverty and the Taliban: Interview with Afghanistan Ambassador to the U.S., Said Tayeb Jawad

Government Affairs.

Melinda Baker
23 Military Law on Trial

Industry Info.

IPOA Lion
6 News from IPOA

Columnists.

Doug Brooks
4 The Swiss Show Some Initiative
Amb. Herman Cohen
25 Just When Things Couldn’t Get Worse for Zimbabwe
J. J. Messner
26 Airbus Versus Boeing Should Not be the Debate

Profiles.

IPOA Member Profile
5 Overseas Lease Group
Peacekeeping Operation Profile
30 African Union Mission in Burundi

Copyright © 2007 the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA). All rights reserved. The IPOA logo and the IPOA lion image are trademarks of the International Peace Operations Association. The Journal of International Peace Operations (JIPO) and its logo are trademarks of the International Peace Operations Association. The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent the opinions of IPOA, its officers, Board of Directors, members or affiliates. IPOA bears no responsibility for the editorial content; the views expressed in the articles are those of the authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the Editor-in-Chief.
The Swiss Show Some Initiative

Bringing Clarity to International Legal and Regulatory Frameworks

DOUG BROOKS

The author is the President of IPOA.

I

N April I represented IPOA at one of the final meetings of a project spearheaded by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Swiss Government, better known as the “Swiss Initiative.” The project is designed to “to promote respect for international humanitarian law and human rights with regard to private military and security companies operating in conflict situations.” In a series of meetings since 2006, the Swiss have been diligently working to draft a broad document of widely accepted international legal obligations and good client and state practices. Their persistence has, surprisingly, paid off.

From the beginning, the Swiss Initiative has been refreshingly inclusive with invitees from the academic world, NGOs and the industry itself. The meetings sponsored by the Initiative have been more collegial than contentious, and their format has allowed delegates to work through issues in both formal and informal settings. Analysts and researchers are often astonished at how supportive industry can be towards good laws, rules and regulations; and the industry representatives always brought a foundation of reality to discussions that occasionally strayed into whimsical political science theory. The contacts made through the Swiss Initiative meetings have been enduring and invaluable to IPOA’s own efforts to promote successful and ethical private sector operations.

The Initiative consists of two sections: legal obligations and good practices. While states continue to negotiate a small number of the more prickly international aspects of the legal recommendations, the good practices section has largely been finalized. Both bring an important level of clarity and focus to the use of civilian contractors in contingency operations.

The results are overwhelmingly constructive, but some grating issues could still be clarified. First, the drafters have settled on the terminology of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), which some believe blurs the critical legal partition between civilians and military. Our industry is not military; it employs only civilians, even the approximately 5% that are armed. They do not – and should not – have the same rights as combatants under international law. From an international legal perspective this actuality should be clarified rather than obfuscated by clumsy terminology. The U.S. Department of Defense uses the term ‘contingency contractor’ which we believe is a neutral and accurate description of the broad collection of civilians hired to provide critical support services in conflict, post-conflict and disaster relief operations.

Second, the Initiative is a golden opportunity to reaffirm the importance and legality of providing humanitarian security. Protecting human beings – including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) – should be as legitimate as protecting oil facilities, warehouses and NGOs. Unfortunately, suggestions that this important capability be specifically mentioned in the document were disregarded.

The Swiss Initiative process should be complete by year end, and the final product will be of significant benefit for our industry. It portends clarity on state responsibilities, insight into applicable international law, standardization of contractual requirements, and suggests a bevy of best practices for clients and governments. This clarification and standardization will significantly assist the most responsible companies working in conflict and post-conflict environments, and offer guidance to new firms looking to provide critical services in an ethical manner. Future peace and stability operations will benefit from the Swiss prescience.
The International Peace Operations Association Annual Summit is the premiere event of the private peace and stability operations industry.

The Summit will be held in Washington, D.C., home to some of the world’s largest clients in the global peace and stability operations industry — and also Headquarters of IPOA. The venue for the Summit will be The Liaison Hotel on Capitol Hill, 415 New Jersey Avenue NW, near the U.S. Capitol.

WHO DOES ATTEND AND WHO SHOULD ATTEND?

- Logistics Firms
- Private Security Firms
- Security Sector Reform Firms
- Product Manufacturers/Suppliers
- Government
- Humanitarian Development Firms
- International Organizations
- Media
- NGOs
- Military
- UXO Firms
- Academics

Excellent sponsorship and exhibitor packages are still available

Contact Jared Lawyer at jlawyer@ipoaonline.org for more information

Register online at

www.ipoaonline.org/summit
IPOA is pleased to welcome six new member companies to the Association: AECOM Technology Corporation, American Glass Products, Ecolog International, Rutherfoord, Swift Global Logistics and The Development Initiative. The addition of these new companies brings our membership total to 41, tangible evidence of our Association’s ability to continue to attract companies from a wide variety of countries and specialties.

**AECOM Technology Corporation**

is a multibillion dollar a year international company composed of 21 companies that provide a full range of professional, engineering, technical, training, logistical, and management support services to government and commercial clients. AECOM has more than 40,000 employees in over 690 offices in more than 85 different countries.

**American Glass Products**
is an international company with over 200 employees worldwide. AGP manufactures state of the art bullet resistant glass and after market/OEM automotive glass, and selling and marketing these products to automobile manufacturers, government agencies and armoring companies worldwide.

**Ecolog International**

provides life support services and infrastructure services in contingency operations. The key services provided by Ecolog are construction, logistics, waste management, power and water supplies, laundry, potable toilets, aviation, communications and cleaning. Ecolog has over 1,000 employees worldwide.

**Rutherfoord**

is a full service worldwide insurance brokerage with specialty in DBA insurance programs.

**Swift Global Logistics**

headquartered in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, has provided a comprehensive range of freight and logistics services since its inception in 1989. Swift is dedicated to providing quality service and innovative logistics solutions, offering customers local expertise through its network of 46 offices throughout Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

**The Development Initiative**
group of companies provides the following services to multi-national corporations, governmental and non-governmental organizations: landmine clearance, battle area clearance, explosive ordnance disposal and consultancy, narcotics detection dogs, attack dogs and explosive detection dogs, and, logistics and remote operations support.

---

**Six New Companies Gain IPOA Membership**

**IPOA Membership Continues to Grow at a Rapid Pace**

---

**AECOM Technology Corporation Facts and Figures**

- **Contact:** Robert Akin
- **Address:** 1200 Summit Avenue, Suite 320
  Fort Worth, TX 76102
- **Telephone:** +1 817-698-6703
- **Facsimile:** +1 817-698-6759
- **Email:** robert.akin@ags.aecom.com
- **Web site:** www.aecom.com

**American Glass Products (AGP) Facts and Figures**

- **Contact:** Richard Hull
- **Address:** 631 American Glass Way
  Knoxville, TN 37932
- **Telephone:** +1 865-675-0525
- **Facsimile:** +1 865-675-0526
- **Email:** rhull@agpglass.com
- **Web site:** www.agpglass.com

**Ecolog International Facts and Figures**

- **Contact:** Gokman Ucok
- **Address:** Dubai Airport Free Zone P. O. Box 54464
  Dubai, United Arab Emirates
- **Telephone:** +971 (0) 42-994-500
- **Facsimile:** +971 (0) 50-915-5018
- **Email:** ucok@ecolog-international.com
- **Web site:** www.ecolog-international.com

**Rutherfoord Facts and Figures**

- **Contact:** Sara Payne
- **Address:** 5500 Cherokee Avenue, Suite 300
  Alexandria, VA 22312
- **Telephone:** +1 703-813-6503
- **Facsimile:** +1 703-508-6943
- **Email:** sara.payne@rutherfoord.com
- **Web site:** www.rutherfoord.com

**Swift Global Logistics Facts and Figures**

- **Contact:** Rachel Kriss
- **Address:** 5335 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 440
  Washington, D.C. 20015
- **Telephone:** +1 202-895-2798
- **Facsimile:** +1 202-232-2578
- **Email:** rachel.kriss@swiftfreight.com
- **Web site:** www.swiftfreight.com

**The Development Initiative (TDI) Facts and Figures**

- **Contact:** Julie Cross
- **Address:** 101 Eagle Tower, Montpellier Drive
  Cheltenham, United Kingdom
- **Telephone:** +44 1242-517-271
- **Facsimile:** +44 1242-517-203
- **Email:** jcross@thedevelopmentinitiative.com
- **Web site:** www.thedevelopmentinitiative.com

---

*Email Jared Lawyer at JLawyer@IPOAonline.org*

*The author is the Development Manager at IPOA.*
Valuable, Cost Effective Solutions through Customized Leasing Programs to Multi-National Companies, Government Agencies and NGOs Operating Projects in Developing Countries

Whether Leasing Vehicles, Equipment or Complete Camps Inclusive of Engineering, Construction, Infrastructure and All FFI Details—OLG Financing Allows:

- Capital funds to be utilized for several projects and for core purposes.
- Improved cash flow management.
- An immediate response in a time sensitive situation when vehicles, equipment and complete camps are needed as a result of a crisis situation.

Flexibility & Freedom with OLG!

- Vehicles and equipment may be relocated to alternate projects in different countries.
- THE CHOICE IS YOURS—any vehicle make, model or equipment type.
- Vehicle equipment upgrades, parts packages, communications/navigation systems can be included in the monthly price.

Review the Option of Leasing as a Project Financing Mechanism

Contact us directly for more information and customized pricing
Telephone: 1-954-315-3862
E-mail: HQ@overseasleasegroup.com
Fax: 1-954-315-3884
Tel: U.S. (800) 331-0599
Web: www.overseasleasegroup.com

IPOA We Are A Proud Member of The International Peace Operations Association
IPOA Holds Successful Reception on AFRICOM
Col. James Herron Addresses Industry Representatives on Recent Developments

COLONEL James Herron, the Director of the AFRICOM Liaison Office for the U.S. Air Force, addressed an IPOA networking reception focused on AFRICOM. The networking reception was held on April 23 at the Hotel Lombardy in Washington, D.C. The reception was attended by over 75 representatives from both member and non-member companies, government agencies and NGOs.

Col. Herron provided an assessment of progress on AFRICOM, addressing both operational and conceptual issues concerning the new Command. The presentation was then followed by a Question and Answer session allowing those in attendance to glean further insight into the latest developments within AFRICOM. In response, Col. Herron provided very frank and candid assessments.

IPOA has taken a keen interest in the development of AFRICOM, and the organization had been an outspoken advocate of the Command’s development from an early stage. In response to demand from member companies, IPOA will also devote its Annual Summit in October 2008 to the subject.

IPOA wishes to thank Col. Herron for addressing the reception and for providing such useful insights on such an important current topic.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION MEMBER PROFILE
Overseas Lease Group

THE Overseas Lease Group, Inc. (OLG) is a vehicle, equipment, shelter, and complete Man/Disaster/Refugee Camp leasing business that specializes in providing customized lease solutions to multi-national companies, government agencies, and NGOs operating in developing countries. The main focus of the company is to provide financing for our clients’ projects in developing countries that may normally be challenging environments in which to operate.

OLG began with a great focus on leasing customers large and small size fleets of armored and non-armored project vehicles including buses, construction trucks, and even aircraft. Over time, the company has added to the product or leaseable assets available to the Humanitarian, Military and Industrial oriented customers to meet their unique needs. During the last year, OLG has formed alliances with shelter companies, specialty equipment manufacturers, and various companies that supply needed infrastructure for complete Man/Work/Refugee/Disaster Relief Camps. OLG works with each customer to facet the project and finance everything together: generators, water purification systems, communications and IT equipment, solar energy systems, modular buildings, water storage, hospital and medical facilities, inclusive of all engineering, construction, infrastructure and all FFI details.

Building strong alliances has allowed OLG to fully and satisfy the individual needs of each project. Whether leasing vehicles, equipment or complete camps, OLG continues to provide the following benefits that allow clients to mobilize and operate worldwide:

• financing solutions that allow capital funds to be utilized for several projects and core purposes;
• improved cash flow management
• ability to relocate vehicles and equipment to alternate projects in different countries
• the ability to choose product make, model or equipment type.

OLG will package Vehicles, Shelters, Equipment, or a Complete Camp to simplify financial planning, structure and overall project coordination.

The OLG Corporate Headquarters is located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida with an office and personnel located in Kabul, Afghanistan. Lease Support Services, our subsidiary contract administrators, are located in Parsippany, New Jersey.

Going forward, OLG plans to continue building strong alliances and partnerships that allow the company to supply financing for all commodities and assignment commitments in all emerging countries. To provide comprehensive service and more timely response to disaster relief needs of NGOs and time sensitive projects, OLG plans to expand its regional offices to include Dubai, UAE within the next year.

Overseas Lease Group Facts and Figures

Founded: 2003
IPOA Member Since: 2008
Head Office: Fort Lauderdale, FL
Contact: Tracy Badcock
Email: tb@overseasleasegroup.com
Web: www.overseasleasegroup.com
Despite Some Progress, There is Much Work to be Done

FOR all of Washington’s white papers on the war in Iraq, testimonies by General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and wonkish retching over the war’s latest development – the recent routing of Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, for example – the cures counseled by Congress, the candidates, and the Administration continue to be nauseatingly simplistic: withdrawal or stay the course. The contrasting spectrum of solutions is stark – from immediate withdrawal to an unimaginable 100-year presence – and the criteria for success, or anything remotely close to a “win” constantly shifting.

Sectarianism
In the early years of the war, fingers pointed to virulent and violent Sunni-Shia sectarianism, which was nonexistent pre-invasion (intermarriages were frequent, integrated nonsectarian military common), as the prime obstacle to ultimate Iraq war victory. The number of times members of Congress used the word “sectarian” on the Senate and House floors to describe the impossibility of a stable Iraq was extraordinary. It was the buzz word to use. This preoccupation with sectarianism formed the foundation of a proposal posited later by Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Sen. Joe Biden (D-Delaware), Brookings’ Michael O’Hanlon, and others, that Iraq be split into three sections, along sectarian lines. Balkanize Iraq, they said, and sectarianism will be summarily silenced.

Benchmarks
As Congress quieted on sectarian citations, Washington latched on, instead, to so-called benchmarks, coupled with the semi-absurd metaphoric call for Iraqis to stand up as Americans stood down. Assessing whether Baghdad met any of Washington’s 18 indicators for success, it quickly became clear that Iraq was nowhere near the mark. This public benchmarking faded fast as unmet expectations ultimately implicated the U.S. for inadequate capacity and institution-building of Iraq’s government.

Troop Surge
Attempting to bolster the besmirched benchmarks with brute force, and, concurrently, exemplify a renewed commitment to Iraq’s security, the White House moved decisively, and controversially, towards a military surge. Immediate results indicated a positive impact and as post-surge attacks diminished, Democrats and Republicans alike acknowledged – some reluctantly, some gleefully – that the surge was showing signs of success. This was irrespective of the fact that “there was no one left to kill,” to quote one reporter inside Iraq, since Baghdad was already subdivided into separate Sunni and Shia enclaves, encased by U.S.-built miles-long walls. Regardless, the troop surge substantially shifted American opinion. The majority opinion in 2007 favored a return of troops as soon as possible. It lost its majority in 2008.

Anbar Province
Political gains were needed, however, to justify the new troop levels as concerns mounted regarding the infeasibility of a military-only approach. Surge-induced success was merely a management of violent conflict, not a transformation of it. Thus, Iraq’s Anbar Province became the poster child for success in a bizarre throwback to the Iran-Iraq War, a war in which both sides received strategic assistance from the Americans. Similarly, in Anbar, U.S. forces were funding former Sunni insurgents who detested, and were eager to kill, the very Shiite leaders the U.S. simultaneously supported. These “concerned local citizens” as they were so unsuitably named, or “awakening councils” provided the Pentagon, and even Washington’s war critics, with a compelling story: local Sunnis equipped and trained by U.S. forces, rising up in opposition to al Qaeda. In the global war on terrorism, this was showcase material and breathed new life into a formidable and flagging fight.

The sad reality in the entirety of split of India into two states – cause countless casualties, further uproot the millions of Iraq’s internally displaced peoples, and eventually leave a lingering distaste for the “other” – much like the Balkanized Serbia and Kosovo continue to struggle with. Had the idea of a subdivided Iraq taken root, essentially the U.S. would have taken a united Iraq, wherein pre-invasion national identity trumped sectarian lines, and not only exacerbated ethnic and religious differences but corralled Iraqis into camps of perpetual non-coexistence, with the central-based Sunnis left to fight over the resource-rich north and south.

On benchmarks, to continue to call for accountability when Iraq’s governmental capacity is near nonexistent is naïve. Many in the country think that an Iraq government fails to exist at all. Politicians positioned within the “Green Zone” have little power over it. National infrastructure – the necessities of electricity, water, sanitation, schools, roads, hospitals – fails to function, forcing Iraqi citizens to look elsewhere for

E-mail MShank@gmu.edu
The author is the government relations adviser at George Mason University’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

CONTINUED PAGE 12
The Future of Iraq: Development.

Juliette R. Shedd

Iraq Policy in the Post-Bush Era

U.S. Presidential Candidates Priorities in Iraq will have Lasting Impacts

EVALUATING Iraq policy must start with identifying U.S. national interests in Iraq. If we determine that long term stability in Iraq is not necessary, than a pull out of U.S. troops and reallocation of funds and manpower makes sense. However, there appears to be consensus that a stable, peaceful Iraq is in the U.S. interest. In that case, U.S. policy toward Iraq should seek to employ the lessons learned from other peace processes. The three leading Presidential candidates have made Iraq a main focus of the campaign and spelled out policy prescriptions. Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-New York) and Sen. Barack Obama (D-Illinois) emphasize political and economic reconstruction, while Sen. John McCain (R-Arizona) pushes for a security-first stabilization policy. Whether security or reconstruction is emphasized will have a profound impact on Iraq’s future.

Hillary Clinton

Clinton’s policy toward Iraq focuses on political and economic reconstruction efforts. Her Web site promises that she would have a “clear, viable plan to bring our troops home starting with the first 60 days of her administration.” Her article in the November-December 2007 issue of Foreign Affairs states “While working to stabilize Iraq as our forces withdraw, I will focus U.S. aid on helping Iraqis, not propping up the Iraqi government”—funding governmental and non-governmental organizations that can aid the Iraqi people directly. Specialized units would engage in targeted operations against al Qaeda in Iraq and provide “security for U.S. troops and personnel in Iraq and train and equip Iraqi security services ... but only to the extent that such training is actually working.” Clinton’s plan replaces U.S. military muscle with diplomatic and reconstruction focus and places heavy emphasis on making Iraq a UN-dominated peacebuilding effort.

Barack Obama

While appealing to Americans frustrated with the war, this policy assumes efforts to train Iraqi security forces can be sped up enough to allow Iraq to provide its own security within months. Recruiting and training civilian police and military forces is an essential part of a good stabilization plan. Multi-ethnic integrated forces can be a significant force for stability. Clinton’s emphasis on doing it quickly and disengaging if it is not effective, does not allow time to deal with the inevitable challenges and setbacks that arise in building a legitimate security force. The outcome of this policy is more likely to be a hastily fashioned security structure that will not survive the U.S. troop pull out and may well continue to be viewed as corrupt and ethnically based.

An emphasis on engaging with international actors is appropriate. Focusing on increasing international involvement would allow actors perceived as less partisan to enter the political space in Iraq. But from the standpoint of achieving a long-term peaceful Iraq, Obama’s plan has two major faults. First, it places an extraordinary amount of emphasis on the role of the United Nations in Iraq. Reconstruction efforts must be coordinated if they are to be effective, and replacing U.S. troops with UN forces would significantly complicate any efforts to make strategic, comprehensive efforts to achieve stability. It is also far from the clear that the UN and its member nations would engage in Iraq at the level suggested. Bringing peace to Iraq will not be a simple task, requiring significantly more peace enforcement than the UN traditionally takes on.

Clinton and Obama both propose that solving the economic problems of individual Iraqis will bring about needed security gains,
Iraq Policy in the Post-Bush Era

FROM PAGE 10

ignoring the idea that security must come alongside reconstruction, if not precede it. The removal of U.S. troops in large numbers not matched by increased local security capability will likely increase the violence levels in Iraq. Neither Clinton nor Obama’s plans provide real insight into how they plan to fill the security vacuum in Iraq. The last five years have shown how challenging building Iraqi security and police forces can be, what would they change to train effective security forces in a year?

Neither Clinton nor Obama specifically address the role of U.S. civilians or U.S. contractors in Iraq. In the short-term, the task of removing 140,000 troops and their equipment would keep logistical support in demand; but the lack of permanent bases and presence would mean a narrowing of logistical contracts after the drawdown. However, the removal of U.S. troops could mean significant increases in the contracts available to private security firms as reconstruction companies increasingly turn to private security to protect their operations. But if the security situation deteriorates as quickly as it might, U.S. companies and NGO’s charged with reconstruction, civil society building, and local capacity building, might shut down or curtail their Iraq operations.

John McCain

John McCain’s plan for Iraq includes a more robust counterinsurgency campaign that would clear areas and hold them, allowing “economic and political development to occur in a secure environment.” His campaign site states that the U.S. should accelerate “the training and equipping of Iraq armed forces and police to enable them to play a key role in securing Iraq. Only in a secure environment will the development of Iraq’s political and economic institutions have a chance to succeed.” His international efforts would center on increasing international pressure on Syria and Iran to stop “aiding and abetting” violence in Iraq. McCain’s plan would involve only modest and gradual changes for U.S. contractors. The semi-permanent presence of U.S. troops and likely increased troop levels would require the need for ongoing logistical support. With his emphasis on clearing and holding areas, a modest increase in private security contracts might be expected.

Maintaining a strong presence in Iraq and emphasizing the training of Iraqi police and military are important priorities to achieve a peaceful Iraq. He uses the language of politico-military strategy that implies a coordinated effort to improve both security and economic conditions over the long term. McCain does not provide detail on how he would build the police and armed forces, nor does it indicate how other international partners might be included in the process. The strength of McCain’s plan is an emphasis on maintaining security while developing effective Iraqi security forces, this strategy would be most effectively employed by a truly international coalition, not just the U.S. and close allies.

The emphasis that Clinton and Obama place on incorporating international partners in the efforts in Iraq is necessary, but a significant withdrawal of U.S. troops would paralyze security efforts and make it impossible for political and economic gains to transform Iraq into a stable state. McCain’s plan places the correct emphasis on improving and maintaining security, but by maintaining Iraq as a primarily U.S. operation, it misses the benefit of making reconstruction in Iraq a truly international project. We should hope that our next President will be able to lead us toward a policy in Iraq that recognizes the need for security first and incorporates international partners in a collaborative effort toward a stable, peaceful Iraq.

U.S. Policy in Iraq: A Plague on Both Houses

FROM PAGE 9

political representation and personal protection. Until priority is placed on these points, the Baghdad-based government will forever remain impotent as a political force, and benchmarks embarrassingly pointless.

On the 30,000-strong troop surge, one wonders what they are guarding, or conversely, if they will ever be able to leave. Baghdad is now a maze of walls and zones separating the increasing hatred between the now strikingly segregated Sunni and Shia communities. Furthermore, the “Green Zone” government is ineffective beyond its armed reach. If government services were functional, that might be cause for security concern. But with 70 percent of Iraqis lacking clean water, 80 percent without effective sanitation, 90 percent of hospitals with no medical and surgical supplies, and nearly half struggling in absolute poverty, one wonders what the surge is securing. If the surge intended to give reprise to allow for further reconstruction, to address these basic needs, it might have merit. But the extra boots are bent on bolstering a more segregated society, not a lesser one. At some point, since indefinite financing of an essentially imprisoned Iraq is untenable given America’s recession, this will backfire mightily. Current ceasefires, which some in Washington think are harbingers of impending peace, are merely politicized pauses as militias wait out the surge, regroup and rethink strategies.

On Anbar awakenings, to further fund former Sunni insurgents – who up until recently fired freely on Americans – as they turn their sights instead on al Qaeda, both undermines the concept of a centralized Iraqi government in Baghdad and escalates Sunni-Shia violence. Once holding a privileged position in Saddam Hussein’s government, Sunnis got the boot when the U.S. arrived and have never fully reintegrated despite well-intentioned de-Baathification legislation. The Shia-led leadership in Baghdad wants nothing to do with anything Sunni and consequently, Sunnis are left to fend for their survival, leaving them ripe for the Pentagon picking. It is the American Wild West all over again. Equipping local Sunnis with the money and munitions to manage their own affairs makes a Baghdad-based centralized government completely irrelevant. And while al Qaeda may get a thorough thrashing in Anbar, Iraq as a whole is worse off.

What now, then, if these approaches are ostensibly ineffective in establishing a stable Iraq? Before specific tactics are even mentionable, the modus operandi that landed America in this quagmire, and the one in Afghanistan, must first be questioned, before it is doomed to repeat itself in Iran or Pakistan by any of the three presidential candidates, all of whom seem poised to repeat the mistakes of the past. The prevailing notion that regime change is feasible via unilateral, military mechanisms that are socially, culturally and religiously ill-equipped to navigate the ground post-invasion must be upended. Moreover, to assume that security in any nation state is possible without sufficient attention paid to the political and economic needs of society as a whole is wholly unrealistic. Yet this thinking, which continues to characterize the current president’s policies, will hardly get the Washington regime change it needs in the November presidential elections. And until it does, the war in Iraq, and others like it, will continue to plague this country.
IRAQ’S security situation has improved dramatically over the past year — even if, as General David Petraeus recently told Congress, it is hardly time to start popping the champagne bottles just yet. Iraq’s political scene is also improving. By my benchmarks used now in Brookings’ Iraq Index, the political situation merits a score of 5 on a scale of 1 to 11. This is hardly a strong grade, and even the progress made to date could be reversed, but there is progress nonetheless.

Meanwhile, what is happening on the economic side? As students and practitioners of counterinsurgency and nation building well know, the economy is the third pillar of any successful mission, along with the security and political environments, and can never be neglected. Yet apart from occasional statistics about Iraq’s full coffers, blessed by US$100 a barrel oil, we do not hear much about the economy these days.

It is not for lack of trying, or for lack of resources. American officials and contractors continue to do remarkable things at considerable personal risk and hardship in Iraq. Hospitals and electricity plants are being built, transportation infrastructure improved, water and waste treatment plants constructed. There are lots of ribbon cutting ceremonies and lots of timelines being met, even if others sometimes slip, and even if corruption or poor performance have marred a few efforts.

But the other striking, and lamentable, fact about our economic efforts in Iraq is that for the most part we don’t have the slightest idea of how well they are working. That has to change.

To be fair, a few more things are in fact known about Iraq’s overall economic performance — beyond the individual anecdotes and specific completed local projects. Inflation is within bounds. Oil production has increased gradually (though only modestly). Due in large part to the improved security environment, electricity production and distribution finally took a substantial step forward in 2007, for the first time since the 2003 invasion. Without even counting the informal electricity sector, which has itself grown, official numbers increased 10 to 20 percent late in 2007 — though there have been problems in 2008 that will have to be cleared up as the hot season arrives in Mesopotamia. Cell phone ownership and usage have skyrocketed; national port capacity has increased substantially; the internet is making some inroads.

Not all is so good, even among those broad areas that we can track at the national level. Household fuel supplies are inching up slightly, but only after a couple years of stagnation or even decline relative to demand. Foreign investment remains very modest due to ongoing uncertainty about Iraq’s security and its future. And of course, unemployment remains quite severe.

Beyond those conclusions, though, data is sparse. While the U.S. government can point to plenty of individual projects that are progressing or reaching the ribbon-cutting phase, we do not have a sense of overall national trends. How many Iraqis get water? How many have their trash picked up, or sewage removed dependably from their neighborhoods? How many get the water they need to irrigate their crops? How many get basic health care when they need it? How many of their kids are in school? And how do all these numbers compare to last year, or the latter year of Saddam’s rule? This last question is important because Iraqis’ perceptions of the performance of their current government and of the United States will always be formed in part by comparing today’s conditions to those of the pre-invasion period.

American aid agencies do not have viable strategies to collect meaningful data, perhaps because they are deferring to Iraqi authorities on such matters. With American aid dollars drying up even as Iraqi government funds increase dramatically due to the high price of crude, it is increasingly clear that while security remains in large part an American task, economic reconstruction and development must be led by Iraqis. So we bow out of the debate at times.

This is an understandable decision in one sense, but a dangerous one in another. We must know how well the economy in Iraq is doing. How else can we know whether to advise Iraqis to undertake a massive jobs creation program to alleviate the unemployment rate? Or to revamp strategies for national infrastructure, focusing on smaller and more local systems rather than larger ones vulnerable either to sabotage or to politicians’ bickering and interference? How else can we pressure countries like Saudi Arabia to do more to help Iraq, if we cannot clearly explain the amount of help Iraq still needs? How can we convince war-weary American voters to stay with the Iraq effort (even as it is gradually downsized over the coming years) if they have no comprehensive sense of how it is really going?

We should be able to collect better data. Each year the World Bank produces admittedly imperfect, but still useful, basic developmental information on the overwhelming majority of the world’s countries, including some others experiencing conflict. Few of these countries have the huge foreign presence currently found in Iraq, yet data is still gathered and vetted. Information on child survival, primary education, literacy, and life expectancy is readily available for most African states, for example. Why can’t we do at least as well in Iraq?

One place to start is to ask the UN, which produces most of the above-mentioned data for other countries, to expand its similar operations throughout Iraq. UNICEF has recently issued a report on the state of Iraq’s children, but its data on education is old, and in fact the report provides a nationwide estimate on the availability of basic utilities only for the single specific matter of sewers (UNICEF estimates that, outside of Baghdad, 20 percent of Iraq’s children presently have use of proper sewerage facilities).

Another approach would use polling and surveys to gauge Iraqi attitudes about quality of life indicators. To be sure, such surveys produce imprecise information at best, and only become truly meaningful over a period of months or years as we can discern trends in perceptions. But it is better to start gathering such information late than never. Also, even if survey data is bound to be inexact, perceptions are hugely important when the issue is building a nation, healing sectarian wounds, and restoring to the extent possible the image of America. We need to know if Iraqis believe their lives are getting better.

2007 was the year of security improvement in Iraq, a remarkable period of unmistakable and hugely encouraging progress in reducing violence. Of course, 2008 needs to continue to be a year for Iraqi political progress to reinforce that security trajectory. But just as much, it needs to be the year of the economy. With the security environment so much better, that is now possible. But we will only know how well we are doing, and what further policy changes may be necessary, if we recognize the importance of economic trends — and become curious enough to study them with the same care and attention that we devote to understanding Iraq’s violence.
A Tough Road to Educating Iraqis

A Case Study of the Challenges Involved in a Key Aspect of Post-Conflict Development

O ne of the key pillars of post-conflict reconstruction is the rehabilitation of an effective education system. This particular component of development is key to ensure that the standard of living for the country’s next generation is sufficient to hopefully prevent a spiraling back into conflict.

When Creative Associates International, Inc. began the implementation of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s education programs in Iraq in 2003, what it found was far more dire than anticipated. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s summer 2006 report, the education sector along with the agriculture sector, were the “most completed” of U.S. Government reconstruction efforts. RISE ended in 2004 and Ed II in early 2007.

To be sure, a good deal of reconstruction is still needed in Iraq’s education sector as well as many others. As the leading implementer of education programs in Iraq for USAID through RISE and Ed II, Creative’s staff saw firsthand the range of needs the Iraqis confront as they move forward. But building on the progress made is no small feat. U.S. support is vital to provide Iraqi school children the education – and their teachers the proper training – that they need to help Iraq on the long road toward peace and prosperity.

In the 1990s, war and UN sanctions exacted a heavy toll on the Iraqi educational system. The tight control of the central government left a legacy of neglected facilities, under-paid and under-qualified teachers, and no national commitment to education. Hard economic conditions led many students to drop out of school to support families. Female students weren’t encouraged to pursue their education and community members were excluded from interacting with school staff. The decline of the educational system was tragic, especially for a country with such great pride in its contributions to Arab culture.

The program leaves behind many accomplishments that will serve as a foundation for continued reconstruction and stability. Through the training of master teachers in a cascade system, Ed II trained 40,197 teachers in child-centered pedagogical and technical subject skills. Under RISE, 31,838 teachers were trained, bringing to 72,035 the combined total of teachers trained under both programs.

For a nation that once boasted the best education system in the Middle East, the Iraqi schools exemplified years of neglect with overcrowded facilities often lacking electricity, proper sanitation, furniture, lab equipment and books in libraries. In some villages, classes were held in structurally unsafe mud schools.

Knowing that a strong education system would help stabilize Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein, USAID committed funds to support and rebuild the Iraqi educational system under the Revitalization of Iraqi Schools and Stabilization of Education project, known as RISE and its follow-on, the Support for Iraqi Basic Education project, known as Ed II.

The noble goal of rebuilding the Iraqi educational system, however, was also complicated and challenging because of security threats. Still, according to the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2006 annual report on Iraq, Iraq – stand a chance for brighter futures.

For a nation that once boasted the best education system in the Middle East, the Iraqi schools exemplified years of neglect with overcrowded facilities often lacking electricity, proper sanitation, furniture, lab equipment and books in libraries. In some villages, classes were held in structurally unsafe mud schools.

Knowing that a strong education system would help stabilize Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein, USAID committed funds to support and rebuild the Iraqi educational system under the Revitalization of Iraqi Schools and Stabilization of Education project, known as RISE and its follow-on, the Support for Iraqi Basic Education project, known as Ed II.

The noble goal of rebuilding the Iraqi educational system, however, was also complicated and challenging because of security threats. Still, according to the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2006 annual report on Iraq, Iraq – stand a chance for brighter futures.

E-mail Jessica@caii.com

The author is a Senior Associate at the Creative Center for Security and Stabilization.
A Surge in Confidence in Iraq’s Security Situation
The Streets of Iraq are Barely Recognizable to Only One Year Ago

SAY you’re an operator who did a stint in Iraq in 2006. Back then you were dodging sniper fire, popping smoke when you jumped out of the vehicle, taking cover in any building you could kick a door through and powering through IED ambushes a couple times per day. Back then, Iraq was a crazy place – there were few places in the country from Baghdad-north that you could see more than a few quiet hours on any one day.

Now fast forward to January 2008. Remember that market you dreaded driving through the last time you were there? Pull over and buy some bread from that brick oven joint on the corner of Routes Michigan and Green, you’ll be fine. How about that rule never to stay in one area for more than a few seconds? Cut the places you have to do that anymore in half. And don’t mistake those AK-47-toting Iraqis with sweat suits and headscarves wrapped around their faces for insurgents. They’re your best friends now.

The story of last year’s “surge” of 30,000 additional combat troops has become a tale of two Iraqs. In a sense, it always was; but now that second Iraq – the peaceful one – is a lot bigger. Violence has dropped so precipitously and for so long in some areas the troops there are asking to ditch some of their body armor, and in others, Iraqi troops have moved in where U.S. forces had dominated.

It’s not all candied almonds and chai tea, though. In places like Tikrit, Mosul, parts of Diyala province and some Baghdad neighborhoods, al Qaeda militants and Shiite insurgents continue to rack up the coalition death toll. There’s hard fighting still to do in those areas, but for the most part, the post-surge Iraq is a very different place.

Perhaps the most dramatic change can be felt in Anbar province – once considered the principle command and control node for al Qaeda in Iraq and a province that was deemed “lost” in 2006. With violence across the province dropping precipitously over most of the past year, Marines – the bulk of forces in Anbar – who were girding for a brawl on this year’s rotation have had to dial back their warrior ways for a softer approach. Though their thoughts are tinged with disappointment, many are nevertheless practical about the new reality.

“There’s not much going on this time around,” said Cpl. Ken Dickerson with the Hawaii-based 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. “But at least we’re not losing anybody.”

The two years preceding 3/3’s August deployment were some of the most violent for U.S. forces in its nearly five year occupation of Iraq. But since the surge of...
30,000 troops launched in early 2007, violent incidents in Anbar have dropped to levels unthinkable just a year ago.

According to officials with II Marine Expeditionary Force, there were about 170 “significant events” in Fallujah during the first week of January 2007. That includes firefights, IED attacks, mine explosions and roadside bombs that were discovered, but that did not detonate. By the last week of December, the number of “sigex,” as they’re called, in Fallujah dropped to less than 20.

In Ramadi, the capital of the Sunni-dominated Anbar province and a troubled hot spot for years, incidents dropped from 198 in one week of February 2007, to three by the last week of the year. And in far western Anbar, the Marine commander there reports around 15 sigex per week — and that includes IEDs found by coalition troops but not detonated. Marine officials attribute this massive shift to a population fed up with al Qaeda in Iraq’s terrorist tactics and rejuvenated tribal governance that cast its lot with American efforts to bolster the national government.

Whatever the reason for the reduction in violence, Marines in the field have switched from rifles to paint brushes and from bullets to handshakes. For some of leathernecks on their first deployment to Iraq, it’s a bit of a let-down. One Marine who’s a veteran of the fierce Fallujah fight in November of 2004 said it’s been tough to keep his Marines motivated after regaling them with stories of that epic battle. They came here to fight, he said, and instead they’re patrolling streets teeming with people, devoid of enemy activity.

In fact, 3/3’s Lima Company hadn’t fired a single shot in anger in months, its commander, Capt. Quintin Jones, said. And that’s just fine with him. As local police take greater control of their towns and local citizens help keep al Qaeda malcontents from detonating bombs in their markets, the Marines here are left with little to do but reconstruction and institution building — an overall mission that has one every Marine can appreciate. “It might be a little boring here now,” said Lance Cpl. Parker Winnett, a radio operator with Lima, 3/3. “But at least I’ll come home alive.”

One place it’s definitely not boring, however, is Saddam’s old stomping grounds of Tikrit. Now considered a conduit for al Qaeda militants streaming north and east out of Anbar and Baghdad, you’ve still got to keep moving to the “sniper dance.” You’re out in the open. There are houses all around you — cover and concealment for enemy sharpshooters to plink off a U.S. Soldier. Stand there, wait a few seconds, shift to the right — then do it all over again. If you’ve been to Iraq before, you know the routine. “We don’t want a sniper to get a good shot off on us,” one Soldier said. “So we keep moving all the time.”

In the home region of the deposed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, the security that has only recently descended is tenuous at best. With the Iraqi army largely pushed out to the surrounding towns and villages to help U.S. forces root out the most tenacious holdouts in other areas, the focus in Tikrit is on building a durable police force that can provide security to the local population and at the same time keep the insurgency from sparking up again.

For the American Military Police units and the civilian advisors that help them achieve their mission it’s a tall order. With corruption a part of everyday life and a policing philosophy making the transition from being an instrument of oppression to a force that serves the community, putting the local constables on the right track takes constant interaction and a deep reservoir of patience.

“Our motto is ‘no free chicken,’” said Staff Sgt. Joe Cline, a platoon sergeant with the 56th Military Police Company, who added that their main mission is to cut the Iraqi police’s dependence on the U.S. military.

Each of the platoons with the 56th Military Police Company — which is comprised of Army reservists from Arizona, California and Nevada — is divided into smaller Police Transition Teams, called “PITTs.” Paired with civilian contractors drawn from police departments from across the country, the PITT teams patrol the towns outside the sprawling Camp Speicher base just to the north of Tikrit, visiting police stations, meeting with their leaders and assessing what they need to keep cops on the beat.

On a patrol to the Tikrit patrol station, MPs wanted to see if a shooting incident that occurred the previous day showed up on the station’s log books. After a furious series of mistranslations and fumbling through piles of papers, the Iraqi policeman said he didn’t have the shooting — which occurred just a block away — on his books.

“That was reported at another station,” the Iraqi policeman told the MPs. Frustrated, the MPs looked at each other with dismay.

“One of the things we try to do is to get these guys talking to each other,” said Staff Sgt. David Heath, a platoon sergeant with the 56th MPs. “We’ve had shooting incidents happen right out front that they didn’t respond to.”

Despite their lack of coordination with other stations and security forces in and around Tikrit, their presence is definitely felt throughout the area. It’s tough to pass a street corner in Tikrit that doesn’t have some sort of police checkpoint. Pickup trucks bristling with machine guns and blue-shirted Iraqis storm through the city. You can even hear police sirens whining across town in pursuit of criminals and miscreants.

And that’s a big change for many of these soldiers, who expected a hard fight when they trained for the deployment. “It’s a lot better than what I thought it would be like,” said Spec. Sadie Hagemann, 21, of Sheridan, California, who’s on her first deployment. “I didn’t expect the IPs to be as active as they are.”

But sometimes the mission of taking their hands off the reins of the IP clashes with the still simmering terrorist threat. On January 21, the MPs received a report that in the nearby town of Owja — which is where Saddam Hussein’s body is interred — the entire Iraqi police force had quit en masse. This worried American military commanders, who thought the exodus was a sign that a major terrorist hit was in the works.

Suspicions were high as the MPs rolled out the next day, speeding past the understated tomb of Saddam, whose portrait bedecks the arch above its entryway. They don’t like Owja, where many of the residents’ allegiances reportedly fall in the Baathist camp.

But after a round of hearty handshakes, cups of bitter Turkish coffee and an unhealthy round of chain smoking with the city police chief, Maj. Qusay Abdul Razaq, things were smoothed over. “It was just a misunderstanding with the battalions,” Razaq said, referring to the so-called Emergency Response Units paramilitary police, which conducted a large raid in Owja without informing the local police.

“Everything’s okay now.”

Minutes later, a squad of Soldiers from Alpha Company, 1st Special Troops Battalion of the 101st Airborne Division came into the chief’s office. They’d heard the same report of a mass exodus and were loaded for a fight with an enemy assault that never came.

Though all the Soldiers left the Owja police headquarters relieved that they didn’t have to conduct an all-out assault, many were still suspicious that the underlying tension hadn’t truly abated. “I hate Owja,” said Spec. Anthony Adamo, 21, of Tucson, Arizona, an MP with the 56th MP Company. “There’s so many terrorists there that we can’t pick up.”

True, there are still places in Iraq where bombs kill, bullets fly and mortars whistle through the air. But transport yourself back just a year and it’s a very different Iraq you’ll see. Though violence is down and reconciliation is up, the big question the troops in Iraq are asking themselves is will it hold. And none of them really wants to come back to find out.
Security in Iraq: The Private Security Perspective

GRAHAM KERR

Iraq Still Poses Significant Security Challenges

The most certain test by which we judge whether a country is really free is the amount of security enjoyed by minorities.[1] Tahsin al Sheikhly was the Iraqi Government’s spokesman on its recent security crackdown, when the government of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki moved against the Shia Militia, in particular Jeysh Al Mahdi (JAM). During the resultant upsurge in violence in Baghdad, Mr. al Sheikhly’s family home was assaulted by around 40 Militia fighters armed with small arms and rockets launchers; his house was burnt down during the ensuing gun battle and he was taken hostage. He was released after five days when a tentative agreement was brokered with the assistance of Iran. Mr. al Sheikhly recounted his ordeal in an interview with a British journalist from The Times newspaper. He recognized most of his kidnappers, who made no attempt to disguise themselves, but he will not be hunting them down now.

“Maybe later. Now everything is confusing, there is nothing clear for us. Maybe after we settled everything we will look for them, we will impose the law...”[2]

He also commented reflectively upon on the state of the various houses in which he was held during his ordeal.

“Most of the houses were very, very simple and very, very poor. They haven’t an ashtray. They haven’t a table, a plastic one, they are drinking not clean water. If the Government doesn’t take care to improve their lives, everything will be gone ... our strategy was looking always at security, not for peace. We need social peace more than security.”[3]

One feels that Lord Acton would be disappointed at this stage. Nonetheless, security is one of the central pillars of any civilized society; its interrelated mainstays are: effective government (hallmarked with good governance); strong institutions of state (especially those of law and order); a sound education system; and a well developed social and economic infrastructure.[4] Most would agree that despite its potential, particularly economic, Iraq’s mainstays are currently of inadequate strength and it will take years rather than months to rectify this.

Any article, especially on Iraq, is inevitably a snapshot to some extent; underlying trends tend to remain relatively consistent but the degree to which their influence is felt fluctuates considerably. For example, at the apogee of the internal violence in late 2006 and early 2007, there were a series of high level assessments that stated that some key parts of the country were virtually ungovernable and civil war was inevitable (especially some quarters of Baghdad and Al Anbar Region). This dire situation spawned the ‘Surge’ of some 30,000 American fighting troops during the Spring and Summer of last year. This action pulled Iraq back from the brink.

When I initially drafted this assessment in mid-March, I was focused on the durability of the significantly lower levels of violence, which had been the predominant success of the Surge. A week is a long time in politics, and this adage is no more true than in Iraq. My focus shifted to take into account the Iraqi Prime Minister’s premature move against the Militia.[5] Its lack of success was largely due to both the plans and the troops involved being inadequately prepared. This snapshot attempts to capture the underlying trends and their current degrees of influence.

Following the removal of Saddam Hussein, the democratically-elected government has not been able to assert its authority, and Iraq’s internal security declined steadily until mid 2007. This impeded all reconstruction efforts and engendered a state of lawlessness. Corruption, nepotism and economic stagnation have all exacerbated the malaise and remain significant problems. Polarization into the dominant groupings (Sunni, Shia and Kurd) has been a further consequence with fears that an already partisan dominated insurgency could degenerate into a full-blown civil war. The multi-faceted nature of the insurgency and the lack of any unifying purpose increases its complexity. Foreign fighters, inter-sectarian

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

dangerous place in which to operate in any respect – commercially, militarily or politically. It is assessed that this is likely to remain the case for years rather than months.

From a security standpoint, the dangers are probably well known but are either singly or a combination of:

- indirect fire including mortars and rockets;
- small arms fire from pistols to heavy machine guns, sometimes using armor piercing bullets; and
- Improvised Explosive Devices, which are the most deadly element of the insurgent’s armory, particularly the Explosively Formed Projectiles which have penetrated military armor.

Attacks have generally become more sophisticated in terms of tactics and technology. Furthermore, intimidation of local nationals who work for Coalition Forces or private security companies has become widespread.

Finally, kidnapping has been a common feature of all elements of insurgency. It is estimated that 30-40 Iraqis a day are kidnapped (generally for ransom). They are an easier target than Westerners, who carry higher ransom or political potential.

In Iraq there are several different species of ‘rough men’ who counter the various threats posed by the insurgents – MNF-I and other Coalition Forces, Iraqi Army and Police most notably. These elements can be violent, but there is another significant element to the security milieu, that has provided by civilian private security companies whose role is to deliver protection and defensive security. Offensive operations are rightly neither expected of nor sanctioned for private security companies. Defining a ‘typical Private Security Company’ is elusive, but in Iraq there are several common characteristics:

- Most of the employees are consultants (security operators who are hired for specific contracts) with an ex-military or field force police background.
- Most provide physical security – for people, camps, convoys and equipment.
- There has been much scrutiny and debate concerning the use of private security companies in a war zone. Concerns revolve around the apparent lack of accountability, professional standards, regulation and discipline. As ever, the promoters of these concerns can always find some evidence to support their case. This should not be surprising given that the use of private security companies in such an environment is a venture into unchartered waters. However, it is quite clear that the reconstruction program, the resupply of coalition forces and the guarding of several key installations would not have been possible without the huge commitment of private security companies and their operators.[7] Military forces could not have sustained these demands at the prevailing level of their operations.

Private security companies would prefer to develop a system of self regulation, which is usually better informed and more pragmatic than that which is externally generated. To this end, a number of associations have been created.

This whole topic warrants far more detailed examination than can be afforded in this article, which is a self declared snapshot but non-partisan hitherto. The final section is unreservedly partisan but is intended to give an illustration of the work typically undertaken by one of the many private security companies that has been operating in Iraq since 2003. Hart Security Limited has been heavily involved with providing security for a number of large and challenging reconstruction projects throughout Iraq. Most of this has been within the electrical sector. These tasks have typically required that Hart provide static guards for camps and power lines plus mobile teams for work parties, VIPs and convoys.

Hart has always employed as many Iraqis as possible on its projects – the most at any one time being 3,000. This has encouraged local communities to buy into our projects and brought them much needed employment and income. Hart has also benefitted from local knowledge and information.

In addition to these major projects Hart has consistently provided a number of Convoy Escort Teams (10 at the most and currently four) to protect the resupply convoys for the U.S. Military. This has proved to be the most dangerous work. The Company provided a high profile Personal Security Detail for Dr. Allawi for a year and also was responsible for the provision of security in parts of Baghdad and the Basra area for the elections in early 2005. All of this enabled clients to work in a more secure environment but, as for all Private Security Companies, there has been a significant price to pay in ‘Blood and Treasure’.

Typically Private Security operators are experienced, brave and work without the same level of support as they were used to in the military. To be certain, all are there by choice but their contribution to operations overall in Iraq should be duly recognized.
The United Kingdom, which devoted 45,000 personnel to the initial invasion, has effectively disengaged from major combat operations. After proving inept at combating the growing influence of Shiite militia men in the south and facing mounting casualties, the British government announced that the U.K. would completely withdraw from Basra City and maintain just over 4,000 troops at the regional airport instead. This number is expected to dwindle further to 2,500 sometime during 2008. Those that remain will perform ‘security sector reform’ duties, or ‘overwatch’ as it is euphemistically termed by the U.K. government.

Likewise, the new Australian Labor administration of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has indicated its intention to remove all remaining Australian armed forces personnel from Iraq. Mr. Rudd’s ardent anti-war stance contributed to a landslide victory at the recent general election and reflected popular discontent at Australia’s continued military commitment to the MNF-I. Mr. Rudd has stated that the remaining 900 Australian Defence Force personnel should be withdrawn by the end of 2008.

Poland’s government also wants complete disengagement by the end of 2008 as well. Its command of the Multi National Division-Central South is facing scrutiny by the recently elected Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who believes that the remaining 900 Poles in Iraq (down from 2,500 previously) should be brought home as soon as possible.

However, this waning commitment of coalition members to the counter-insurgency and reconstruction effort is not wholesale. A number of countries, particularly from the former Soviet bloc, have retained and in some cases increased their numbers in Iraq.

Georgia, for example, has a quarter of its army deployed to Wasit province conducting operations along the Iranian border and also providing security at several Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). Georgian contingents have also been involved in the protection of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) in Baghdad.

Similarly, Romania has around 400 troops in southern Iraq engaging in reconnaissance missions and prisoner interrogation, whilst its neighbor and NATO ally, Bulgaria, has a company of soldiers guarding facilities in Ashraf City and running the Temporary Interview and Protection facility at the same location.

Although deploying significantly smaller numbers, both Macedonia and Albania maintain deployments that are sizable undertakings considering their more limited military capabilities. Service personnel from both countries conduct combat operations in Baghdad and Mosul, supporting U.S. Special Forces in their fight against the insurgency.

This concentration of forces from the former Soviet bloc is by no means coincidental. Many analysts regard such deployments as politically motivated moves by countries intent on solidifying their claims to NATO membership. Georgia, Albania and Macedonia are all chasing Membership Action Plans (MAPs) from the alliance, whilst both Romania and Bulgaria remain in the infancy of membership and are eager to prove their mettle.

Beyond these European forces there is a notable contingent of South Koreans stationed in Iraqi Kurdistan and a Mongolian infantry company supporting the Polish-led division out of Diwaniyah. The 933-man strong ‘Zaytun Division’ from South Korea is a significant contribution from a country that generally shies away from international engagement. However the division is strictly confined to reconstruction projects and Seoul has flatly refused to consider expanding its role to include combat.

Outside the U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom there are international forces participating in the NATO training mission for the Iraqi police force and UNAMI. The former draws on personnel from 16 countries but has comparably few numbers of boots on the ground, with the entire mission consisting of no more than 250 military instructors and support staff.

UNAMI has around 300 employees based inside Iraq and another 300 in supporting roles at various locations throughout the Middle East, but the majority of these are locally employed, civilian staff.

The U.S.-led coalition is far from an alliance of equals. Despite the somewhat diverse representation of nation-states, the numbers of non-U.S. service personnel involved are negligible. Although the staunchest allies of the U.S. have proven fairly resilient in their ‘staying power’ very few contributors have allowed their troops to engage in high-intensity operations, which reflects global governmental hesitation about taking casualties in Iraq. The MNF-I reached its peak in early 2004 but since this point has been in terminal decline and only the persistent attention of U.S. diplomats have prevented its complete collapse.
Uniting Behind the United Nations in Iraq

Iraq’s Future May Require the UN to Take a Greater Role in Reconstruction

FOR many years now, the role of the United Nations in Iraq has been controversial. In the 1990s, the UN was the forum through which the devastating regime of sanctions was imposed on the Saddam Hussein dictatorship. A result of this program was the heavily criticized Oil-For-Food Program in 1996. Similarly, it is also arguable that the UN resolutions authorizing the disarming of Iraq provided the legitimization for the Anglo-American coalition that invaded the country in 2003, although the Security Council vetoed a formal authorization of the war.

At the outset of the invasion the relationship between the UN and the United States was strained, with no explicit UN support for the invasion. Yet the invasion took place regardless, leaving many critics of the UN to triumphantly claim that its legitimate and credible role as an international body capable of enforcing collective security, even when such security is breached by the world’s superpowers, had been severely tarnished.

Despite initial differences of opinion between the invading coalition and the UN, it was not long before the latter was to be active within war-torn Iraq: on August 14, 2003 the Security Council of the United Nations passed resolution 1500 to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which entailed the delivery of humanitarian aid and the engagement in institution building and reconstruction.

However, when the UN compound in Baghdad was struck by a massive truck bomb on August 19, killing 22 UN staff including the mission chief Sergio Vieira de Mello, then-Secretary General Kofi Annan withdrew almost all UN personnel from Iraq after reviewing the security situation.

The UN got involved in Iraq once again in 2004 following Security Council Resolution 1546, which introduced the two main areas of concern in Iraq that the United Nations has had since that time. The first is granting authorization for the Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) to operate within the country. This was in view of the fact that Iraq now had a sovereign government and at the request of the then Iraqi Prime Minister Dr. Ayad Allawi. The authorization has subsequently been reviewed and renewed on a yearly basis. The second is the operation of United Nations missions in Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait, under the auspices of the UNAMI.

Five years have passed since the beginning of the invasion and clearly the tables have turned as it is now more evident than ever before that the UN and the U.S. are working side by side in an effort to establish a stable, peaceful, secular and democratic Iraqi state.

The UN has two primary roles in Iraq—humanitarian and political. With respect to its humanitarian role, which is arguably less controversial than the political one, the UN has been providing support to the government of Iraq in delivering basic social services through its cluster system approach, which comprises of some 16 UN agencies, funds and programs specialized in the various sectors to be rebuilt. These sectors include agriculture and food security, education, health and nutrition, refugees and IDPs, infrastructure, governance and support for the electoral process.

Within the framework of the cluster approach aforementioned, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are two of the most actively involved UN agencies in the reconstruction and development work that is being undertaken in Iraq.

Among the extensive number of current projects is the Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq Programme through which the UNDP, in close collaboration with the Iraqi Government and the International Organization of Migration, is assisting the process of identification and placement of qualified expatriate professionals in the Iraqi labor market so as to accelerate the ongoing rehabilitation efforts of the Iraqi economy. This particular initiative is exemplary of the UN’s intention of promoting strategies which are meant to enhance local and national ownership of all ongoing relief and reconstruction strategies, giving thus opportunity for the Iraqi people as opposed to being strategies dictated from above with little concern for the needs of beneficiaries.

Other important UNDP-led humanitarian initiatives include those pertaining to the reconstruction of essential humanitarian infrastructure and restoration of basic services. These include projects concerning water and sanitation, reconstruction of hospitals and community markets and the installation of electricity generators and transmission equipment.

Similarly, in the area of transportation the UNDP has been providing support in the development of ports, waterways management practices and the rehabilitation of the national civil aviation infrastructure. Moreover, the UNDP has been engaged in an effort to remove UXOs (Unexploded Ordnance) which obstruct safe commute as well as reconstruction work throughout Iraq.

On the more sensitive issue of the political role of the UN, past major achievements include the latter’s contribution to the formation of the first functional and democratically-elected Iraqi parliament in 40 years and its role in the drafting of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution. The UN has also helped in the implementation of the two rounds of general election and a national referendum on the Constitution. Furthermore, UNAMJ has provided assistance in the planning process of the legislative agenda of the Independent High Electoral Commission and has been able to observe the selection of the nine Commissioners by the Council of Representatives.

However, the support of the UN and the U.S. in the establishment of an Iraqi elected government has not been able to strengthen the government’s legitimacy as resistance continues to pose security problems from within, ultimately hindering the successful implementation of current and future humanitarian assistance initiatives.

It is clear that a long-lasting peace in Iraq will only be achieved through a well negotiated and inclusive political settlement. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that there is scope for the UN to play a significant peace brokering role in such a political settlement process; however, this will be possible only if the UN is allowed to take the lead as a neutral body and if it then engages with all key actors. Ultimately, if this happens, the humanitarian initiatives of the UN will bear even more fruitful future outcomes than now.
The U.S. Department of Defense recently released a memo directing commanders to apply Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) jurisdiction in certain circumstances involving civilians, and currently the first civilian contractor is being prosecuted under military law since the Vietnam War. The Departments of Defense and State, and USAID have been working toward a Memorandum of Understanding to develop improved uniform standards and requirements for contractors. Congress continues to call for hearings on contractor oversight and accountability, yet the MEJA Expansion Act continues to remain stuck in the Senate.

Looking at the overall report card, the Department of Defense, in coordination with State and USAID, is trying to take specific initiatives to improve its acquisition procedures and clarify the role and standing of its contractors. In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in early April, Jack Bell, the Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, stated that the Memorandum of Understanding and other inter-agency regulations mandated by Sections 861 and 862 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) FY08 should be executed by the July 1, 2008 deadline. However, efforts at improvement might prove to be long and painful. Recent embarrassments such as a fraudulent ammunition contract and the recent Defense Procurement Policy Report citing the Army’s failure on testing and approval of first articles for over half of its body armor contracts no doubt reveal this.

Moreover, attempts to clarify procedures and jurisdiction for handling misconduct by contractors in contingency operations have resulted in an even more confounding picture. The Department of Justice has been repeatedly criticized for its absence in pursuing criminal cases under the jurisdiction given to it by the current Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) passed in 2000. Testifying before Congress in early April, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice Criminal Division divulged (without providing the number of total referrals it had made to the UCMJ in October 2006 that allowed for UCMJ jurisdiction over persons accompanying U.S. armed forces in both declared war and contingency operations. It is unclear whether in publishing this memo, Defense fully anticipated the potential outcomes that would arise. With what was seemingly a balanced attempt to take action without stepping on the authority of U.S. federal jurisdiction, myriad legal and practical challenges were unleashed when less than a month later the first active prosecution of a civilian contractor in Iraq occurred. Alaa Mohammad Ali, a dual Canadian-Iraqi citizen who served as a translator for the U.S. Army, was accused of stabbing another contractor on a U.S. base in Iraq. Should this case go to trial in a military court, it will both once again raise the controversial issue of prosecuting civilians under military law and bring up questions of whether the military is prepared and equipped to handle the sheer number of potential cases that this precedent could set. Mr. Ali’s non-American citizenship only adds another layer to this already complex case.

Looking to Congress, clarification and guidance do not appear to be in sight as long as the Presidential election dominates the scene. There has certainly been no shortage of congressional hearings by the various government oversight, foreign relations, and armed services committees and subcommittees over the past few months during which federal agencies are chastised for their poor acquisition and oversight processes. However, it is not enough for Congress to criticize and then pass the buck. Partisan politics threaten necessary first steps such as passing the MEJA Expansion Act or creating the Commission on Wartime Contracting that was mandated in the NDAA FY08. The rule of construction added to the MEJA Expansion bill passed by the House that exempts intelligence activities challenges both its ability to be passed in the Senate and the bill’s potential effectiveness if it were to be passed. As for the Commission, with two appointees made by the President, it is doubtful if any action will be taken on that front prior to the November election.

The lack of direction in developing a unified strategy for regulating and ensuring legal accountability for contractors in contingency operations poses a major problem for all stakeholders. The possibility that the application of military law to civilians will be struck down in the future, as it was decades ago, is very real. The DFAR rules continue to emphasize that contractors are not part of the armed services, do not carry out combat missions, are subject to the rules on the use of force rather the military rules of engagement, and bear the risk of determining which set of laws take precedence, including those of the host country. Given these continued designations, it is difficult to determine whether the October 2006 UCMJ amendments will be able to hold-up given the traditional civil-military legal distinction.

In the face of an absent Department of Justice, striking down military jurisdiction would continue to perpetuate the unacceptable lack of legal accountability that the U.S. has been struggling with for the past several years. On the other hand, using the military justice system to investigate every allegation of wrongdoing is at best burdensome on a practical level. At worst, the U.S. military is setting a dangerous precedent in having a second-country military play judge to a third-country national when a host-country’s legal system is unavailable. In Iraq, CPA Order 17, which currently provides non-Iraqi contractors immunity from Iraqi law, will run out at the end of 2008. With resentment from Iraqi officials, the U.S.’s inability to establish a legal solution that falls in line with the values of its legal system could come back to haunt it in the future.

U.S. legislators must recognize that the use of contractors in contingency operations, particularly private security contractors, is a real and complex situation that requires proactive solutions. Passing effective MEJA legislation can provide the Justice Department with FBI investigative resources and required reporting mandates that can help it to become the necessary legal outlet that should be handling these cases in the first place. On the front side, Congress needs to push for better regulations that help weed out unqualified contractors before problems arise. If the U.S. government and military cannot come up with a more closely integrated approach to acquisition, oversight, and accountability, problems will continue to slip through the cracks and the blame game will continue indefinitely.

Email mbaker@ipoonline.org
The author is a Research Associate at IPOA.

Military Law on Trial
The First Civilian Contractor to be Prosecuted Under UCMJ Since Vietnam
Michael Shank interviewed Afghanistan’s Ambassador to the US on March 6, 2008, regarding Afghanistan’s poppy and poverty problems, relations with Pakistan, U.S. presidential candidates’ policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan, Paddy Ashdown, and talks with the Taliban.

**JIPO:** What do you make of the United States’ new tack in dealing with poppy in Afghanistan— that of planting pomegranate instead of spraying crops? What’s your assessment regarding the most effective way of addressing the opium problem? Do you see promise in providing farmers with alternative crops?

**Ambassador Jawad:** First we have to be very clear that there is no one solution for a very complicated problem such a poppy. There is no silver bullet to kill this beast. Over-emphasis has been made, actually a lot over the past five years, on eradication, all types of eradication, manual or aerial spraying or others, which is important but only aspect of fighting narcotics. It’s one-fifth of the strategy.

That strategy must have five pillars. First is eradication. The second is interdiction, going after the traffickers. The guys who are making most of the money are not the farmers it’s the trafficker and the processor. It’s important to enhance the interdiction capabilities of both the international community and the Afghan government.

The third is alternative livelihood. Again, not alternative crops: logically, economically, socially it doesn’t make sense to say “now don’t grow poppy, instead grow pomegranate or grape.” It’s not going to work. If you’re looking for alternative livelihood that means that you’re going to have to introduce a number of crops depending on the region. It could be rose for rosewater, it could be sunflower, or it could be cotton or a number of other products. But equally important if you’re going to succeed on that you have to have facilities to process this. A pomegranate, in order to create value, must be converted into pomegranate juice and exported outside. Or grape [converted] into a more valuable product. So the third aspect is an alternative livelihood and that includes an alternative crop, but the alternative crop is just one part of the alternative livelihood. The real task is development, infrastructure, building the roads, making sure that the legitimate crop gets to the market. The fourth component is building institutions, police, judicial system, the courts, and others. The fifth component is reducing demand through regional cooperation. As long as there is demand, somebody will grow them. And as long as countries around Afghanistan do not cooperate on eliminating trafficking and processing, that problem will continue. So there has to be five pillars. Eradication is one pillar but this is only one-fifth of the fight.

**JIPO:** Do you feel that the international community is predominantly focused only on this one aspect?

**Ambassador Jawad:** Eradication, yes. That’s why there hasn’t been that much progress.

**JIPO:** In light of the recent United Nations report, which focused on the demand for opium throughout the world, do you think there is insufficient attention paid to the demand side of Afghanistan’s narcotics problem?

**Ambassador Jawad:** Again, as much as reducing the demand is a long term project, as much as the regional cooperation is a long term project, as much as development and building infrastructure is a long term project, fighting narcotics is a long term project. It takes from five to ten years. But it takes a comprehensive approach by all parties. We are not going to succeed on that if we’re going to try one aspect, just interdiction or just eradication. We have to have all of them.

We have to have an incentive for the farmer to do something else. But you have to have a strong enforcement capability, which comes from interdiction, institution building and eradication. Eradication just by itself pushes the farmers into the hands of the traffickers.

**JIPO:** You’ve talked a lot about the need to build institutions in Afghanistan. Is there a role for the U.S. here despite the fact that U.S. aid to Afghanistan has been primarily military, with reconstruction aid totaling only 10 percent of U.S. assistance?

**Ambassador Jawad:** Yes, but more funds should go specifically towards capacity building of the government, trade and private sector capabilities. That capacity building consists of two parts. One is training, and the transfer of skills; training the judges, the prosecutors, the traders, the shop keepers, to be able to integrate into this global market, by having the pomegranate from Helmand to reach Dubai. That requires a better degree of understanding of how to package it, how to get it to an airline, how to get it to Dubai. So those are all important steps that need to be taken in training and transfer of skills.

The other part is to provide better funding for the government to pay better to keep the civil servant, the teacher, and others to continue to work for the government. Pay forty dollars to the teacher, while the economy grows at a much faster rate, and the teacher will leave the job and...
become a taxi driver or something else because he can make a lot more money. If you don’t pay adequately you don’t get qualified people. Particularly when the economy is picking up, if their salaries stay the same, instead of building capacity the government is bleeding capacity.

**JITO: Do you think this message is making its way to the U.S.?**

**Ambassador Jawad:** To a certain degree, yes, specifically there is a lot more emphasis on capacity-building but a lot of the capacity building is now based on sending consultants and getting reports. This is not the way to do it. You really have to create this capacity among the Afghans. The consultant comes in, he is charging something like $10,000 - $40,000 a week, and then they write a report and they take it back on their laptops. You really have to work with the ministries, the institutions that lack this capacity, not create parallel structures, an advisory board, a panel or a commission combined of Afghans and foreigners, that is not effective. You really have to invest that money and those resources in the ministries and in the office of the governor or district chief at the local level too to create that capacity.

The PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) can play an important role of not only digging wells or building a clinic but also teaching the Governor or his staff how to open an email or write an email. If there are traders there locally, bring them in and teach them the basics of how to come up with a balance sheet. [Teach them the] basics on the marketing and packaging—simple things that could be very beneficial for them.

Capacity-building is really a transfer of skills, at every level. That transfer of skills doesn’t mean bringing them here to get an MBA, though this is needed also at a different level, but even a two-day course is effective at the district level. Have a course for the police officers on respecting human rights. This is all capacity-building.

Equally important, make more funding available to the government to pay better. When they pay better, they recruit more qualified people. When they don’t pay, nobody shows up, or they are unqualified.

**JITO: Do you see any of the three U.S. Presidential candidates—Obama, Clinton, or McCain—shaping a new effective policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan?**

**Ambassador Jawad:** Fortunately everyone — the Congress, the Administration, media, the think-tanks — understands the magnitude of the problem. There’s a better degree of willingness to grasp that yes we are facing a serious challenge here. And what we have done has been effective in certain aspects and in other areas we have to do it in a better way, a different way.

We are grateful that the Democrats are indicating that they will do more for Afghanistan. Equally important, the administration is about to increase their support for the country. What is important for us is for U.S. policymakers to see and understand that stability in Afghanistan means stability in the region and also security in the United States.

**JITO: Do you have any thoughts on how the new coalition government in Pakistan will impact Pak-Afghan relations?**

**Ambassador Jawad:** I think it’s a step forward. We always in the past argued for the strengthening of civic organizations, civil rule in Pakistan. We are happy for the fact that the election was fair and transparent. In the long run, what we expect from the Pakistan government is to fight extremism in a sincere way. And to recognize that extremism is a threat for Pakistan, for Afghanistan and for the world. Any government that is based on that, we offer our support, our friendship.

**JITO: How do you see the Afghan-Pak border issue being dealt with?**

**Ambassador Jawad:** The border is not an issue. The same, weak capacity that exists in patrolling the Pakistani border, in fact a much weaker capacity exists along the Iranian border, the border with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Why is no one coming from there? So the problem is not the border. The problem is what’s happening on the other side of the border.

You have almost no one at the Canadian border; most people are coming from Mexico. It’s not the border or how many people you have at the border with Mexico or Canada; it’s what’s happening on the other side, poverty and many other things that are driving people from Mexico into the United States. That force is not in Canada.

It’s not the border. It’s not how many big walls you build on the border. It’s what’s happening on the other side. You can build walls but it’s not going to help. You have to go to the source.

**JITO: Why was Afghanistan not interested in having Paddy Ashdown serve as the UN special envoy?**

**Ambassador Jawad:** Coordination in Afghanistan needs to take place at three levels: First, among the international partners; Second, among the international partners and the government of Afghanistan at the national and local level.

Paddy Ashdown played a role in bringing the international players together. But it’s equally important that the coordinator enhance the coordination between the international community and the Afghan government. That will happen only if the international community considers Afghan important. Therefore, based on his experiences, and based upon what we heard, there was concern about the way he operated in the past. Getting back to your question on pomegranate, you’re not going to resolve the problem of Afghan narcotics by pomegranate. You’re not going to resolve the problem of coordination at the international level with Paddy Ashdown. You’re not going to have coordination if you’re not ready to be coordinated.

These different countries, with different degrees of commitment and different mandates, they will not change overnight and say tell us Lord Ashdown what should we do? Now the gentleman from Norway will take his place. I’m sure that he’ll try his best. But this is not a key that you just turn around and say we have appointed this person. No, there is going to be a lot of hard work for us, for the international community.

**JITO: There has been a lot of debate within Kabul and within the international community as to whether or not talks with the Taliban should take place. Do you think reconciliation with the Taliban will ultimately need to have them at the table?**

**Ambassador Jawad:** Yes. There are different degrees of engagement right now. President Karzai, the government of Afghanistan, our international friends now understand more and more why we are coming from that position and have shown willingness. We will talk with the Taliban. Provided they respect the Afghan constitution. The Afghan constitution is a joint achievement of the Afghan people and the international community that came to assist Afghanistan. Underneath that framework, we have indicated our willingness to talk with the Taliban.
Zimbabwe’s “Election” Crisis.

Zimbabwe: Stability Under Threat

Political Consensus is Required to Prevent a Potential Military Coup or Civil War

According to the final results of the March 29 elections for the lower house of Parliament in Zimbabwe, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) won 99 seats, the ruling ZANU-PF party obtained 97 seats and a breakaway MDC faction got 10 seats. One independent candidate won a seat. Three by-elections will have to take place.

The MDC and ZANU-PF each won 30 seats in the Senate. The presidential election results have not yet been announced, although reliable sources say MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai received 53.03 percent, President Robert Mugabe got 43.7 percent and Simba Makoni, former ZANU-PF, managed to bag six percent of the vote.

President Mugabe and his ruling party have prevented the announcement of the presidential election results. In this regard their strategy seems to be to:

- Ensure a second round of voting during which time intimidation and even election fraud will be used, also in the absence of many of the original elections observers.
- Challenging the validity of parliamentary results (wards) in order to ensure a recount or numerous by-elections.
- If everything else fails, to bring the elections into dispute and then to insist on new elections. If this is prevented the ruling elite might well declare a state of emergency or execute a “silent coup.”

Although the main faction of the MDC has won the most seats in parliament, it will still need a coalition with Simba Makoni and the smaller MDC faction to ensure an outright majority. Makoni might insist on the accommodation of other ZANU-PF moderates – a request that might not be acceptable to many within the MDC.

The MDC has now established itself as a national party, with strong support in both rural and urban areas. As such, it will be extremely difficult for ZANU-PF to defeat the opposition in free and fair elections, should this take place within weeks.

Notwithstanding earlier fears, the elections were relatively free and fair and little evidence exits of vote rigging. According to local experts, the ruling party seriously underestimated support for the MDC, also in rural areas. As a result, less intimidation and vote buying took place than during previous elections and this contributed to the opposition’s strong showing during the March 2008 elections.

Technically, a second round of voting might be required to elect a new president, as the constitution requires an absolute majority - something Tsvangirai might have missed by a small percentage. But the MDC is not keen on a run-off, as they expect the levels of intimidation and political violence to increase dramatically during such a campaign period. However, if the election is anything close to free and fair, Tsvangirai should emerge the victor – probably with at least 60 percent of the vote.

For now, one of the most immediate threats to stability is the fact that some senior commanders in the security forces remain unwilling to accept a complete handover of power to the MDC. The role of retired General Solomon Mujuru is vital to ensure that the military refrains from direct intervention. He is a ZANU-PF stalwart and former chief of the defense force, but also opposed to President Mugabe's continued rule. As such, he is in the best position to convince his former colleagues not to intervene in current political impasse.

The next few weeks will remain tense and the MDC will have to ensure that it can convince ZANU-PF leaders and security force commanders that a new government will respect the constitution. Any indications of a program of retribution could lead to a bloody coup attempt.

MDC supporters will also have to be controlled and prevented from attacks aimed at hard-line ZANU-PF elements. Victory celebrations can easily turn into anarchy and violent confrontations. Under the present circumstances, the reaction of local security force structures, including the riot police, is difficult to predict.

Behind-the-scenes talks have been taking place to try and avert a military coup. At least two hardliners are reportedly willing to stage a coup: Air Force Marshal Perence Shiri, who is closely associated with the Matabeleland massacre of the 1980s, and the Defence Force Commander, General Constantine Chiwenga.

Air Marshal Perence Shiri attained notoriety after the transfer of power to black Zimbabwe in 1980. President Mugabe made his trusted friend commander of a highly sensitive army unit called the Fifth Brigade. Shiri was given the task of suppressing dissidents among Zimbabwe’s minority Ndebele tribe. He went about this with gusto, commanding a unit which murdered at least 8,000 people and tortured or abducted tens of thousands more between 1983 and 1986, making him one of the most feared men in Zimbabwe. He reportedly fears that a new government will institute legal proceedings against him.

But Shiri and Chiwenga have reportedly met opposition from Army Commander Philip Sibanda, Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri, the Chief of the Zimbabwe Central Intelligence Organisation, retired major-general Happyton Bonyongwe; and the Director of Prisons, retired brigadier Paradzai Zimondi, who feared the worst in the event of a military clampdown.

It is understood that Shiri and Chiwenga feared a future government without a ZANU-PF component. To allay their fears, Simba Makoni has reportedly been mentioned as the man who could fill that void, “in a very senior position and possibly as prime minister,” a role abolished when Mugabe was elected president in 1987.

There are three main short term possibilities:

- Tsvangirai and the MDC will be declared the victors and Zimbabwe’s economic reconstruction could begin.
- Mugabe and ZANU-PF will either not accept the results, therefore remaining in power, or will manipulate the electoral process to ensure at least a partial victory. This will lead to the complete collapse of the economy, increased political violence and possibly to a military intervention, facilitated by General Mujuru in order to rid ZANU-PF of Mugabe.
- International and regional efforts could still lead to some kind of political compromise, ensuring an interim power-sharing agreement, as well as assurances that Mugabe and senior ZANU-PF leaders will not be charged with human rights violations or economic crimes. This will ensure neither immediate political stability nor long term economic recovery.
EVERY time Zimbabwe appears to have hit rock bottom in its political, economic and social disintegration, something new arises to bring greater suffering to the embattled population.

The most recent tragedy was caused by the presidential and parliamentary elections of March 2008. An honest count gave the opposition MDC party a majority in Parliament, the first time the opposition has won since the country’s transition to black majority rule in 1980. But in the presidential election, the government prohibited the announcement of the results, indicating that the MDC candidate had either won, or had forced ruling President Robert Mugabe into a run-off election. Three weeks later, the government indicated that a run-off would take place, even though the final vote count was still not released.

The government’s announcement of a run-off election was followed by a wave of brutal repression of opposition parties, the independent press, and villages that failed to give President Mugabe a victory on the first round. It was clear that Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party were determined torig the run-off election, using intimidation, violence and rigging or whatever else was necessary to stay in power.

When President Mugabe saw his popular support starting to dwindle in 2002, he decided to do whatever was necessary to keep himself and his party in power. He had won elections easily between 1980 and 2000 because Zimbabwe was relatively prosperous with strong commercial agricultural export earnings from tobacco and corn. In addition, there were substantial revenues from the mining of platinum, chrome and copper.

Towards the end of the 1990s, there was growing discontent with unemployment caused by a high percentage of high school graduates and very little new foreign investment. Secondary school graduates could not find jobs. An opposition political party, the MDC, started to get traction in elections, winning the two big cities, Harare and Bulawayo.

Mugabe’s problem was caused by his Marxist-Leninist political philosophy. The private sector, especially large multinational corporations, were suspect, and had to be discouraged, except for those Zimbabwe had inherited from the days of white minority rule. Without new investment, and with a growing population, unemployment rose.

On the political side, the ZANU-PF party designated itself as a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. Indeed, it was more important than the government. All major policy decisions were made in the ZANU-PF’s impressive party headquarters in downtown Harare prior to government action as a rubber stamp. According to doctrine, the vanguard party could not be allowed to lose power. As a former Vice-President of Zimbabwe said in 2002, “if the party nominates a baboon to run for President, the people will obey and vote for the baboon.” In short, Zimbabwe was governed on the Soviet model, with a veneer of fake free elections.

With an election defeat looming during the period 2000-2002, Mugabe needed to take dramatic action to divert popular opinion. His actions led to a devastating blow to Zimbabwe’s economy, and turned the country into a militarized state very similar to Burma or North Korea. Mugabe’s dramatic actions were designed to stir up xenophobic nationalism and anti-white racism in an effort to sublimate growing anti-government feeling.

First, he ordered the seizure, without compensation, of the large commercial farms owned by white Zimbabweans. Mugabe said that the British government was responsible for paying compensation because the best agricultural lands were seized by whites during the time of British colonialism. The confiscated farms were redistributed to high party officials and their families.

Second, Mugabe used the police to engage in thugsquish actions against opposition politicians, privately owned newspapers, and rural villages that had dared to vote for the opposition. The latter had their food rations cut off in times of drought. He also got rid of high court judges that dared to be independent.

The net results of Mugabe’s actions were an almost total loss of agricultural export revenue, a severe shortage of foreign exchange to pay for vital industrial and agricultural inputs, and a massive outflow of citizens to South Africa and Botswana seeking employment and food. As of the beginning of 2008, Zimbabwe has lost about one-third of its population, four million people. In addition, the loss of revenues caused the government to print money, resulting in massive inflation running at the rate of 100,000 percent per month.

As in Burma, high ranking military and police, as well as leading ZANU-PF officials, have enriched themselves by playing the spread between local and foreign currencies. Scarcemoney is sold off to party cronies at low fixed exchange rates, while the general population starves. At the same time, the seized commercial agricultural farms are producing low value and low quantity subsistence crops instead of the former high value export crops.

The bottom line is that Zimbabwe is suffering from a collapsed economy and is a growing police state. Is it moving toward a failure or collapse of the state? This is not likely in the near future because, as in Burma, there is enough export revenue from remaining mineral exports to keep the police and military loyal, and to enrich the party hierarchy. Even if he wanted to, Mugabe could not give up power and allow the opposition to win a free election because so many thousands of ZANU-PF bureaucrats would lose their only source of livelihood.

Neighboring countries are also suffering because the large influx of refugees from Zimbabwe is putting enormous pressure on local economies and resources. Regardless, the regional Southern African Development Community (SADC) of which Zimbabwe is a founding member, is unable to apply pressure on Mugabe because South Africa’s president Thabo Mbeki, a fellow Marxist-Leninist, will not allow collective action.

One positive sign is that NGOs and trade unions in South Africa are beginning to raise their voices against Mugabe. During April, labor unions in South Africa managed to block a Chinese arms shipment destined for Zimbabwe from being unloaded in the port of Durban, preventing onward land delivery to Zimbabwe.

The only hope right now is that Mugabe’s advanced age of 85 will result in his stepping down in the near future due to incapacity. This could lead to a split in the ZANU-PF party, and possibly a military coup. Meanwhile, the suffering of the Zimbabwe people continues to increase exponentially. Shame on South African President Mbeki for averting his eyes and for his declaration that “there is no crisis in Zimbabwe.” He would say that because the “vanguard” Marxist-Leninist party remains in power. For Marxist-Leninists like Mbeki, that is what counts.
Airbus Versus Boeing Should Not be the Debate Rather than Buying, How About Contracting Air-to-Air Refueling Services?

I
t could become the biggest defense contract in history — to the winner goes the spoils of a US$40 billion contract that could potentially swell over ensuing years to US$100 billion. After much anticipation, the Pentagon announced last month that the winner of the contract to supply a fleet of brand new air-to-air refueling tanker aircraft would not be the U.S. plane-maker Boeing, but rather its European rival, Airbus.

Well, European rival isn’t entirely accurate. After all, Airbus’ parent company, the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS), engaged in a joint venture partnership on this contract with American defense giant Northrop Grumman. Nevertheless, there has been much hand-wringing by various politicians over a perceived loss of jobs overseas. But all is not quite what it seems. Although 40 percent of the A330 tanker is built outside of the U.S., so too is 15 percent of the 767. So, the Boeing product is not exactly 100 percent baseball and apple pie. The EADS-Northrop Grumman partnership also intends on building a factory in the U.S., heralding the creation of 25,000 new American jobs. But the politics of “they took our jobs” aside, it seems that the Pentagon’s decision wasn’t particularly difficult from an objective point of view. The EADS-Northrop Grumman model, a converted Airbus A330 airliner, could carry more fuel and offer more flexibility (in terms of cargo, troop-carrying and airlift capabilities) than Boeing’s modified 767. And, EADS-Northrop Grumman could supply 49 of the tankers by 2013 as compared to Boeing’s 19. Not to mention that the 767 represents increasingly obsolete technology. And, the A330 had also been selected recently by the Air Forces of Australia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom.

But lost in all of this debate is this question: why is the Defense Department buying tankers at all? This question is not based on a perceived glut of tankers, but rather on the issue of alternatives. In 2004, the Defense Department’s attempts at leasing tankers (to the tune of US$20 billion) was derailed by a corruption scandal that saw Boeing’s chief executive step down and two other executives trade their offices for jail cells.

Nevertheless, there is a third option, namely contracting out the service of air-to-air refueling. Indeed, this service already exists. One company, Omega Aerial Refueling Services, already provides contract refueling services to the U.S. Navy under a program administered by NAVAIR SYSCOM PMA-207.5. Each tanker’s use is funded on a flying hours basis, and the fuel is purchased separately on government credit card, just like any other government or military fuel purchase. Omega currently has two KC-135 (converted Boeing 707) tankers and one KDC-10 (converted Douglas DC-10) tanker, used on demand by the Navy and Marine Corps. This fleet (and the fleets of any other private firm that decided to enter the business) could easily increase in response to market demand.

An added bonus for contractor tankers is that during downtime, these aircraft can easily be reallocated to civilian use. For example, a private contractor could operate a KDC-10 for a few days’ worth of Navy refueling missions, and for the rest of the week transport 300 holiday-makers on Caribbean package holidays. Or, perhaps, the Air Force could have a “ready reserve” of aircraft capable of rapid conversion and deployment in time of war, whilst otherwise carrying around passengers and cargo like a regular airliner. In other words, doing so could provide the Air Force with effective surge capacity. This form of contracting allows private companies to operate efficiently and minimize the waste caused by sole-use tankers sitting idly on the tarmac awaiting their next refueling mission which could be days or weeks away.

Indeed, Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) is already beginning to follow a similar model under a (albeit controversial) system of private finance initiatives, where the government rents infrastructure from private companies. The RAF’s £13 billion program calls for private companies (in this case a consortium known collectively as AirTanker) to acquire, maintain and deploy air-to-air refueling tankers for the Royal Air Force on demand. Audit assessments by the British government leading up to the deal confirmed that private companies were able to maintain the aircraft and stand at a greater level of readiness than would be possible by the RAF itself.

This would not be a huge stretch for the Air Force. After all, an air-to-air refueling tanker is not exactly a sensitive piece of technology. The air-to-air refueling technology itself has been around for nearly half a century, and the frames on which it flies around are routinely flying for the likes of Air France or US Airways. So, civilian operation, or even further, civilian-military mixed-use is not really a “bridge to far.” Furthermore, the military is already happy to use the private sector for troop transport through the Air Mobility Command. If you’ve ever wondered how most U.S. troops get to Iraq, it is generally by ATA Lockheed Tristars or United Airlines Boeing 747s. In many ways the manner in which the military will rent commercial airliners for troop transport is not too different from leasing air-to-air refueling tankers on an as-needed basis.

The private sector has demonstrated how it can provide many services to the military in a much more efficient and effective way than if the military took care of those services themselves. As a result, the military can focus on those tasks they are best at and provide significant savings to taxpayers. The debate over the tanker deal should not have centered on Boeing versus Airbus; indeed, it should have centered on buy versus rent.

Email J. J. Messner at JMessner@IPAOline.org
The author is the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of International Peace Operations and is the Director of Programs and Operations at IPOA.
Did You Know?

Did you know that the Philadelphia Inquirer rated the Journal of International Peace Operations as one of the most influential policy publications in the United States?

Or, did you know that the Journal of International Peace Operations is read by over 10,000 people in the peace and stability operations field?

Advertise in the Journal of International Peace Operations and a lot more people will know a lot more about you.

Visit www.peaceops.com or call +1 202.464.0721 to find out more.
Much of the circulation of the Journal of International Peace Operations comes from online downloads. However, the Journal is also available in print! Subscribe to the print edition of the Journal and receive the world’s leading publication on the private peace and stability operations industry in wonderful, glossy color every two months.

For the price of a subscription, your printer will thank you.

U.S. Subscriptions US$ 45.95 per year
Overseas Subscriptions US$ 49.95 per year
Postage and Handling included

Visit www.peaceops.com or call +1 202.464.0721 to find out more.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ACADEMY

presents

The 1st INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

on

AFRICANS SECURING AFRICA

STRATEGIC CHALLENGES FOR ARMED FORCES FOR THE NEXT DECADE

BLUE BAY LODGE, SALDANHA

16 – 18 SEPTEMBER 2008

For more information, e-mail vdyk@ma2.sun.ac.za
African Union in Burundi
Burundi’s Neighbors Seek to Maintain Peace After Years of Civil War

In April of 2003, the African Union (AU) launched the first full-fledged peacekeeping mission in the organization’s short history in the small central African nation of Burundi. The country, which won independence from Belgium in 1962, had been beset by destabilizing ethnic tensions and periodic flare-ups of hostility ever since, but none as destructive as the violent sequence of events that began in 1993. In that year, the country’s first ever Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was killed in an assassination plot hatched by the military. His successor, another Hutu, died just months later in plane crash. This second sudden death left behind it a power vacuum so potent that it sparked a frenzy of bloodshed which killed 250,000 people within 12 months and quickly evolved into a ghastly civil war that would rage for the next seven years.

Though punctuated with periods of order, the conflict did not reach any meaningful conclusion until late in 2000, when the warring factions met in Arusha, Tanzania, under the guidance of Julius Nyere and later Nelson Mandela to sign the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Accord. An important first step in ending the violence permanently, the Arusha Accord nevertheless suffered flagrant breaches of its ceasefire provisions in the years that followed, and, after a particularly costly assault on the capital of Bujumbura in early 2003, the AU finally decided to act.

In April of 2003, the Heads of State and Government of the AU met in Addis Ababa to discuss their response, settling at last on a full-scale peacekeeping mission to restore order to the country in accordance with Article III of a 2002 variation of the ceasefire agreement that called for such an international presence. The resultant AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) mandate focused on safeguarding the cantonment areas and providing technical assistance to the disarmament and demobilization process, with specific tasks including acting as a liaison between hostile parties, monitoring and verifying the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, facilitating the activities of other stakeholders in the peace process, securing safe passage for all parties as well as identifying assembly and disengagement areas, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, providing protection for returning leaders, and, lastly, coordinating with the United Nations representatives in the country in the hope that a UN mission would move to replace the AMIB after a year’s time.[1]

The mission’s troop contributing countries were limited to Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa, with commitments of 980, 280, and 1600 men each, respectively. Led by South African Major-General SZ Binda and his deputy, Ethiopian Brigadier General G Ayele, the force was comprised of both a military element including infantry units, a protection and reaction team, and a rapid reaction force, as well as a limited civilian element based in Bujumbura. The projected costs for the mission totaled US$1.65 million, but, falling short of funds in its own peace operations coffers, the AU was forced to rely on troop-contributing countries themselves to cover their initial deployment, as well as donations from Western supporters such as the U.S. and the U.K., which never amounted to the full amount necessary to conduct a successful operation.

In addition to the lack of appropriate funding, AMIB faced challenges in several other key areas. While it did succeed in stabilizing much of the country, the AMIB was never able to fully secure the Bujumbura rural province, which remained hotly contested by rebel leader Agathon Rwasa and his Palipehutu-FNL followers. The AMIB also struggled to coordinate activities with the UN presence already on the ground, leading to inefficiencies and gaps in effectively monitoring the ceasefire agreement. Furthermore, an over-reliance on the transitional government of Burundi left the AMIB compromised in implementing conditions to which all warring parties could agree. Finally, a lack of standardized doctrine among the troop-contributing countries created an environment of discord within the AMIB, where not only did disagreements arise regarding best practices, but interpretation services to facilitate these discussions were also lacking.

Thus while the AMIB proved valuable as a stop-gap measure to stem the immediate flow of violence in 2003, it left significant challenges behind for the UN follow-up mission, ONUB, to address over the course of its two-year mission. By 2006, however, after rebel leader Agathon Rwasa finally agreed to sign a ceasefire agreement, the ONUB’s mission came to an end and Burundi continues to function peacefully today.

ENDNOTES
Providing solutions today.

Creating hope for tomorrow.
YOU NEED AN AWARD-WINNING LOGISTICS STRATEGY.

When does Agility DGS consider a job well done? When the fill rate for feeding the forces in Iraq surpasses the contract requirement? When life-risking dedication in challenging environments earns unanimous respect across all branches of service? For Agility, success isn’t measured in orders delivered or deadlines met. It occurs when our partners meet their goals. It’s an intimate approach to logistics that demands individual attention and personal ownership. It’s how Agility brings an award-winning logistics strategy to feeding the forces and to everything we do. YOU NEED AGILITY.

Toby Switzer
CEO, Agility DGS

agilitylogistics.com