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I like to point out that every military that expects to be relevant beyond its national borders in the future will be working with the private sector. How militaries and governments address this certainty reflects their strategic foresight and their policy interest in maximizing their capabilities. Australia is going through this process now and by all appearances they are getting it right.

It is no accident that the U.S. military, the most capable and comprehensive in the world, nevertheless makes significant use of the private sector to enhance its own capabilities. At the same time, numerous ‘lessons learned’ and good practices can make national policies on working with the private sector in areas of conflict significantly more effective, ethical and ultimately acceptable to the taxpayers funding the military.

Many of the best U.S. policies came from trial and error. Most interesting to note is that the evolution of contractual clauses reflects the immediate lessons learned in the field.

After enough meetings and signatures, these clauses eventually become policies. The United Kingdom and Canada have also been using private resources to expand the capabilities of their much smaller military forces, at times in very innovative ways. Policy makers should also take a hard look at the Swiss Initiative, a collaborative project between the Swiss Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has brought together governments, NGOs and trade associations to design best practices and highlight governmental obligations under international law.

In designing policies for private sector utilization some obvious concerns should be addressed:

1. Good Procurement Policies

Does government procurement default to the lowest bidder? That may be fine for widgets, but what about for medical services, for military training or logistics that impact directly on national policies and where poor performance could cost lives, or even cause national policy failure? Quality has to matter, and procurement officials should be looking at a range of factors including a company’s history, ethics, past compliance and capabilities.

2. Good Regulations

The U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations include thousands of pages of rules on how contracts for federal work must be executed, and the Department of Defense adds their own supplement for their contractors. Most governments have similar sets of rules, but the tricky part is applying regulations designed for domestic work to firms – often foreign firms – providing vital services to militaries and police in highly chaotic conflict and post-conflict environments. Enforcing good rules acts as a barrier against the entry of less professional companies, thus raising quality.

3. Good Oversight

While I often point out that
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Iraq and Afghanistan are the ‘best supported, best supplied military operations in history,’ there have been a number of high profile problems – many of which could have been avoided by effective and adequate oversight. The U.S. Department of Defense has itemized some of the key issues in its Gansler Commission Report – a must read for any government or military considering smart contracting. From an industry perspective, good oversight rewards the more capable companies and leads to future contracts and bonuses for effective work.

4. Accountability

Are companies penalized financially when they fail to deliver? Good contracting requires a partnership between governments and private companies, especially in chaotic conflict and post-conflict operations. These sorts of contracts need built-in flexibility, but at the same time other companies are waiting in the wings if a contractor is repeatedly failing to deliver and thus weakening a mission. As a supplement to governments, good trade associations have an ability to police their own members as well, adding an extra level of security for contracting organizations.

The second part of accountability is criminal issues. While the vast majority of private sector employees are locals under local law, inevitably companies will need to bring foreign experts to work in these dangerous operations. We should expect these individuals to acquit themselves professionally, and contracts can require proper vetting of personnel. Nevertheless, a process is needed for criminal accountability of foreign contractors, as local courts during conflict situations are rarely recognized as functional or fair. The United States created the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) to address some of these issues, and while it continues to undergo improvements as a direct result of experience in the field, there is no reason it could not serve as a model to build on by other nations. In brief, MEJA allows the U.S. government to try contractors charged with felony crimes in U.S. federal courts. At the same time it includes a clause allowing foreign governments to try their own citizens if they wish, thus avoiding any conflict with international law. Foreign nationals bring enormous expertise and experience to reconstruction and military support operations, but in order to recruit the best professionals, governments should ensure that due process is available so that employees can expect a fair trial should they be accused of criminal acts.

5. Transparency

Finally, good transparency is essential when using the private sector – not just to assure taxpayers that their money is being used judiciously, but so that the world can see that effective accountability is in place. The United States has long held contracted firms accountable and has a system for debarring them in cases of clear misconduct. More problematic is the criminal accountability of individual contractors where the U.S. system is regrettably opaque. Although there are reputed to be more than fifty MEJA cases underway, no official numbers have been released and no information on who is being charged is issued until the very end of the process. This lack of transparency creates the impression of a lack of accountability, which angers U.S. citizens and – more significantly from a policy perspective – the population of a country where contractors are supporting policies. (A bill that would vastly improve transparency will likely be passed by Congress soon.)

My recent meetings in Australia have been exciting in this respect. The entire Australian military, including regulars | president’s message

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The spiral into war that has gripped the country of Georgia over the past month is, while tragic, anything but surprising. Since Georgia declared its independence from the crumbling Soviet Union in 1991, it has contended with three separatist movements on its small territory.

From 1991 to 1994, former Soviet functionaries in Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia and fought short but brutal wars of secession. As a contingency, each breakaway region has also considered joining their backers in the Russian Federation, although, until now, neither seemed very eager to become another neglected republic in the constellation of greater Russia. A third breakaway region, Adjara, was brought back into the fold following the peaceful Rose Revolution in 2003 that ousted former Soviet apparatchik, Eduard Shevardnadze. Despite continued Georgian efforts to negotiate a return of the two remaining territories to the state, even with guarantees of broad autonomy, a solution has remained elusive.

Both conflicts are complex, fueled by differences in ethnicity, language and religion. Both regions are geographically inaccessible and characterized by mountainous and often impassable terrain. A mix of deep-seated group grievance and economic isolation is thus compounded by a harsh geography that has allowed the two regions to remain outside of the control of Tbilisi and easily exploited by terrorist and criminal networks that flourish under such conditions. Add to the mix a resurgent Russia, bent on denying the reach of NATO to expand any further into its perceived sphere of influence and a brash, young, and nationalistic Georgian leadership that came to power on promises of reuniting all of Georgia under Tbilisi's control and who are adamant about courting the West, and a perfect tinderbox was created. On August 1, the match was thrown.

In interviews we conducted in Georgia in September and October of 2007, officials within the government of Georgia, as well as representatives from the OSCE and the European Union, repeatedly stated that the status quo was no longer tenable. Moreover, they warned that the perception that these two conflicts were “frozen” was also faulty, as sporadic incidents of violence had been steadily increasing over the last two years, simultaneously with the worsening of relations between Moscow and Tbilisi.

Indeed, from early 2006 onwards, the bellicosity of the rhetoric exchanged between then-Russian President Vladimir Putin and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili increased sharply, with each side becoming more entrenched in their positions regarding the two breakaway republics. Separatists in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia had long received tacit Russian support in their ambitions to split from Georgia but, from 2006 onwards, the leadership in Moscow became far more overt in its encouragement, including issuing Russian passports to ethnic Ossetians in South Ossetia and sending in...
Questions arose concerning the failure of the “peacekeeping” mission in South Ossetia and why more was not done to protect civilian lives.

Meanwhile, in Georgia, President Saakashvili was becoming more determined in his efforts to reassert control over South Ossetia, including pumping millions of dollars of economic aid into the region for infrastructure development and establishing a rival political structure to the de facto South Ossetian government in the Georgian-controlled areas. Critics, however, suggested in interviews that economic aid provided to the impoverished region went almost exclusively to ethnic Georgians and not Ossetians, thereby worsening the fissure between the two groups. Moreover, Georgian attempts to install political leadership in South Ossetia by supporting former South Ossetian Prime Minister Dmitry Sanakoyev, viewed by most Ossetians as a traitor and stooge, was a serious miscalculation that further divided the local populations.

At the start of the conflict, questions arose concerning the failure of the “peacekeeping” mission in South Ossetia and why more was not done to protect civilian lives. Russia, defending its invasion of Georgia as a move to protect both ethnic Ossetians and Russian peacekeepers, further obfuscated the nature of the mission there. From the start, the mission was intended to be a trilateral ceasefire operation comprised of Russian, Georgian, and North and South Ossetian forces under the auspices of the Joint Control Commission, a mechanism mandated to uphold the ceasefire and coordinate activities between the three parties. Predictably, the peacekeeping mission was never, nor could ever be considered, neutral. Each actor was motivated more by political and strategic aims than the goal of protecting civilians or curbing violence. For Georgians and Ossetians, maintaining their own peacekeepers allowed each party to monitor, and in some cases stake, their territorial claims. For Russia, their peacekeeping presence allowed them to monitor their volatile southern border with the recently pacified North Caucasus, deter Georgia, and like the other parties, stake a claim in any future settlement by establishing ex ante their right to protect their interests in the region.

According to officials at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), who are mandated to observe the ceasefire, South Ossetia had become a “sieve” with virtually no security, surveillance, or international presence above the mandated Line of Control, established by the peacekeeping arrangement. Although it is highly unlikely at this point that Russia will agree to remove its troops from the area, any new international force with a mandate to protect civilians must also be prepared to confront the criminal networks that flourish in South Ossetia. In addition, if reports of widespread ethnic cleansing in the region are true, Russia must be held to account for allowing Cossack and Ossetian irregulars to ransack Georgian enclaves and towns.

In the short-term, the international community should move swiftly to establish a credible and robust peacekeeping mission under United Nations or European Union leadership with a primary mandate to protect civilians. The OSCE’s pledge to provide 100 military observers to their pre-existing eight is commendable and should be carried out.
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as quickly as possible. Armed irregulars in the territory of Georgia, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia, must be disarmed and demobilized by their respective political leaderships before any measure of stability can be expected to take hold. Moving forward, all parties to the conflict, including Russia, who has the responsibility to protect human rights and security within the territory they currently occupy and control, must be held accountable under international law.

The United States and European Union, by encouraging former Soviet states like Georgia to stake their futures on democracy and integration with the West, now have an obligation to help Georgia rebuild, both inside of South Ossetia and within Georgia proper. With destroyed and severely damaged infrastructure, a looming IDP crisis, and resentment running deep, what is required in Georgia this time is more than just half-hearted attempts to separate the warring factions, but a full international commitment to address both the root causes and current manifestations of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian crises. These measures must be more than stern words; they must be followed with meaningful actions, including a long-term economic pledge, a continued push to integrate Georgia into NATO, and diplomatic support for a final status agreement in both breakaway regions. Notwithstanding whether the United States’ decision to vigorously support Georgia’s entry into the Alliance was ultimately done in too much haste for Europe or Georgia, it cannot abandon the process at this juncture. To do so would allow Moscow to believe that it can flout international law by invading its sovereign neighbors in order to check their democratic ambitions, a precedent that should never have occurred.

Finally, as the South Ossetia crisis has demonstrated, allowing “frozen” conflicts to remain festering is not a useful strategy. Given the stakes for U.S./Russian relations and the future of the NATO Alliance, U.S. leadership is urgently needed to ensure international action, beginning with a proper peacekeeping force.
I

N the last fifteen years, humanitarian personnel have faced security challenges never envisioned almost 150 years ago, when Swiss businessman Henry Dunant witnessed the suffering of the Battle of Solferino in 1859 and launched the Red Cross movement.

Today, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) remains firmly committed to a classical approach to protecting its humanitarian personnel, based on the negotiated consent of parties to the armed conflict. However, the assumptions underlying the consent-based approach to security for humanitarian actors have substantially eroded since the end of the Cold War.

Non-international armed conflicts, including ethnically-motivated attacks, failed and failing states, and the growth of insurgency-based warfare have tragically cost many humanitarians their lives. Sean Greenaway and Andrew Harris observe that “[i]n virtually every part of the world, those providing aid to distressed populations have been robbed, beaten, raped, abducted and murdered ... Only 6 percent of those interviewed – which included development workers – recorded no security problems at their work location.”[1]

A multitude of factors are believed to have increased the security risks facing humanitarian actors in recent years:

- Lack of situational awareness and local knowledge among humanitarian personnel in their initial period of deployment;
- Competition between humanitarian organizations, resulting in the placement of inexperienced staff in the field and increased risk-taking;
- Directly targeting humanitarian workers who are not perceived as neutral due to their foreign nationality, perceived cooperation/relationship with opposing military forces, or their human rights advocacy;
- Targeting humanitarian workers to discredit the ability of the occupying authority to protect civilians, or influence a third party;
- Lack of respect for the protected status of humanitarian workers under international humanitarian law; and,
- Economic motivations of belligerents or “criminal profiteering” to steal materiel and supplies.


The complexity and instability of modern armed conflict is met with two trends with respect to humanitarian assistance and security. First, humanitarian organizations no longer have a monopoly on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in difficult security environments – if they ever did. Other actors, including...
state armed forces and, more rarely, private military and security companies now deliver humanitarian aid directly. Second, many humanitarian organizations have managed their security risks by adopting an array of new, and sometimes controversial, approaches to protection.

The humanitarian community is divided about when, if ever, humanitarian organizations should resort to private security for the defensive armed protection of humanitarian personnel, property and materiel. Unfortunately, the literature on private military and security companies has overwhelmingly focused on states as clients. Comparatively little attention has been paid to other clients, such as humanitarian organizations.

On one side of the debate, organizations like the ICRC and Médecins sans Frontières have resisted the use of armed protection. The ICRC’s philosophy is that security is best achieved through adhering to its core principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence.

Conversely, organizations like CARE and the World Food Programme have extensively used armed escorts in transporting aid to populations in need. An International Alert study found that these armed escorts are usually provided by the host government, but in some cases where the state authorities lack effective control these organizations have hired private security companies to provide armed protection to aid convoys.[2]

Reliance on state armed forces for close protection has been resisted by unsavory local characters as “guards” or even worse, the organization may unwittingly associate itself with a party to the conflict and, thus, become the target of attacks.

The nature and extent to which humanitarian organizations hire private security companies remains relatively unexplored. What is apparent is that private security companies are engaged in a wide range of activities for humanitarian organizations, of which armed protection is likely a very small aspect.[4]

A major legal impediment in the minds of humanitarians to accepting armed protection is the risk of losing their protected status, involving immunity from attack and other rights, under international humanitarian law. The private security literature has not engaged in a sustained analysis into the key question of whether humanitarian actors using armed private security for defensive purposes constitutes “direct participation in hostilities.”

Two positions have been staked out on the matter. Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini state that armed escorts by a private security company “would in practice constitute a military operation,” according to the ICRC’s view.[5]

Conversely, Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, a legal advisor to the ICRC, has written that “all employees of PMCs/PSCs present in situations of armed conflict and hired by entities other than states” will be entitled to civilian status, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. [6]

Blanket assertions that humanitarian personnel automatically lose their protected status as civilians by using armed private security contractors are inconsistent with international humanitarian law. The contextual nature of the inquiry into the suspension or loss of civilian status through “direct participation in hostilities” and recognition in treaty law of certain rights of armed individual self-defense by civilians, requires a case-by-case assessment into whether the use of private security contractors in a given situation entails the loss or suspension of protected status by humanitarian personnel and premises, which are defended by armed protection.

The key to whether humanitarian personnel or objects lose their...
A ll companies are in business to make a profit - but it’s how a company makes a profit that counts. They should be encouraged to see the many benefits of supporting humanitarian response and operating in an ethical fashion.

Dubai-based RA International specializes in re-establishing infrastructure in shattered communities. Like all companies, we are in business to make a profit but we are committed to humanitarian causes, ensuring a return to the communities in which we work, and we encourage other companies to do likewise. By offering humanitarian aid, private companies can develop sustainable long-term relationships with local people. This helps gain a foothold in the community, facilitating the company’s efforts in doing business in the area.

We help communities by recruiting staff locally and offering them salaried, vocational, on-the-job training. The company then either employs them or helps them set up businesses on their own and then enters into partnerships with them. We foster the growth of community-based NGOs that add value to their communities. By giving people the means to set up their own businesses and associations we foster trust between our company and the local communities. This goes a long way to facilitating a good business environment while breaking down barriers on all sides.

We supply camp services, catering, waste management, procurement and logistics, power generation and engineering and construction in countries around the world, and have sponsored many community projects in countries such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Sudan.

In the field of waste management, RA International currently operates the majority of NATO contracts within Kabul and also has waste management operations in Mazar-e-Sharif, Gardez and other areas of Afghanistan. Instead of setting up our own wastewater treatment plants, we work with the Afghanistan government and build treatment installations with Afghan ministries, thus adding to the government’s infrastructure. Whilst using these installations, RA also pays fees for the service, further adding revenue to state coffers.

We also operate waste management contracts in Juba, Sudan, working closely with the government of South Sudan to establish environmental guidelines. We provide Portaloos, as well as empty and clean them, for two girls’ schools in Kabul. We have provided food for orphanages in Kabul and given the finance ministry essential office equipment. In Juba, we have supplied free offices and accommodation to Médecins Sans Frontières and supplied a community of lepers with food and drink. In Sierra Leone we have provided materials to build two schools and installed a number of hand pumps now supplying water to schools around the country.

It is doubtful that many similar projects and their ensuing...
Never underestimate the power of private companies who offer aid. Companies are focused on efficiency, building their reputation and getting things done on time and on budget.

Humanitarian Actors Under Attack

A multitude of other issues arises with the decision of humanitarian organizations to hire armed protection, but their decision to do so will not inevitably involve the loss of coveted protected status under international humanitarian law.

The use of private security contractors by humanitarian organizations deserves greater attention due, in part, to its impact on the broader humanitarian community and the potential impact that this practice has on the decision of state armed forces to directly deliver humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian organizations that choose to hire private security contractors would benefit from ongoing exchanges of information with one another and sharing of best practices. Bringing together representatives of humanitarian organizations, state armed forces, private security companies, policy makers, and academics with diverse viewpoints on these matters could also assist in confronting these issues.

Endnotes

HE first sign of the disaster was a little girl’s sandal in the water. Then the debris of houses, the bodies, and then the smoke on the shoreline from burning refuse of what hadn’t been swept away by the waves. Survivors were met almost immediately by gray hulls and Americans. Two years later on the other side of the world, a city fell to a hurricane as levees broke and anarchy followed until the citizens’ fellow Americans arrived on the scene.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations are nothing new to American military and government agencies. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief includes securing areas, then providing food, water, shelter, medical assistance, and reconstruction efforts. No other country is as capable of mounting such herculean efforts, particularly on distant shores. Nor are many countries as capable of voluntarily sharing their time or money.

The Giving USA Foundation reported that Americans donated more than $295 billion in 2006. In response to the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the United States provided more than 24.3 million pounds of relief supplies and equipment in the two months following the disaster, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development. One Navy cruiser operating off Sumatra found that within 24 hours, its crew had donated more than 500 pounds of their own clothing and purchased items from the ship.

In the case of Hurricane Katrina, both the Navy and the Coast Guard played major roles in evacuating citizens of New Orleans. Private security firms also contributed to the effort. Seamus Flatley, who served as on-site manager for Blackwater Worldwide during Hurricane Katrina, noted that the company started sending assets within two days, conducted 128 rooftop rescues, and provided security at government offices—all at its own expense.

The U.S. Navy, in its recently released maritime strategy, mentioned humanitarian assistance seven times in less than 20 pages of text, signifying the importance the Navy places on exerting soft power throughout the world. The Navy hopes to “mitigate human suffering.” The document states that the “expeditionary character of maritime forces uniquely positions them to provide assistance.” With the majority of the world’s population located within 100 miles of the world’s coastlines, the Navy and Coast Guard are integral to such efforts.

In addition to ad hoc missions like those after the tsunami, the earthquake in Pakistan or Hurricane Katrina, which devastated New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, the U.S. Navy has conducted goodwill tours such as the USNS Mercy’s 2006 humanitarian assistance deployment to Pacific islands and Southeast Asia or the more recent deployment of the USNS Comfort throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America. In the latter deployment, more than 98,000 patients received treatment, according to a recent article by the mission’s commander. The deployments also included...
While the United States and its Navy and Coast Guard remain the pre-eminent global first responders to disasters, could the global stability industry contribute to these missions? The first issue is access. At nearly 900 feet long, the deep-draft USNS Comfort is limited to larger ports. Although the majority of the world’s population lives within 100 miles of major bodies of water, few live near accessible deepwater ports. Private naval companies, can provide smaller but capable boats to administer to the needs of areas with smaller populations who might not otherwise receive much-needed medical treatment or supplies from the United States. These boats might also be small enough to enter navigable rivers, thereby reaching even more remote populations.

The second issue is the perennial problem of numbers. As of mid-November 2007, the U.S. Navy had 279 deployable ships: fewer than half the number it had during Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s tenure in the 1980s. While a carrier or expeditionary strike group en route to its duty station might be able to respond to major crises, the problem of more missions with fewer ships remains. Supplementary capabilities provided by private naval companies would be a force multiplier.

The third issue is timely response. Rather than getting underway from the continental United States and making a time-consuming passage across oceans, the U.S. Marine Corps has a Maritime Prepositioning Force with squadrons strategically stationed throughout the world to meet global conflicts when they erupt. The Military Sealift Command, for example, contracts some of its supply work out to firms like Edison Chouest and Hornbeck Offshore. A similar structure could be created specifically for contingency humanitarian relief operations composed of private naval company-owned boats, particularly in Southeast Asia and around the increasingly important coastlines of Africa.

While private security companies have proliferated in recent years, particularly with operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, applying global security operations to the maritime environment hasn’t fully matured, much less been explored. McLellan, a former Navy surface warfare officer, suggests that they’re “ahead of our time; people are just catching on to the value” of using private companies to support the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard.

Pistris, Inc., a firm that has specialized in maritime operations for 10 years, is one company that uses its maritime component in support of humanitarian assistance efforts, through its innovative use of commercial craft. Pistris is partnered with a shipyard that converts fast support boats for use with multimillion-dollar yachts. Yacht owners don’t want their own decks encumbered with helicopters, small boats, or supplies, so they purchase these boats that trail behind. Since everything is now modular, you could easily install containers of surgical supplies or anything else the mission requires.

But there are concerns, namely the negative connotations of employing private firms to do what may be considered inherently government or military functions. If a private naval company is based in the United States, then it might be U.S.-flagged. “Lots of countries don’t want American presence,” McLellan argues, “so it may be more palatable to fly a non-American flag” while accomplishing the same goal. But he suggests that it’s in the private naval companies’ interest to be “strategically helping, not hindering, to acquire more business opportunities,” part of the performance-based marketing approach that has proven successful for many defense firms.

These concerns might be mitigated by the fact that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions conducted by private naval companies would be cooperating with embedded U.S. government and military personnel as well as NGOs, such as those who were embedded on recent deployments of the Comfort and Mercy.

Ridenour and Flatley both noted their firm’s “Field of Dreams” mantra: “If you build it, they will come,” a phrase familiar to most in commercial enterprises. With regard to private naval companies and their potential role in humanitarian assistance roles, if it happens, they could be there.

This article was originally printed in Serviam, January-February 2008.
JAMES Jay Carafano is a leading expert in defense and homeland security at The Heritage Foundation. Recognizing that the war against terrorism will be a protracted conflict, Carafano’s research focuses on developing the national security that the nation needs to secure the long-term interests of the United States – protecting its citizens, providing for economic growth, and preserving civil liberties. An accomplished historian and teacher, Carafano was an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, N.Y., and served as Director of Military Studies at the Army’s Center of Military History. He also taught at Mount Saint Mary College in New York and served as a Fleet Professor at the U.S. Naval War College. He is a Visiting Professor at the National Defense University and Georgetown University. Carafano is the author of several military books, history books and studies. His latest is Private Sector/Public Wars: Contracting in Combat-Iraq, Afghanistan and Future Conflicts, a rigorous study of the role of contractors on the battlefield and their impact on military effectiveness and civil society.

JIPO: What drew you to contracting as a research subject, given your focus on defense and military history?

Carafano: Heritage is a nonprofit, nonpartisan foundation that has worked on national security issues since it was created 30 years ago. After the outbreak of the Iraq War, one of the issues that there was a lot of concern and discussion on was the role of contractors. We spent a good amount of time investigating and decided that defense contracting was not this massive problem that people popularly perceive, or has been portrayed in the press.

But, as a military historian, I found the issue quite fascinating because what I saw happening had much larger imports beyond Iraq. I think this is reflective of a much, much larger trend, which is a fundamentally different way of conducting warfare. If you look with a truly long term view, particularly in the Western way of war, I think you can argue that since the fall of the Roman empire there have been only three different ways we fight wars, marked by shifts in the sharing of responsibility between the public sphere and the private sphere.

From the fall of the Roman Empire to the 17th century, warfare was essentially a private activity. Governments were very weak. They had very little power to tax people and they had very little authority or control compared to modern nation states. If somebody wanted to go to war they had to get money and hire people, and most of them came from the private sector. Over the course of hundreds of years, coinciding with the rise of the modern nation state there is a shift in the balance, making the public sector in war very large. Not that the private sector disappeared, but the public sector had much more responsibility in terms of fielding military capacities, directing those capabilities, raising money to pay for them, and driving the research and development. That trend really culminated in the middle of the 20th century in the Cold War, where the public sector was huge and the private sector
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The Summit will be held in Washington, D.C., home to some of the world’s largest clients in the global peace and stability operations industry — and also Headquarters of IPOA. The venue for the Summit will be The Liaison Hotel on Capitol Hill, 415 New Jersey Avenue NW, near the U.S. Capitol.

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Sunday, October 26

Exclusive IPOA Members-Only Professional Session: United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa
Maj. Gen. Patrick Cammaert, former Commander, MONUC

Cocktail Reception
Maj. Gen. Patrick Cammaert, former Commander, MONUC

Monday, October 27

Opening Address sponsored by DynCorp International
Gen. Anthony Zinni (Ret.), former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army CENTCOM

Panel I: Partnerships and Perceptions
James Cockayne, Associate, International Peace Institute
David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Int’l Narcotics and Law Enforcement*
Lt. Col. John A. Nagl (Ret.), Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Jill Shankleman, World Bank Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency*

Lunch Address
Jane Holl Lute, Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-building Support, United Nations

Panel II: The Future of Peacekeeping Operations
Emmanuel Bombande, Executive Director, West African Network for Peacebuilding
Victoria Holt, Senior Associate, The Henry L. Stimson Center*
Don Kraus, Chief Executive Officer, Citizens for Global Solutions

Workshop on International Rules and Regulations
Ann-Marie Buzatu, Privatization of Security Programme, Geneva Center for DCAF
Michael Love, Assistant General Counsel, Computer Sciences Corporation
Representative of the Government of Switzerland

IPOA Annual Summit 2007 Dinner
Guest Speaker to be announced

Tuesday, October 28

Keynote Address sponsored by RA International
Soraya Narfeldt, Chairman, RA International

Panel III: The Challenges of Doing Business in Africa
David Lowry, Director, International Center for Corporate Accountability*
Dana Pietsch, Vice-President, AIG WorldSource
Rocco Procopio, Manager International Security, Marathon Oil
Witney Schneidman, President, Schneidman and Associates International
Alex Yearsley, Head of Special Projects, Global Witness

Working Lunch
Guest Speaker to be announced

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* Speaker has been invited
I think that this is a world-historic shift in how warfare is going to be fought in the 21st century. I think Iraq and Afghanistan are wakeup calls for people to recognize what has really been happening for decades. This is not some kind of anomaly, but just a reflection of a growing trend that we’ve all been ignoring.

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JIPO: You talk about the necessity of close cooperation between military and civilian leadership. How do you envision streamlining the system to allow this to happen?

Carafano: If there really is an issue in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of using contract works, 9.99 times out of 10, what I found is that you can track it back to the government just not being a very good customer. Either it didn’t contract correctly, or it didn’t have the milestones and data and human capital in place to really oversee and run the contract appropriately.

The thing that people have to realize is that when we downsized the military in the 1990s, we downsized the contractor force right along with everyone else. The problem in Iraq was not just that there were not enough boots on the ground, but also that there were not enough contract supervisors. Just like you cannot just create divisions overnight, you can not create a contract workforce overnight.

Carafano: Absolutely nothing. Military contracting has zero impact on civil-military relations. People think you have to have healthy civil-military relations to have a healthy civil society, and it is exactly the opposite. Civil-military relations are not the driver of the train. If your civil society is healthy, then civil-military relations are going to be healthy regardless of how many contractors there are.

If you look at the traditional role of the American military in civil society, the military doesn’t teach people citizenship. Civil society teaches people how to be citizens, and then some of those serve in the military. This notion that we need to draft people into the military to make them citizens is just antithetical to how American civil society has actually evolved.

JIPO: In your book you state “A healthy relationship between the military and democratic society is symbolic. The nation fields a military based on its aspirations of how the nation will serve in war” (p 176). Given that assertion, what can the current American relationship with contractors tell us about civil-military relations?

Carafano: I think that the only thing that should be inherently governmental is oversight and responsibility. The government is responsible to the American people for the money it spends. Beyond that, in my mind, everything else is really up for grabs. I think that it’s often a matter of strategy, and if people are looking for a hard and fast rule of what is governmental or not they are simply on a fools errand.

Many of the things we don’t complain about outsourcing are the most destructive and damaging. We outsource writing doctrine; we outsource writing plans; we outsource the intellectual side. The problem with doing that is if we outsourced everything Maj. Eisenhower did and left staff support to some civilian when that contract [ran] out, that civilian, and all the knowledge and intellectual capabilities they would have garnered doing the job, [would have gone] and we wouldn’t be growing a four star general.

JIPO: Recent Congressional debate has once again raised the issue of what activities should be inherently governmental in conflict and post conflict environments. What limits do you feel should be set on civilian contractors under these conditions?

Carafano: I think that the only thing that should be inherently governmental is oversight and responsibility. The government is responsible to the
Because we made Eisenhower do all that stuff, and then because we kept him in the army, [we could] exploited that knowledge over his 30 year military carrier, and got a senior military commander.

**JIPO:** Given that you think the focus of the government should be on oversight, who should have primary responsibility for it?

**Carafano:** I think that all the pieces are there. We have a lot of oversight mechanisms, a lot of laws on the books, a lot of great capacity in terms of inspectors-general, whistle blower laws and government agencies, and all that’s good stuff. We have all the right things there, but you have to have the people there, with the training, the experience and the moral attitude to do the job. We don’t need more laws and we don’t need more mechanisms. What we need are people who are qualified and competent to do the job.

A baseball team is a baseball team. A little league team has the same number of players on the field as the winner of the World Series. The reason why they are different is not because they play under different rules, or because they have different organizations, it is because one has world class athletes and the other one has little kids who are three feet tall. The answer is really simple. You have to have a world class team. If you have qualified people in the right numbers doing the job, you are going to be fine. If you do not, you are going to get what you pay for.

**JIPO:** You advocate a “risk-based” approach to the use of contractors in the future. How do we streamline the current system to get there?

**Carafano:** I think the answer for a contracting workforce is just like any really good human capital program. One of the things I talk about in the book is the enormous lost opportunities [we have had in training]. Before Iraq and Afghanistan, the military fought wars every day at the national and combat training centers, but other than running the video equipment to film the session, there was nobody playing the contractor. That has to be part of the training system.

Things that work well in the military get sustained in the military. I am sure the guys in Iraq are doing contracting better now than they were in 2003. The point is what are we going to be doing it like in 2020? The military only retains things for which they have institutions, organizations and doctrine. Unless you write a doctrine, and embed it in a living organization, unless you have institutions that train it, it is not going to exist.

**JIPO:** How do you think these debates will advance in the future, particularly...
given the election?

Carafano: I think quite frankly that if there is a Democratic administration, the problem is going to go away, because it will be their contractors. Let’s not forget that KBR, which has gotten all kinds of criticism in Iraq, was the single largest contractor in Bosnia and Kosovo, and when they were Clinton’s contractors nobody had a problem with them. I think a lot of the political hubbub about contractors is really a reflection of American politics and has very little to do with reality.

The truth is, regardless of who it is going to be, the contractors are going to be there. Even if you could put everybody in a green suit, you would spend so much money to get so little return you would be like Gulliver in the land of the Lilliput, tying yourself to the ground.

One of the great ironies is that rather than contracting being some kind of Achilles heel for the United States, it is actually an enormous competitive advantage. Contractors are going to be there, they are a great resource, and everybody is going to exploit them.

Who exploits them best is the guy that is going to get ahead. I think that countries with a rule of law, countries that do not have corruption, and that have some degree of transparency, are going to be able to contract much more efficiently and effectively, and they are going to be able to extract a lot more power out of the private sector than anybody else. We ought to be looking at it as this enormous competitive advantage, where we can get so many more resources so much more quickly, so much more flexibly, so much more agilely then anybody else.
WHEN President George W. Bush announced the creation of a new combatant command for Africa, the words “innovative” and “pioneering” were regularly used by administration officials to describe the command. More than a year later, as AFRICOM approaches full-operating capacity, AFRICOM’s billing as an innovative approach to meeting U.S. security goals has put AFRICOM under increased scrutiny.

The establishment of AFRICOM clearly reflects an evolution in the U.S. government’s perceptions of American strategic interests in Africa, which are tied to five overarching goals: eliminating terrorist networks and safe havens; preventing the proliferation of illegal arms, weapons of mass destruction and narcotics; ensuring strategic access to sea lanes; securing means of access and transportation, both on land and at sea; and facilitating free market access.

As Defense officials explained to representatives of some 40 African countries earlier this year, the “hidden agenda” behind AFRICOM’s establishment is that, in the Bush Administration’s view, helping African partners to ensure their own stability and security would also improve their capability to deter terrorism, proliferation and crime. The increase of security cooperation activities between the U.S. and African militaries in the last decade is indicative of this approach, and Department of Defense argues that such activities could be better coordinated by a single command, rather than divided among three.

AFRICOM’s creation also reflects an evolution in U.S. defense strategy, which is focusing increasing attention on stability operations and building partner capacity worldwide. Unlike European, Central, and Pacific Commands, which have traditionally been more focused on preparing for potential war-fighting operations, the Defense Department has given the new command a greater emphasis on “soft power,” with its guidance being to head off potential conflicts by engaging earlier, at “Phase Zero,” through sustained theater security cooperation. The Defense Department’s aim to incorporate an unprecedented number of civilian personnel in the command seems to be an acknowledgement that the U.S. military cannot prevent conflicts in Africa without a more holistic approach. AFRICOM’s planners originally hoped to staff as much as a quarter of the command with intelligence, diplomatic and development experts from civilian agencies like State, USAID, Treasury and Agriculture. SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM, by virtue of their missions, also have engaged civilian agencies on a more sustained level, but no command has incorporated interagency personnel within their staff at the level proposed for AFRICOM.

Creating these new civilian billets is one thing, staffing them is another. When AFRICOM reaches full capacity on September 30,
2008, less than one percent of its personnel will have come from civilian agencies. While some of these civilians have been placed in the command’s leadership structure at an unprecedented level, the scale of interagency representation falls far short of the Defense Department’s original goal.

Like the military, State and USAID are stretched thin by commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has stressed the need to increase the number of diplomatic and development personnel, and has requested funding for new mid-level positions at State and USAID. Many of these hires would be assigned as political advisors to combatant commands like AFRICOM.

AFRICOM’s creation reflects an evolution in U.S. defense strategy, which is focusing increasing attention on stability operations and building partner capacity worldwide.

increasingly military in nature have been raised in a series of congressional and private sector initiatives looking at the respective roles of hard, soft and smart power in national security policy. Some of these studies question whether the current interagency process is structured in a way that can adequately meet security challenges. One congressional inquiry found that shortcomings in the process have, on occasion, led the military to take on missions that are not part of its core responsibilities.

The question of AFRICOM’s location has also been controversial. The Department of Defense initially announced its intention to locate the command’s headquarters on the continent to give its staff a better understanding of the African context and to provide closer proximity for building relationships with African security partners. Some in Africa interpreted this to mean that the United States would be establishing a military base with permanently deployed U.S. troops on the continent. Defense Department officials have stressed that the location in question would be a staff headquarters rather than a troop headquarters, and that there are no plans to establish any new military bases in Africa. Several factors, including negative African reaction, challenges in finding a suitable location, and a lack of consensus within the U.S. government on the criteria for choosing a site, have led AFRICOM officials to delay answering the question of the command’s permanent location.

Defense Department has requested almost $400 million for AFRICOM for the upcoming fiscal year. A recent Government Accountability Office report notes that continuing uncertainty surrounding AFRICOM’s permanent location leaves significant questions regarding future funding requirements.

While Congress has expressed general support for the creation of the new command, House Appropriators have questioned the need to fund AFRICOM at the requested level given lingering questions over the command’s mission, location and interagency coordination.

As AFRICOM stands up, the command will be judged not only by its ability to assume ongoing operations and security relationships, but also by its ability to effectively address the concerns of Congress, other U.S. government agencies and interested parties, and African partners within the context of its operations.
OVER a period of 80 years, somewhere around 160,000 British and Irish convicts were transported to the Australian colonies, where they played a central role in founding a new nation. All but a handful of them were shipped by private contractors.

The following case study suggests that, 200 years ago, public officials were grappling with much the same challenges of competition and contracting for complex public services as governments around the world face today. However, they learned the lessons and over time, developed a sustainable system of performance contracting.

The contract for Australia’s first convict fleet, which sailed in 1787, was won by a naval contractor, William Richards, following a public tender in which he seems to have been the only serious contender. Richards supplied six ships and he was required to feed and provision some 800 convicts and their guard of marines for a period of eight months. It was largely a cost-plus arrangement, with Richards paid a flat rate per month for each ton of shipping, and a separate rate per convict day for the food and provisions.

This was similar to the contracts that the Navy board had developed for the shipment of troops, and given that the ships were sailing to a corner of the world that only three European ships had visited, it is understandable why such a cost-plus contract might have been used. The voyage was an outstanding success, with a death rate of around 3 percent, comparable to the mortality rates on the last convict shipments to North America a decade earlier (which kept the convicts at sea for a much shorter time).

However, the expense of establishing a new colony halfway around the world was considerable, and when the decision was made in July 1789 to contract for a second fleet of convict transports, Treasury was instructed to minimise the cost. The Navy Board asked suppliers to bid on a flat rate per convict embarked, so that the substantial risks associated with delay en route were shifted entirely to the contractor.

The successful contractors were a firm of slave traders who employed security arrangements that were customary in the trans-Atlantic trade. With a fixed price contract, the ship’s masters had no incentive to pause at the Cape of Good Hope long enough to allow their convicts to fully recover from scurvy, and they were permitted to sell any provisions left over at the end of the voyage to the owners’ profit (which they did).

On the First Fleet, the Governor of the new colony, Arthur Phillip, had acted as contract monitor, and he had been willing to negotiate with the Navy Board and the Treasury to secure better conditions for the convicts and troops. By contrast, the contract monitor on the Second Fleet was a naval lieutenant who was reluctant to intervene in the
The H.M.S. Lady Penrhyn was one of the six convict-carrying ships of the first fleet.

Given this incentive regime and the lack of intensive monitoring, it is not surprising to learn that the convicts were short-rationed and physically abused. When a petty officer on one of these vessels protested to the Chief Mate, the latter allegedly replied, ‘Let them die and be damned. The owners have been paid for their passage, and if we deliver 150 or 200 of them, it will be enough.’ More than a third of the convicts were lost to disease and malnutrition (including those who died within weeks of landing).

That contractual incentives had contributed to this horrific outcome was well understood, with one contemporary observer commenting that it would not be the last such exhibition of human misery,” for the more of them that die, the more it redounds to the interest of the ship owners and masters, who are paid so much a head by government for each individual, whether they arrive in the colony or not.”

When the accounts of the brutality on the Second Fleet reached London, there was an inquiry and a criminal prosecution, and the Home Department argued that in all future shipments, the contractors should be paid for the number of convicts actually landed, rather than for the number taken on board.

After further consideration, it was concluded that the contractors might not be prepared to accept the complete transfer of outcome risk, and it was resolved that they would be paid a flat rate for each convict embarked, and a further sum for each one landed at Sydney Cove. At the same time, the Home Department ordered a naval surgeon to be appointed to each vessel, to oversee the treatment of the convicts en route.

The first ships retained under this new incentive regime were managed by the First Fleet contractor, William Richards, who delivered two shiploads of convicts and lost only one of them to accident or disease.

When the ships arrived in Sydney Cove, the Advocate General of the new colony commented on the difference that a contractual incentive fee had made: ‘No ship … could have brought out their convicts in higher order, nor could have given stronger proofs of attention to their health and accommodation.’

There would be more horrific voyages, but the average mortality rate dropped dramatically after the introduction of performance contracting. It would not until the inspection regime prior to embarkation in England and Ireland was reformed, and surgeon superintendents were given powers to override the authority of captains at sea, that the challenge of safe transportation would finally be overcome.

By the time my great-great grandfather was transported to Australia in the 1840s, the only serious dangers to the convicts lay in the uncertainties of ocean travel – one of the young men was badly hurt from a fall onto the deck.

The key to success lay in good contract design, the selection of a socially-responsible provider, and sound contract management by public officials.
In the summer of 2007, Senators Jim Webb (D-Virginia) and Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri) proposed the creation of a commission that would investigate contracting practices, ranging from the disbursement and awarding of contracts to the legal frameworks governing accountability and good practices. Intended to increase transparency and accountability, as well as reduce waste and save taxpayer dollars, the proposal reflected concerns about the level of privatization and outsourcing of the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Public support for greater government oversight of wartime contractor has only increased in the last year, as several high profile incidents involving both private security and logistics contractors have drawn greater attention to the situations.

The formation of a wartime contracting commission was not an unprecedented development, given the growing reliance on the private sector seen over the last seven years. During the Second World War, then-Senator Harry S. Truman chaired the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, the mandate of which was to investigate mismanagement and waste among military contractors. Widely considered a success, the Truman Committee was reported to have saved taxpayers as much as $15 billion by reducing corruption and instituting cost-saving measures.

Webb and McCaskill’s proposal received considerable bipartisan support, and was included in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, and became law in January 2008. During the spring of that year, the senators announced that the ratified commission would be an eight-member bipartisan panel of outside experts with the power to hold hearings, take testimony, receive evidence, and order oral testimony and document production.

The mandate calls for the commission to issue both interim and final reports with findings and recommendations on several specific topics. These are expected to include the issue of "inherently governmental" functions, especially as pertains to defense functions and private security contractors. This July’s congressional debates over existing Department of Defense policy on the issue serves as only the most recent indicator of the needed to clarify the legally acceptable roles for civilian contractors in conflict environments. Furthermore, the commission will have the ability to evaluate specific situations for fraud, waste and abuse: and if it finds both a violation and a lack of corporate accountability, it can refer violators to the Department of Justice for prosecution.

The Contracting Commission has a two-year mandate, and is scheduled to issue its final report in 2010 as well as an interim report due no later than March 2009 that will include recommendations for improvements in the contracting process.

Out of the total eight members, House and Senate Democratic leaders selected four, Republicans two, and the White House got to...
The makeup of the commission seems to be both bipartisan and balanced, without preconceived notions about the place of contractors in wartime operations and defense.
As of August, 2008, there were reliable reports in the oil industry press that official Nigerian crude exports had decreased to below one million barrels per day. This contrasts with exports exceeding 1.8 million barrels per day as recently as 2007. This reflects an intensification since early 2008, of banditry, political intimidation, violence and political insurgency in the six states of the Niger delta, also known as the “South-South” region of Nigeria. Insurgents have been expanding their destruction of oil infrastructure, as well as kidnappings of expatriate oil employees and urban guerrilla operations in main centers such as Port Harcourt.

In office for over a year, the government of Umaru Yar’Adua appears to be groping for solutions to a multifaceted crisis. During an official visit to the United Kingdom in June, President Yar’Adua accepted a British offer to train counterinsurgency units. This was quickly rescinded after a strong push back from political and security officials. Most Nigerian political elites believe that only a political solution can return the Delta area to normality. Above all, Nigerians do not want to see foreign security forces becoming involved in Delta stabilization efforts.

The residents of the Delta sub-region have been expressing deep grievances for over two decades. Their air has been polluted by the flaring of gas associated with crude oil production. Their wetlands, streams and farm land have been polluted by oil spills and pipeline leaks. To add insult to injury, the residents have seen virtually no benefits from the oil revenues coming to Nigeria via the Federal government. The people remain among the poorest in Nigeria.

Ironically, the Delta security problem was exacerbated by the 1999 constitution that inaugurated multiparty democracy in Nigeria. That document stipulated that 52 percent of all crude oil revenue must be distributed among the 36 states in proportion to their populations. In addition, the six Delta states receive a double allocation per capita because they produce most of the hydrocarbons. This constitutional change made matters worse because the people of the Delta earned no benefits in terms of roads, electricity, schools, and clinics despite the extra revenue. Money that was previously diverted into corruption at the Federal level was henceforth diverted at the state level.

The high expectations generated by the 1999 constitution were not fulfilled, thereby stimulating various forms of violent protest accompanied by increased criminality. Political protest grew with the formation of militia groups: mainly youth affiliated with different ethnic tribes. At the same time, as transparency grew in the federal government oil accounts, it became necessary for corrupt dealings in oil to move to the state level. This meant that the ruling political movement, the Peoples Democratic Party could not allow any other group to control the six state governments of the Delta. Free and fair

The author is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and is President of Cohen & Woods International.
It would appear that those who stand to benefit from a continuation of the status quo have the upper hand.

Political insurgency is designed to destroy hydrocarbon infrastructure in order to pressure the Federal Government to negotiate a greater share of internal power and oil resources for the Delta peoples. The leading insurgent group is called the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, or MEND. It has demonstrated the capability to disrupt large volumes of oil production, including from platform 50 miles out to sea. MEND demands political negotiations, which have yet to be organized.

So far, the federal government has been attempting to organize an all-parties conference of Delta stakeholders under the leadership of Vice President Jonathan Goodluck, a native of the Delta and former state governor. This process appears to have stalled because of prerequisite demands by different parties. The government wants a meeting without preconditions.

As of mid-2008, it would appear that those who stand to benefit from a continuation of the status quo have the upper hand. These include security forces that are getting a cut from the illegal traffic in crude oil; ethnic militias that are collecting money from political leaders in order to intimidate any political opposition; state governors who control the funds devolved from the federal government, and Peoples Democratic Party functionaries who cannot envisage any alternation of government power, along with the hydrocarbon patronage that goes with it.

What kind of package is needed to correct the Delta situation?

- An independent government-wide auditing system, along the lines of the U.S. Government Accountability Office, to inject transparency into the state government accounts. This would help channel state revenue into roads, schools, clinics, etc., away from political channels.
- A project for the Nigerian Navy to interdict the pirate tankers that load the illicit crude oil emerging from the bayous. NATO and/or AFRICOM could provide technical assistance in intelligence collection, radar and sonar surveillance, and boarding/identification techniques. If the pirate tankers stop loading, “bunkering” has to dry up.
- A major public works program for the Delta with federal funds to bring about rapid visible improve-

most recent models of the most deadly weapons. The stolen crude oil is loaded onto barges that sail through the swamps and meet up with waiting tankers in Nigerian territorial waters near the coast. These tankers are generally from India or the Philippines.

Apart from being outgunned by the “bunkerers,” some of the police and military are believed to be part of the scheme. It is also believed that the chain of profit from “bunkering” may go to the highest levels of both the state and federal governments. Other forms of criminality in the Delta include the kidnapping and ransoming of expatriate oil workers as well as wealthy Nigerians living in cities like Port Harcourt. Groups of thugs also hire themselves out to state government officials in order to intimidate opposition.

courage to move forcefully? The year 2009 will be crucial.
There are many things the international community is doing badly when it comes to Darfur. But perhaps one of the most startling points is how ineffectively the international community is disguising its half-hearted commitment to making the peacekeeping operation in that woebegone province work. The international community could at least try harder at looking as though it is, well, trying harder.

The UNAMID mission has been a model of dysfunction from even before its beginning. For years, the number of dead Darfur hit six figures and the number of villages destroyed, people displaced and women and girls raped reached unimaginable heights. Meanwhile, the world sat back and watched, at best passing meaningless and empty resolutions. Eventually, just over a year ago, the U.N. Security Council finally acted and established the UNAMID mission to augment the African Union’s AMIS mission that was already in the field (well, from 9 to 5 Monday to Friday anyway).

In late July, the Save Darfur coalition published a damning report on one—albeit very important—aspect of the UNAMID mission: the provision of helicopters. Certainly, helicopters are only one component of a peacekeeping operation, and they are by no means a silver bullet. But helicopters are essential to enhancing the capabilities and especially the reach of a peacekeeping mission. Let us not forget that Darfur is the size of France, after all.

When the UNAMID mission was established, 18 helicopters were ordered. Even beyond the fact that 18 helicopters is pitifully few for an undeveloped area the size of France, the international community has yet to fill even that low requirement. Indeed, out of those 18 called-for helicopters, there are currently zero deployed to Darfur. This helicopter deficit was driven home to the UNAMID mission during July when a convoy of peacekeepers was ambushed. Three hours of militia attacks left seven peacekeepers dead and another 19 wounded. Without helicopters, no rescue mission or reinforcement effort was forthcoming for the ambushed peacekeepers. The capability gap that hampers the peacekeepers’ effect and reach within Darfur is one issue. But it is also a valid question to ask just how many more armed militia attacks need to occur and just how many more peacekeepers need to die before the much-needed helicopters are sent to Darfur.

One might be driven to thinking that there was a worldwide helicopter shortage. But this is patently not true. Especially if one sits for any length of time by the helicopter highway that is the Potomac River in Washington, for example. Though it is true that there is already a heavy demand for helicopters on missions from Iraq to Afghanistan and from Congo to Chad, there are still helicopters to be found. Indeed, by the Save Darfur coalition’s estimates, just the...
countries in NATO (in particular, the Czech Republic, Italy, Romania and Spain) have about 104 helicopters going spare that could easily be deployed to Darfur.[1] Throw in non-NATO countries that are traditionally big supporters of U.N. operations, such as India and Ukraine, and that number begins to approach 150.[2]

It should be noted of course that helicopters are by no means the Darfur mission’s only concern. The current deployment of UNAMID peacekeepers face a bleak task, with little logistical support, little or no pay and inadequate rations. And although it is more symbolic (especially for morale) than an actual impediment to effective operations, UNAMID peacekeepers are actually having to wear blue plastic bags on their heads for a lack of blue helmets. The less well-resourced and exposed the peacekeeping force, ultimately the less protected are the people of Darfur.

On paper, the numbers make sense. But this is a simplistic analysis that ignores, for example, political hurdles. A major problem for European nations, who are generally those identified as having the requisite helicopter deployment capability, is that since the end of the Cold War, they have generally come to treat their militaries like prestige cars, wishing to avoid deploying them less they get scratched. Even if certain militaries have the capacity and the capabilities, and so long as their governments wish to avoid deploying those assets, the whole analysis will remain a purely academic exercise.

A common complaint about the role of the private sector in conflict and post-conflict operations is that countries can deploy assets to these dangerous environments without incurring the political cost of deploying their own soldiers or precious equipment. Of course, this argument is always voiced as a talking about Apache or Mi-26 helicopter gunships … the helicopters needed in Darfur are simply transport vehicles to allow peacekeepers to enjoy an acceptable level of mobility.

If the international community is not serious about saving Darfur, then that is clearly an insurmountable barrier to success. But if the international community does want to see the population of Darfur protected, it needs to do far more than it is currently doing. One option is to properly support the peacekeeping mission, by providing it with the required resources, not least helicopter capacity. With the 18 helicopters called for in the UNAMID mandate, the mission would probably still find itself short of helicopters; but the nations of the world cannot even manage that meager count. Even with political hurdles to overcome, there are still options available, not least the available capacity of the private sector.

Private companies have a long history of providing helicopters to peacekeeping missions. Indeed, private operators are credited with having provided invaluable support to the U.N. mission in Sierra Leone. If countries themselves are not willing to provide the necessary helicopter capacity to the Darfur mission, then there are plenty of private companies who can. And there is nothing controversial about it. We’re not...
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KEY SPEAKERS

Doug Brooks,
Using private firms to share the burden
President,
International Peace Operations Association, USA

Colonel Erich Pokorny,
Reducing the logistical footprint in theatre
Head of Force Development Division,
German Army Operational Logistics and Land Systems Engineering, Germany

Lieutenant Colonel Bart Linsen,
Supplying Forward Operating Bases
Commandant - Construction Engineers,
Netherlands Army Engineers, Netherlands

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Toby Switzer
CEO, Agility DGS

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