Stability & Development

A Conversation with Jim Bullion

Civil-Military Partnerships in fragile states

Obama’s Africa Policy
TOUGH. RELIABLE. READY TO SERVE.

Global Fleet Sales, a subsidiary of the RMA Group, is the authorized distributor for Ford Motor Company products to relief, aid and developments programs worldwide.

GFS is your total global solutions provider for vehicles, fleet management services, and specialized vehicle modifications. We’ve efficiently supplied and supported over 40,000 light tactical, armored and other modified vehicles for peacekeeping operations throughout Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

Through our Foreign Military Sales Program, we are able to handle all of your ground mobility needs.

A trusted partner on the ground that can provide:

- Specialized vehicle conversions including light tactical vehicles, armored security personnel carriers, ambulances, and more...
- Armored vehicles that meet or exceed B6/Nij III standards
- Workshop fitted parts and accessories to vehicles as required
- Strictest quality standards for vehicle testing
- Total fleet and life-cycle management
- Tailor-made logistics to meet your requirements
- Complete parts and warranty support in more than 70 countries
- Consolidated financing and leasing programs

Contact us today: sales@globalfleetsales.net
www.globalfleetsales.net
Stability Operations
Engaging Partners Globally for Stability, Peace & Development

Volume 8 | Number 4 | January-February 2013

THIS ISSUE

FEATURE
Stability & Development

8 Stability and Development
Getting Strong and Looking Long
Whitney Grespin

10 Civil-Military Partnerships
A Platform for Stability and Development in Fragile States
Jeffrey Grieco

14 Embracing Complexity
Hybrid Solutions for Governance Development in Fragile and Failed States
Patricio Asfura-Heim

17 Stability Operations and Peace
Connecting Stabilizers and Civil Society
Charles Hauss

Global Perspectives

24 Africa Policy in Obama’s Second Administration
From Sudan to Mali to DRC
Herman J. Cohen

26 Cost Above Quality?
The Importance of Client Priorities When Selecting Private Security Providers
Philip Strand

QA Interview

20 A conversation with Jim Bullion
Stability, Investment & Growth in Afghanistan

From Headquarters

4 From the Editor’s Desk
5 A Message from the ISOA Chairman
28 ISOA Member News & Jobs Board
29 ISOA Membership Directory
ISOA Year in Review

A Review of ISOA’s Activities: 2012

Jessica Mueller

At the end of 2011, we embarked on a strategic planning process with member feedback, Board leadership and intense internal staff discussions. Subsequently, we simplified our focus as an association and identified our key pillars and moved forward with innovative programming specifically for, and on behalf of, our members for a landmark year in 2012.

Business Development & Networking

Throughout 2012, we held several events focused on this pillar, from standard networking receptions to panel events, both members-only and for the general public, including those hosted by our Middle East chapter. We launched a new members-only salon program, which included a dinner with Bloomberg Government in February on contracting trends and a lunch with Don Steinberg of USAID on resiliency, stability and development in May. We also held a members-only roundtable with the head of UN Procurement, Dmitri Dovgopoly in March, and a fantastic roundtable on logistics and risk in Africa in June.

Advocacy & Outreach

Over the past year, we have interacted with an increasing number of stakeholders and partners. In February and March we conducted Hill visits focusing on key issues in contracting, budgets and foreign policy, and continued our engagement on the Iraq Visa issue and Afghan taxation of U.S. foreign assistance. Our 1 day conference in May, Combating Labor Trafficking, tracked the evolution of labor trafficking laws and regulations and highlighted our membership’s ongoing commitment to battling trafficking. We led a meeting with USAID specifically on Risk Management Companies in Afghanistan in June. Our efforts also included several white papers and members-only information briefs on the Afghan tax issue, treatment of contractors, stability account finding, and sequestration. As a reader, you also witnessed the rebranding of this magazine, and hopefully also took advantage of our e-newsletter, The ISOA Weekly.

Standards & Ethics

Our labor trafficking conference focused heavily on standards, ethics and compliance issues, but that was not our only event focused in that vein. ISOA continued to engage on the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, and the ongoing discussions surrounding implementation. We co-sponsored a lunch event and webinar in March, highlighting its current and expected evolution. We also held a half day seminar: Fundamentals of Ethics and Compliance in March for members.

On to 2013

I make a pledge to our members and to the stability operations community with large for 2013. Right now is an incredibly interesting time in the world, and in turn, a pivotal moment for those of us in this community, from the implementers to the policy makers. There has never been a more important time to engage across sectors, industries, agencies, and across what have previously been deemed to be insurmountable ideological boundaries. Partnerships are not simply a possible strategy or a desirable option, but a true necessity in order to truly achieve success in some of the most complex and fragile nations across the globe – especially in light of the reality of shrinking budgets. There has never been a more important time to be part of ISOA - a global partnership of organizations providing every service imaginable in those fragile environments. I pledge that ISOA will continue to be a leader in fostering dialogue, building connections, and engaging partners toward what our membership works in support of every day - laying the foundations for stability, sustainable development, and long term economic growth. On to 2013...
A Message from the ISOA Chair

ISOA Looks Ahead to 2013

Pete Dordal Jr.

Readers of Stability Operations Magazine, formerly the Journal of International Peace Operations, have been kept informed of industry issues, member news, and ISOA activities for almost a decade. This unique publication is a hallmark of ISOA’s communications with members, partners, and the general public on everything stability operations. As we begin a new year, I am pleased to communicate some exciting news that will demonstrate the International Stability Operations Association’s commitment to take our activities to the next level in 2013.

The ISOA Board of Directors is looking to the future and has been exploring a new association business model which will allow us to be more active and involved in the global marketplace for stability operations services and policies. We understand that we need to evolve and continue to grow in our second decade as an organization. After researching and exploring a variety of options with association experts, we have decided to move our headquarters to a professional association management company. Most importantly, this decision will allow us to keep our first-rate ISOA headquarters office in the nation’s capital. We look at this new arrangement as a strategic partnership, which will allow us to build broader member services and even higher quality programming to all partners and stakeholders as we grow into the future.

Everyone can expect business as usual during this seamless transition, including the continued publishing of Stability Operations magazine. Jessica Mueller will continue to serve ISOA members as SOm’s Editor-in-Chief and ISOA’s Director of Programs & Operations, and Jason Kennedy will remain on staff through the transition period. Moving forward, I am confident that ISOA’s new business model will bring unparalleled expertise and a breadth of resources to help us expand our reach and allow us to provide best-in-class products and services to our members, partners and the public.

On behalf of the ISOA Board of Directors, I would like to thank our previous staff that has served us well and provided a solid foundation on which we can build. Doug Brooks will be moving on, but will remain connected to the organization as President Emeritus and founder. We wish him the best in his future endeavors and greatly appreciate the professional support and leadership he is providing us throughout this transition.

In closing, I want you to know that the Board approached this opportunity very thoughtfully and critically. We strongly believe that this partnership is the right answer for the Association and will allow us to continue to serve our current and future members at the highest level possible. We look forward to continuing to provide valuable insights in ISOA’s communications, from Stability Operations magazine, to The ISOA Weekly e-newsletter, and The Whiteboard e-resource library. Our readers and subscribers will see new content and industry leading pieces and we are excited to explore new and innovative possibilities throughout 2013.

Pete Dordal Jr. is Senior Vice President at GardaWorld and is the Chairman of the ISOA Board of Directors.
8th Annual Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping & Stability
Building Capacity and Redefining US Engagement to Advance Long-Term Security and Progress
February 11-13, 2013
Washington D.C.

Attending this Premier marcus evans Conference will Enable You to Hear From:
• National Defense University on the current mood, both domestic and international, towards peacekeeping, stabilization, security and humanitarian assistance.
• JP Human Security: Partners for Peacebuilding Policy on projecting specific steps to foster more effective US engagement in conflict-affected regions to better harmonize US policy with the international community.
• Task Force for Business and Stability Operations and the Office of the Secretary of State: the role of public-private partnership in order to achieve mutually beneficial goals in providing sustainable, cost-effective aid.
• Center on International Cooperation on "doing more with less" through lessons learned from Libya and Syria.
• US Army Corps of Engineers concerning the potential of creative problem-solving and realistic action points in effort to create change and progress in a complicated global climate.

“TRANSITION”

stability operations to an active state of cost-efficiency
for all stakeholders.”

Current 8th Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping & Stabilization Speakers Include:

Dr. Cynthia Miller
Special Assistant, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights
US Department of State

Ambassador John Herbst
Director, Center for Complex Operations (CCO)
National Defense University

James B. Balocki, P.E., SES
Chief, Interagency and International Services Headquarters
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Claire Lockhart
Co-founder and CEO
Institute for State Effectiveness

Linda Scharf, PhD
Director
JP Human Security: Partners for Peacebuilding Policy

Marianne Garrelis
Coordinator, International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Stabilization Organisations for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD)

Spyros Demetriou
Pastoral Advisor / Senior Operations Advisor, Global Center on Conflict, Security and Development

The World Bank Group

For More Information, Please Contact: David Drey
T: 416-800-2481 E: ddrey@marcusevansch.com

3rd Annual Advanced ITAR Compliance
Aligning Internal ITAR Compliance Processes to Meet Evolving Regulations for Improved Operational Efficiency
February 11-14, 2013 | Washington D.C.

Attending this Premier marcus evans Conference will Enable You to Hear From:
• Manage the transition from ITAR to EAR and review current developments with the Export Control Reform Initiative with BIS and DynCorp.
• Review regulations and disclosures to strengthen internal processes and procedures with Northrop Grumman.
• Establish a framework for secure technology transfer with General Electric Aviation.

“CONQUER ITAR”

regulatory changes and develop tools for strengthening licensing practices, internal procedures and export controls.”

Current marcus evans ITAR Speakers Include:

Todd E. Willis (Tentative)
Director, Muncipal Control Division
CSIS/SIS/DOE

Aurora Garmfield
Director, Inter Trade Compliance Electronics Systems
Lockheed Martin Corporation

Larry L. Willoughby
Manager, Licensing Administration
Global Radio Controls

Catherine R. Raffo
General Dynamics Corporation

Cindy Keeter
Director, International Trade Licensing
BAE Systems

Sol Brody
Director, Export Licensing
Raytheon Company

Justin Minkett
Senior Contract Representative
G & C Electronics, LLC

Bob Schuetzler
Director, Export and Compliance
ATK

Matthew J. Lancaster
Director of Licensing, Trade Policy & Export Controls
EADS North America

William G. van Amerongen
Director, International Trade Compliance
International Rectifier Corporation.

Jennifer Haulk
Counsel - Government Affairs
FLUOR

For More Information, Please Contact: Michele Westergaard
T: 1 312 540 3000 ext. 6625 E: michele@marcusevansch.com
HERE IS AN ONGOING and historic debate in the international affairs community over the conditions necessary for creating sustainable and positive economic growth in fragile and failing states. Over the years, many of these arguments have pointed to one type of programming that is the “silver bullet” to successful development—from democratic governance and rule of law, to microfinance and public-private partnerships.

Scholars, policymakers and practitioners now recognize that no single type of funding, programming or mission is the answer. However, from a long menu of options, stabilization programming is often a piece of the puzzle. Whether a state has been crippled by conflict or a massive natural disaster, it is a simple fact that instability prevents long term growth.

**Whitney Grespin** begins this feature by looking at the relationship between stability and development. She aptly differentiates between stability and security, points to successful growth paradigms, and concludes with a look at the private sector’s capabilities.

Next, **Jeffrey Grieco** looks back on past stabilization successes that have led to long term development. In his analysis, he points to a defining piece of those missions, civil-military relationships, and how vulnerable communities develop with their assistance.

**Patricia Asfura-Heim** focuses on governance development as part of stabilization. Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that top-down approaches are not the answer, and she calls for the international community to recognize that local and customary solutions, while hybrid and complex, are the way for stabilization to lead to sustainable development.

**Charles Hauss** takes yet another perspective, from the peacebuilding community. He aptly identifies the gap between peacebuilders and other communities in the field, and calls for increased communication. Long term growth stems from stabilization and peace efforts, and more collaboration can only strengthen success.

---

**Photo**: Rural development program in Afghanistan. Credit: UN Photo
MUCH AS THE international development and community health paradigm preaches that "you have to get healthy before you can get wealthy," the same goes for the wellbeing of states. A country lacking a stable rule of law and robust civil society also wants for social and economic infrastructure that is hospitable to viable long-term development.

The U.S. Government first accepted the utility of foreign stabilization activities as a tool of diplomacy during World War II with the Marshall Plan. In the half-century that has passed since then, security assistance programs and international aid distribution have become increasingly visible activities of both governments and non-state actors. Private non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) have embraced that development reinforces stability. The realization that these happenings are two sides of the same coin is important. They are, however, two different sides. As General Phillips observed at the 2010 ISOA Annual Summit, “development is not stabilization, and stabilization is not development.”

Security vs. Stability

Though often used interchangeably, it is important to appreciate that security is not the same as stability. Security can be achieved by force, but you cannot foist stability onto a community or social system that won’t autonomously sustain it. Simply analogized, development is making sure that Humpty-Dumpty has safeguards and mechanisms that incentivize that he not fall off the wall. Stabilization is putting him back together after a fall, with the increased costs of sustaining all the King’s horses and men. Security is an environment in which no unexpected factors upset either circumstance, and neither causes the fall nor interferes with the restoration.

There is not a strictly military answer to installing stability and ensuring security. Armed intervention to enforce security in complex environments may initially be necessary, but it is an insufficient solution by itself. Military personnel have the skills to improve the environment before security gets to a level where experts can enter the scene. As Secretary Napolitano remarked at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event last year, “it’s one thing to stand there with a uniform and a gun; it’s another to really know how to solve problems.”

Once security has been established, the hand-off from military oversight to civilian interventions can begin. Practitioners with technical skills that focus on things like water and sanitation practices or basic infrastructure improvement can then begin implementation of projects that address chronic, rather than acute, challenges. U.S. military personnel provide unsurpassed security, but it is the technical experts who follow that have the skills that are foundational to long term development. This is vital in a trade whose goal, for all intents and purposes, is to put itself out of business.

In complex environments that exhibit early or residual indicators of conflict, facilitating development or reconstruction is both cheaper than sending soldiers and has longer effects. Simple indicators of success can also be seen when stabilization efforts are working. Are people putting glass back in their windows? Are they painting their houses? Are they repairing the bullet holes in the walls? These metrics are useful barometers in resource-poor environments.

Getting Wealthy

Economic stagnation and generally low wages make participation in illicit activities, armed groups and organized criminal network seem attractive. Participation in common markets and financial achievement is important to engaging citizens as stakeholders in their communities. Not only must development experts focus on economic growth, but they must also encourage the implementation of monitoring and oversight mechanisms to keep the market honest.

These mechanisms, which often manifest themselves as government regulations, help encourage that a legitimate economy grows rather than a criminal one. By encouraging commerce to happen in legitimate markets rather than in shadow frameworks, there is also a tacit endorsement of the governing bodies that provide oversight. When implemented well, partnerships should end, but their results should not. Building individuals, communities and states that are financially resilient is integral to providing a fertile breeding ground for development results to emerge.

Representing the Coalition for Fiscal and National Security at a December event, Admiral Michael Mullen reiterated that, “A strong economy and strong national security is
inextricably linked.” In post-conflict and other complex environments it is vital that economies get moving, whether it is through development or reconstruction. Economic engagement gives people something to do, and increases the opportunity cost of allowing instability to be prolonged. One development expert observed, “If you want to cause conflict then take away one’s means of making a living.”

Industry Relevance

Even as the U.S. prepares to exit Afghanistan and disengage from Iraq, the contracting industry for stability operations and development work is alive and healthy. For example, the recent degeneration of conditions in northern Mali from a secessionist movement to extremist Islamist safe haven is precisely the kind of cautionary tale that the U.S. and wider international community would like to avoid through capacity enhancement programs that build strong, autonomous states.

“As each day goes by, Al Qaeda and other organizations are strengthening their hold in northern Mali,” said U.S. AFRICOM Commander General Carter F. Ham at a recent George Washington University event.

If the available host nation and regional forces are not equipped to respond to threats such as those posed by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, then it becomes an issue of both wider regional and international interest to ensure that legitimate actors are able to exert control in under-governed spaces. After the last decade of delivering skill-building trainings at country-wide scales, many companies are able to provide these types of services in a more efficient manner than government entities. The delivery of such skill-based programming by contractors has a solid record of effective past performance, and will likely increase in frequency given the government’s recent trending away from physical intervention and towards a preference for mitigative training.

Beyond training programs that immediately place the burden of responsibility on host-nation personnel, many of the most basic internationally supported aid and development programs operate widely in austere and high-risk environments. These are the populations that need the services most, but may also be least accessible. Unaffiliated and non-partisan organizations may require the services of privately contracted security companies to ensure their safety in these areas. Though this often attracts criticism, the fact remains that some of the relief efforts that encourage development cannot be accomplished without the additional protection of such services.

Perhaps least glamorously, but most necessarily, is the ability of companies to gain access to austere, remote or less permissive areas, and establish life-support and logistics hubs that lay the groundwork for development projects. For example, mere months after the fall of the key port city Kismayu from al-Shabab control in Somalia, the contingency contracting firm Atlantean has been able to establish a camp that caters to individuals conducting and supporting stability operations as a precursor to development interventions. Offering full-service accommodations, air charter services, security escorts and other life support services may not seem like an obvious contribution to a state that has suffered so much uncertainty. However, in addition to accommodating development practitioners, these establishments contribute to stabilization through their interactions with the local economy via host national employment, tax revenue, and consumption of other local services.

The work of contingency contracting companies, and even their presence in itself, in transitional environments has positive implications towards stabilizing communities and incentivizing progress. These stabilization activities transform host community inhabitants into stakeholders in maintaining a secure environment that they can build their lives around, and motivates them to choose to contribute to the good things happening in that community every day. And after all, what is development if not an expansion of individual choices? ■
Civil-Military Partnerships
A Platform for Stability and Development in Fragile States
Jeffrey Grieco

From Yugoslavia in the 1990s to Syria, Yemen and Somalia today, fragile states pose destabilizing security threats to entire regions of the world and they impact the global community as well. In Syria, for example, the global community is trying to cope with an emerging humanitarian disaster embedded within a live conflict zone. Even so, there is a remarkable record of success by civil society groups in helping to stabilize such societies by protecting vulnerable populations, building resilience against renewed conflict, and rebuilding economic and governance institutions.

The Balkans: Laboratory for Stability and Development

Recent civil stabilization successes can be traced to efforts launched in the Balkans in the 1990s, where civil society groups became, and remain, critical partners in sustaining the peace and laying the groundwork for the entry of several new states into the European Union. The European Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and World Bank recently confirmed this success, and committed to sustain it, by pledging $38.3 billion of additional aid to the Balkans and Southeastern Europe. The three institutions plan to jointly put capital into small and medium-size enterprises, infrastructure and other projects to promote economic development and continued regional integration.

The community-based model successfully employed in the Balkans, built on and backed by significant financial resources and security sector support, is now being applied in other conflict and post-conflict zones, including North and West Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A relatively new development is that NGOs now cooperate and coordinate directly with US and international security forces, along with key bilateral donors such as USAID and AusAID and other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. In places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the coordination has been so close that the NGOs' work has been viewed as examples of effective counterinsurgency, particularly in the “hold” phase of COIN's “clear-hold-build” strategy, which relies on gaining local support.

The Better Implementer of Stability and Development

As both military and civilian leaders repeatedly point out, civilian agencies are better equipped to understand, support, and work directly with local communities to bring stability and establish a platform for development. There are three primary reasons for this:

1) They are perceived as more of a neutral party (which is especially important in conflict zones) and especially by women and children who represent a majority of vulnerable populations in conflict environments;

2) They are also generally better received by local governments and communities as appropriate providers of stability and longer term economic and political development services because they bring a humanitarian perspective to implementation which focuses on community ownership, livelihoods training and capacity building.

Jeffrey Grieco is Chief, Public and Government Affairs, IRD and a Member of the Board of Directors for the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA). Mr. Grieco is also a former USAID Assistant Administrator.
This is especially important in fragile states suffering from the “youth bulge” which can quickly threaten national security by increased unrest and insecurity; and

3) They maintain a huge repository of development and stability experience and applied practicum including lessons learned, best practices, specialized monitoring and evaluation methodologies and host country knowledge (e.g. cultural, religious, community structures, governance, social networks, etc…) which cannot necessarily be learned and applied quickly if seeking sustainable results.

We also need to recognize that despite their successes, “civ-mil” partnerships are still controversial. Some development organizations say such partnerships compromise their objectivity and political neutrality. These are legitimate concerns, ones with which any serious NGO grapples. One thing is certain: the debate within the development community on the nature and extent of these partnerships will continue.

Nevertheless, the vulnerable communities struggling to maintain or rebuild their lives and livelihoods in the midst of conflict recognize that civil-military partnerships are, in many cases, their best hope for long term stability and developmental success.

Continued on next page
caught in armed and violent conflicts who, by any measure, are among the world’s most vulnerable persons. Nations such as Syria, Yemen, Niger, Mali, Chad and Somalia are just a few that currently have vulnerable communities embedded within conflict areas. During my time at USAID as Assistant Administrator and now at International Relief & Development (IRD) I have come to learn that communities in conflict and post-conflict situations are interested first in stability and secondly in economic and political development. A community must first have that important sense of security so that the cycle of economic, political and social development can take root. As result, the overwhelming majority of vulnerable communities will embrace incentives and alternatives to conflict and unlawful activities when they are offered but that offer is best made by civilian organizations to have a more effective, expeditious and sustainable impact. One area for further study and research is in better understanding how to counter violent extremism in failed states where perhaps the same incentives that worked in a fragile state cannot be used as effectively.

Civil-Military Platforms Can Serve Both Stability and Economic Development Objectives

An example comes from Iraq, a program implemented from 2006-2009. The Community Stabilization Program (CSP) was eventually a $648 million cooperative agreement between the US Agency for International Development and International Relief & Development (IRD) to fund stabilization activities in Baghdad. Based on initial successes, the Department of Defense and USAID soon requested that CSP expand nationwide. At the height of the program, IRD had 1,800 staff (over 90 percent of those were local Iraqi employees) and was implementing $21 million per month in job training, livelihoods and other programs. Where CSP went, stability tended to follow.

Building on experience from its Community Revitalization through Democratic Action (CRDA) program and related initiatives in the Balkans, IRD applied lessons in Iraq about mobilizing war-weary populations to re-establish self-governance, community organization, and democratic principles. IRD supported basic training on rule of law, promoted civil society institutions, and instituted a rapid participatory appraisal process to get projects moving quickly. With this capacity development, Iraqi community groups developed action plans based on their own priorities. These plans were then implemented in close coordination with the military and local provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) as well as local ministry officials – which helped legitimize the government and establish lines of trust and communication between leaders and citizens.

By the time CSP ended in 2009, it had:

- Generated more than 525,000 short-term jobs
- Created or restored more than 57,100 long-term jobs
- Completed more than 1,600 total projects that rebuilt, refurbished, or revitalized key pieces of community infrastructure
- Created or expanded more than 10,000 businesses through micro, small, and medium sized enterprise grants
- Provided business development and skills training to more than 15,000 entrepreneurs
- Graduated over 41,000 citizens from vocational training programs
- Placed more than 9,900 vocational skills trainees in apprenticeships
- Engaged more than 350,000 at-risk Iraqis ages 17–35 in more than 500 youth participation activities, including team sports competition and arts training

CSP was a landmark investment for the largest bilateral assistance agency in the world: USAID. It marked USAID’s first large-scale commitment to a stabilization program in an active conflict zone. Development, diplomatic and defense professionals agree the effort was measurably effective. In a 2008 letter, then USAID Iraq Mission Director Chris Crowley wrote that “CSP has been very successful.” On
the diplomatic side, then Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew said he considered CSP “one of the most effective counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq.” On the Department of Defense side, General David Petraeus noted that CSP is “precisely what we need to do” and is “a wonderful program and we applaud it.” Through collaboration at both the strategic and operational levels, CSP brought community stabilization and laid the ground work for economic development in a conflict environment squarely within US development, diplomatic, and defense objectives in Iraq.

NGOS Can Benefit From Civil-Military Platforms in Conflict States

NGOs are the first to acknowledge the challenges they face in civil-military cooperation initiatives. They also acknowledge the risks civil-military partnerships can mitigate and perhaps the advantages they can leverage. The major mitigating risk is the inherent one of working in a conflict zone. While NGOs rely on strong community-based relationships and a lower profile within local communities, they still must devote in-house expertise, time, and precious resources to the risk management and security needs of their staff and the communities where they work. In some large conflict states, these security resources could represent a significant portion of the program development budget thereby diminishing the programmatic impact for vulnerable populations. Depending on the circumstances, costs can be reduced and security to NGO staff increased through coordination with international security forces. With this degree of care, despite the hardships of working in conflict zones, development NGOs are effective in helping communities to initiate economic and political development in areas of conflict and countering the risks associated with violent extremism.

Perhaps the main advantage to be leveraged through civil-military partnerships is the alignment with authority able to establish and enforce rules and norms. Conflict upends lines of authority, upends established rules and even longer-standing political, religious or social norms and values. It is difficult, often impossible, to help build or rebuild economic and political institutions if one’s work is not seen as taking place within the context of a defined state or community structure. In conflict and post-conflict environments, security forces, whether local, national or international, can be a key part of “state” infrastructure and serve a role in helping to facilitate longer term development.

In Short, Civilian-Military Partnerships Work

In fact, as a platform for stability and longer term economic development they may be needed more than ever. Serious consideration is warranted now by the United States Government and Congressional policymakers to better understand the impact of these partnerships and then, if satisfied with their impact analysis, help to promote and protect these partnerships. Importantly, experience has shown that they: a) help vulnerable populations quickly (especially women and children who represent the majority of these groups in conflict zones); b) stabilize communities in a way that enables longer term economic and political development; and c) promote the values and interests of the United States and the international community.
"Repeating an Afghanistan or an Iraq – forced regime change followed by nation-building under fire – probably is unlikely in the foreseeable future. What is likely though, even a certainty, is the need to work with and through local governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian disaster."

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has followed a Weberian interventionist template that calls for establishing a monopoly on violence, building or reforming administrative bureaucracies, and increasing the penetration of state institutions. The fear of "ungoverned space" has reinforced the presumption that strengthening state institutions in fragile and failed states is the primary solution for countering transnational terrorism and proto-insurgencies. However, recent experiences with nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan have cast doubt on the efficacy of this approach. Despite considerable effort and expense, governance initiatives in these countries have yielded decidedly lackluster results. As such, there is growing recognition that top-down, state-centric stabilization in the most worn-torn areas is too slow, too cumbersome, and in some instances counterproductive to security goals. [1] In today’s era of shrinking defense and international development budgets, wide ranging and long term commitments to governance development have become too costly and politically contentious to sustain on a large scale. [2]

Despite its growing distaste for costly and open-ended stabilization operations the international community will continue to intervene to prevent failed states and to combat terrorist groups.
While there is no question that bolstering governance will remain a cornerstone of stabilization methodology, the current shift away from large scale nation building means better scoped and more effective approaches – ones that take into consideration contextual realities and utilize local solutions - must be developed.

**State-centric vs. customary approaches to governance development**

Bolstering good governance by building formal institutions in weak states is exceedingly difficult because it requires that a variety of conditions exist at the time of intervention or are developed quickly (and simultaneously) thereafter. A top-down, state-centric approach to governance development requires that a social contract between the ruling elite and the population be in place. Such an approach assumes that the host nation’s government has the will to implement social policies and to protect and provide for its population. It requires a degree of security and freedom of movement. Last but not least, this approach requires a considerable amount of indigenous human capital and civil service expertise. These pre-conditions and capabilities are often non-existent or in short supply in fragile and failed states. Thus, according to detractors of liberal interventionism, applying state-centric stabilization strategies in these countries is too time and resource intensive, politically divisive, and not all-together effective. In fact, when top-down approaches have been attempted in states without a strong institutional basis to build on, they have often undermined, rather than promoted, good governance by empowering illegitimate, predatory, and self-interested regimes.

There is growing recognition among many stabilization professionals that a bottom-up approach that mobilizes the population through the co-option of informal or “customary” institutions may provide effective stop-gap solutions in the most conflict-ridden areas. Development experts such as Bruce Baker, Ken Menkhau, Mario Fumerton, and Ariel Ahram, argue that devolving state power to alternate systems, while not without drawbacks, is often the only way to quickly improve human security in weak states, maintain the support of the population, and avoid creating recruitment opportunities for adversaries. In the field of rule of law development, practitioners such as Deborah Isser have found that leveraging existing customary justice institutions to promote a culture of lawfulness and reconciliation in post conflict and war-torn societies is a much more effective solution than demanding the dominance of state justice institutions that are often corrupt and lack capacity or legitimacy. Critics of this approach often rightly argue that an over-reliance on customary solutions can propagate cycles of violence, lead to human rights abuses, or weaken state institutions.

**Towards a hybrid solution**

In places with weak or non-existent governments, a hybrid (top-down and bottom-up) model for governance development that does not automatically put the state at the center of the response, may be an imperfect, but legitimate best option for promoting human security and stability. Such an approach would emphasize what Merilee Grindle has termed “good enough governance” by addressing the immediate needs of the population and recognizing the requirement for more scoped and limited solutions to protecting at risk populations from terrorist, criminal, or insurgent influences.

Fundamentally, the goal of a hybrid approach would be to tamp down drivers of instability – such as tribal or sectarian inflighting or the plight of dispossessed minority groups that if left alone can be exploited by bad actors - while at the same time building habits of cooperation with the formal government and setting the trajectory for long-term state institution building. As such, any stabilization strategy that incorporates customary security, governance and justice solutions would need to avoid creating conditions (such as warlordism) that hinder state development. It is important to note that this approach is not, in it of itself, antithetical to state building. In places like Oman, Jordan, and Turkey, stable and well governed states, the governments have nested elements of tribal dispute resolution and community based security into their state institutions.
cereonies such as fasil and sulha were used successfully by the central government to prevent feuding and encourage reconciliation between sectarian groups. In Afghanistan, the Ministry of Justice has effectively used haqoqs (civil mediators) that work with tribal elders and religious leaders to solve community disputes.

Given current trends, it is likely the international community will find itself engaged in stability operations or development and security sector reform initiatives in large parts of Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Latin America. Many post-colonial states in these areas share certain characteristics such as center-periphery conflict, weak state institutions, oligopolies of violence, ungoverned or under-governed space, and robust informal or “customary” governance, security, and justice systems. These are the proverbial “weak states and strong societies” described by political scientists such as Joel Migdal. In the current constrained environment, it will be tempting to retreat to isolationist tendencies and avoid interventions in these states. This would be a mistake. To achieve its security objectives the international community must embrace complexity, learn to engage at the local level, and look to employ a flexible, hybrid approach to stabilization.

References

[1] Even before Iraq and Afghanistan, there was little international will or domestic support for state building initiatives. The trend since the 1990s shows that enthusiasm for such interventions wanes relatively quickly as donor fatigue sets in and nations become reluctant to provide troops. See Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press), 2010.

[2] Phil Williams, “From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of the State and U.S. Strategy,” Strategic Studies Institute, (June 2008).

[3] The U.S. Department of State 2008 Country Reports on Terrorism lists 14 terrorist safe havens: Somalia and the Trans-Sahara in Africa; the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral and the southern Philippines in East Asia and the Pacific Region; Iraq, northern Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen in the Middle East; the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in South Asia; and the Colombia border region, Venezuela, and the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in the western hemisphere.
STANGELY ENOUGH, peace operations and peace building professionals do not work together anywhere near enough. That should not be the case, because we need each other. In the simplest terms, stability operations are most needed when we peace builders fail in our primary mission—preventing conflict from turning violent. Similarly, if stability operations fail after the fighting ends, it becomes all but impossible for us to do our other job—forging lasting agreements after the fighting stops that lead to reconciliation and equitable, sustainable societies.

In this article, I try to make the case that there are places we can turn to find models of how we could and should work together. I conclude by suggesting that there are also some signs that we are moving in directions that could make cooperation between us easier.

In an ideal world, we would do our work together. As everything from Defense Department doctrine to United Nations sequencing of peace building show, they are intellectually part of a seamless whole. In practice, our two worlds rarely interact in ways that turn what we do into a seamless whole. In fact, projects that combine our two worlds are few and far between. Therefore, it is not surprising that the inspiration for this article comes from a project that at first glance seems quite removed from either peace building or stability operations.

Over the last few years, Cease Fire Chicago (www.ceasefirechicago.org) has developed an integrated program for combating urban violence that is now in use in more than 35 American cities and a dozen foreign countries. Cease Fire Chicago uses an epidemiological model in which urban violence spreads very much like a disease. As with everything from plague to HIV/AIDS, their first challenge is to stop its spread, which they do through the use of carefully trained young men and women who were once part of the problem, not the solution. The “interrupters” intervene in their communities to keep incidents from turning violent or, once a shooting has occurred, to help prevent retaliation and other escalatory acts. Once that “cease fire” is secure, the rest of the Cease Fire Chicago team has the time and emotional space to begin addressing the long-term causes of the “disease” in all aspects of urban society. In other words, Cease Fire Chicago does both a version of stability operations and a version of peace building.

Unlike Cease Fire Chicago, we tend to work in isolation, whether in planning or carrying out our operations. That is hardly surprising, since we tend to come from different worlds.

Most people I know in stability operations have either been in the military or are comfortable working with soldiers. That is as it should be since stability operations almost always involve working in dangerous situations where, if the fighting has stopped, it could easily break out again.

I’m typical of most people in the peace building world. My roots are squarely in the peace movement, beginning with my high school and undergraduate days protesting the war in Vietnam. I have never fired a gun. Few of my colleagues have served in the military.

Charles Hauss is Government Liaison at the Alliance for Peacebuilding and spent more than 35 years as a professor of political science.

Continued on next page
(but happily declining) number of us are skeptical about or even hostile toward working with the military.

Our differences start with the way we are educated, which you can quickly see by comparing an Internet search on graduate education in peace building and stability operations. There is almost no overlap. Stability operations can most frequently be found in curricula for professional military education. Typical (and exemplary) on that front is the U.S. Army’s Peace Keeping and Stabilization Operations Institute (www.pksoi.army.mil) or the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada (www.peaceoperations.org). Their students tend to be mid-career soldiers, but their services are made more widely available through a variety of outreach programs.

By contrast, almost all graduate programs in conflict resolution and peace building are housed in civilian universities and typically lead to a masters or doctoral degree. Few students are veterans or have any experience in stability operations. Few programs offer courses in stability operations, although most include them as a topic in a number of classes.

That the two communities rarely meet can be seen at George Mason University. Not only does George Mason have one of the first and, arguably, one of the best programs in conflict analysis and resolution, it has one of the few peace operations graduate programs at a civilian university. The two are located in adjacent buildings, but at times they seem continents apart. Until recently, few students from one program took courses at the other. Happily, that is beginning to change.

In conclusion, I would like to make the case that we have to work together and are already beginning to.

The biggest steps toward cooperation have come from the training component of the stability operations world. Perhaps because it is based in Canada where the political and emotional distance between the military and the peace community is not as great as it is here, colleagues at the Pearson Centre and one of its offshoots, the Cornwallis Group, have been reaching out to the NGO community for a decade or more. The same is true of militaries in other countries that routinely undertake extensive peace keeping operations. PKSOI and the Naval Postgraduate Schools...
We in the peace building community have been slower to respond. The reluctance to work with the military is finally subsiding. Our students now routinely take courses in stability operations when they can. Fewer of them instinctively shy away from careers either in the military or the security sector writ large.

My own organization is a good case in point. The Alliance for Peacebuilding has just launched a multi-year strategic communications campaign. Part of that effort will include an attempt to broaden the constituencies that think of themselves as peace builders, including the military. Thus, we are co-sponsored a working conference on Peace and the Military in September 2012, which will turn into a permanent project to strengthen communications and other ties between our communities. We are also in the process of hiring a retired colonel, who spent thirty years as a serving and reserve officer, precisely because of his experience in stability operations.

I write at an opportune time for us to work ever more closely together, because both of our communities are realizing that they have to change, and those needed changes will bring us closer together. Those discussions go far beyond the work our two communities could and should do together.

If we are lucky, the next few years will see a dramatic expansion of support for new conceptions of security that have already begun. Thus, it is common for people in both the military and the NGO communities to speak of human rather than traditional national security. Similarly, two then-senior officers working for the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote a new “national security narrative” that has found echoes among many of us seeing to catalyze “virtuous circles” rather than “vicious cycles” in our even more rapidly globalizing world (www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/A%20National%20Strategic%20Narrative.pdf).

Our two communities can play a significant role in that burgeoning discussion and, hopefully, policy change in two ways already hinted at in this article. We can continue training the next generation of professionals differently so that they are comfortable working both in stability operations and peace building. We can also expand our hiring pools so that we increasingly find ways for people at all levels of seniority to work with each other.

To return to the example of George Mason, which is almost certainly the only American university with degree programs in both fields, I am delighted to report that my colleagues are following their students and increasingly crossing the parking lot that separates Founders Hall from the Truland Building.
Stability, Investment & Growth in Afghanistan
A Conversation with Jim Bullion

James L. Bullion is the Director of the Task Force for Business Stability Operations (TFBSO). Prior to joining TFBSO, Mr. Bullion was President of Phoenix Global Services, LLC, a strategy and management consulting firm. Earlier in his career he held senior executive positions in international telecommunications companies. He began his career in commercial banking and investment management.

Mr. Bullion is a retired colonel of the United States Army Reserve and served two tours in Iraq. Mr. Bullion earned a B.A. in Economics from Dartmouth College and an MBA from the Amos Tuck School of Business Administration.

The Task Force for Business and Stability Operations is a relatively new entity in the Department of Defense, primarily focused on Afghanistan. Since the initiative was started, what have been the biggest achievements?

Bullion: TFBSO was established in mid-2006 to focus on economic stabilization in Iraq by identifying opportunities for foreign direct investment in state-owned enterprises, leveraging the purchasing power of the Department of Defense as a catalyst for economic growth. In late 2009, TFBSO was asked to evaluate the Afghan economy and identify opportunities for economic growth, recognizing the significant differences from Iraq’s economy. We rapidly determined that Afghanistan has an enormous wealth of natural resources – minerals, oil, gas and gemstones – as well as opportunities to dramatically improve the value being generated by existing industries such as carpet manufacturing, cashmere production, agricultural products, and other industries and tremendous human resources whose potential needed to be unleashed. We have therefore focused our efforts in those sectors with goals of generating sustainable, long-term revenue for the Afghan government and expansion of the private sector to create jobs and wealth-creation opportunities. We address the first goal by assisting the Government of Afghanistan monetize its mineral, oil, and natural gas resources through international investment and development, and the second by identifying business opportunities for Afghan and international investors, providing assistance to Afghan entrepreneurs to help them expand their businesses and prepare them for potential investment, and helping to create opportunities for new industrial development.

TFBSO’s achievements in Afghanistan are significant, including:

- Successful tenders of hydrocarbon and mineral resources executed to international standards and using fully transparent processes; as a result, several international companies have committed to invest millions of dollars to develop oil and gas fields and explore potential copper and gold mines. Afghanistan is now capable of producing oil and rapidly expanding its production of natural gas. This is expected to spur additional investments in the infrastructure needed to extract, process and move these products, creating thousands of new jobs.
- Development of partnerships between Afghan hand-woven carpet manufacturers and international design and carpet companies in Austria, Chile, Italy, and the United States, bringing Afghan carpet producers into the modern world, thus dramatically increasing the potential size of this important industry; we have also built and launched facilities that will allow Afghans to finish their own carpets and reap their value in Afghanistan rather than exporting semi-finished products, adding millions of dollars to the Afghan economy.
- Creation of a business incubator that has helped many small Afghan enterprises grow and prosper by training their owners and managers in basic business skills and connecting them with market opportunities.
- Evaluation of hundreds of Afghan businesses as potential investment targets for Afghan and international investors, and introducing promising businesses to leading emerging market investment funds.

But the true success is in our relationship with the Afghan people, especially our colleagues in
The reality is that the majority of the country is safe, businesses are growing, commerce is expanding rapidly, and international companies are beginning to recognize and respond to the opportunities that the developing Afghan economy presents.

What have been the biggest challenges to economic growth in Afghanistan from TFBSO’s perspective?

Bullion: The greatest challenge to economic growth in Afghanistan is the enormous gulf between commonly-held perceptions of Afghanistan and the reality of life and business there. Afghanistan is seen by people who have not been there as a violent, poverty-stricken, unstable country run by corrupt officials, all adding up to a place with few good prospects for the future and certainly no place for a sane investor. This inaccurate impression stifles the ability of Afghan businesses to draw in the investment and human capital they need to grow and compete. The reality is that the majority of the country is safe, businesses are growing, commerce is expanding rapidly, and international companies are beginning to recognize and respond to the opportunities that the developing Afghan economy presents. A secondary challenge, which exists in many emerging economies, is the need for improved infrastructure, such as railroads, power, and roads. Tremendous progress has been made over the past several years in all of these areas, and the on-going requirements present opportunities for private investors to come in and help build profitable businesses that can deliver the capabilities that Afghanistan needs to continue its rapid growth.

Economic stability in Afghanistan will require a multilateral, multi-stakeholder effort – from US-led initiatives such as TFBSO and foreign aid programs, to regional and international development initiatives, and local ownership through capacity building programs. What is the primary strength that TFBSO brings to the entire effort?

Bullion: TFBSO’s primary strength is to be able to shape private sector business opportunities in Afghanistan and to position them for partnerships or investments from international businesses or investment companies. TFBSO is not a donor, but rather thinks and operates as an investor itself, managing a portfolio of opportunities and

Continued on next page
tracking and measuring the returns on our investments in terms of revenues to the Afghan government or new jobs and businesses created. As a core component of the Department of Defense, our mission is to support International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to bring stability to Afghanistan; we also operate with a sense of urgency that other programs simply don’t seem to feel. We manage all of our programs directly, with assistance as needed from subject matter experts, but with responsibility always in the hands of our own team members. Most importantly, in all of our initiatives we partner with Afghan stakeholders in the government and private sector, handing off responsibility to them as soon as they have the capacity to execute on their own. Everything we do is oriented toward helping the Afghans take ownership of their society and their economy and accelerating their journey to independence from the world donor community.

Your background in the U.S. military and the private sector allow you to draw from your experiences to lead this unique office. What are some of the lessons learned from your experiences that you brought to your work with TFBSO?

**Bullion:** I spent 30 years as an Army Reserve officer, most of it in Civil Affairs, and including two tours of duty in Iraq, while managing a civilian business career that has taken me through commercial banking, investment management, international telecommunications, private equity investing and management consulting. This is my first experience as a civilian in government service and I am absolutely delighted to have this opportunity to serve again in this capacity. The biggest lesson that I am bringing to TFBSO is that we must have accountability for everything that we do. In the private sector, managers and investors are always being evaluated on the basis of their results – higher sales, lower costs, better returns. They are fiduciaries for their owners’ money and are constantly being asked to show how they are generating value for their owners. Likewise in this role, we have a fiduciary responsibility to deliver returns on the taxpayer dollars that the Congress has entrusted to us. In the case of TFBSO, those returns can be measured in terms of those factors that help build stability in a post-conflict country like Afghanistan: revenues to the government, more jobs, wealth creation through new or expanded businesses. These principles, combined with the sense of mission focus and urgency that I learned through my military career, will, I hope, shape the future of the Task Force in positive ways.

As the drawdown timeline continues, and we look to the subsequent “Transformational Decade” in Afghanistan post-2014, how do you view DOD’s role, and TFBSO’s role, in helping the Afghans secure their own sustainable stability – governmental, societal and economic?

**Bullion:** I would argue that the criticality of the Task Force’s work in helping to build the private sector in Afghanistan is growing as the transition and drawdown progress. Now more than ever, we need to help the Afghans take full ownership of their country and responsibility for its future. The growth of the private sector is the only path to true Afghan independence and stability and the private sector is the only engine that can create sustainable jobs, economic opportunity, hope and dignity for the Afghan people. The Task Force is committed to continuing to plant and nurture the seeds of that growth for as long as we are given a mandate to do so.
IN a world where face-time is increasingly replaced by virtual interaction, one would think that traditional event models are a thing of the past. At ISOA, we know that the opposite is true—as long as events are developed with the attendees needs at the forefront of the planning process.

Our work at ISOA rests on three pillars—business development and networking, outreach and advocacy, and standards and ethics. These pillars drive our event planning process for annual events, ad hoc seminars and receptions. We recognize that a crucial part of developing any business is relationship-building and brand recognition—two needs that ISOA looks to meet at every event.

HOW DO YOU DEVELOP YOUR COMPANY OR ACHIEVE YOUR MISSION THROUGH EVENTS?
Our events center around the issues that matter most to our members—from high level policy issues to the nitty-gritty details of a procurement process—drawing attendees from all corners of the stability operations community. Every event is built to include critical networking opportunities so that members can meet the partners they need for continued success. The current economic environment combined with today’s many international challenges calls for robust partnerships across governments, militaries, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector.

Brand recognition and other basic outreach is also vital. Whether an established company or a start-up, if no one knows your name and what you do, your prospects are limited. Consider advertising in a conference publication, hosting a small event at your offices, or choose the most popular option: sponsor an event. Sponsorship provides maximum exposure to all attendees and even non-attendees, through the event marketing materials, thereby increasing your reach to an even larger audience than simply attending or exhibiting at an event. From small seminars to our flagship Annual Summit, the opportunities to showcase your organization are virtually limitless!
Africa Policy in Obama’s Second Administration

From Sudan to Mali to DRC

Herman J. Cohen

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY worldwide has always suffered from the syndrome that I call, “we don’t want to get involved, but we can’t stay out.” This applied to both Republican and Democratic administrations, and to all continents.

A good example in Africa was the long 30-year Sudanese civil war between the Arab government in Khartoum and the Southern Peoples Liberation Movement. During the 1980s and 1990s, the US regarded this war as essentially a humanitarian issue. When George W. Bush became President in 2001, he decided to begin a comprehensive and vigorous mediation effort that led to a peace treaty in 2005, and the final separation into two separate states in 2011. What happened? Bush was under heavy pressure from his political base to do something to save the mainly Christian population of south Sudan from the horrors of Khartoum’s scorched earth policy.

During his first four years, Obama did an excellent job of refraining from taking charge of Africa’s crises. He did make sure that his administration kept up the momentum in Sudan generated by his predecessor right through to the separation into two states. And even after that momentous moment in 2011, the US has maintained two special representatives to assist the two parties to solve ongoing tensions in the south and in the province of Darfur. But this is anticlimactic. Bush did the real job.

But, apart from Sudan, Obama managed to keep the US from taking charge of major crises in Africa during his first four years. But that does not mean the US has been totally uninvolved.

In Somalia, where African troops, under the auspices of the African Union, have been fighting the al-Shebab jihad Islamists connected to al-Qaeda, the US has been providing money, training and intelligence. But the US role has been very low key.

The US role in regime change in Libya in 2011 was more prominent in that we insisted on international action to stop Gaddafi from committing genocide in Cyrenaica, his eastern province. In this case, the administration coined the term, “leading from behind.” We were pushing the international community to act, but when the action started, we could not avoid playing a supporting role behind France, Italy, and the UK. The complexity of implementing a “no fly zone” turned out to require more direct US involvement that we had anticipated.

In Somalia, where African troops, under the auspices of the African Union, have been fighting the al-Shebab jihad Islamists connected to al-Qaeda, the US has been providing money, training and intelligence. But the US role has been very low key.

In Somalia, where African troops, under the auspices of the African Union, have been fighting the al-Shebab jihad Islamists connected to al-Qaeda, the US has been providing money, training and intelligence. But the US role has been very low key.

There has been a major crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo since mid-2012, with army mutineers wreaking havoc on the population of North Kivu, and neighboring regimes pillaging the province’s vast mineral resources. The American role in the DRC has been the least proactive in history. We have been hiding inside the UN Security Council, and we have been encouraging sub-regional solutions. The DRC is one quagmire we seem to be avoiding like the plague.

What is facing President Obama in Africa as he enters his second term?

Historically, our highest priority in Africa has always been economic development. Every administration has emphasized this. Obama was wise to maintain Bush’s two main programs: PEPFAR to combat HIV, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation to provide significant extra support to governments making a serious effort to reform their economies and their governance.

In addition, Obama needs to continue, or even beef up, his own program called “Feed the Future.” With Chinese and Indians growing their economies at fast rates, their food consumption will be increasing rapidly. Couple this phenomenon with droughts in Africa and the USA, and we will be witnessing high world food prices indefinitely. Africa, with great agricultural potential, cannot afford to continue importing most of its food. Obama’s “Feed the future” program is designed to make Africa as self-sufficient as possible in basic food requirements, and to increase Africa’s food exports. Continuation of this program will be vital.

As for security challenges in Africa, I wish I could say that the Obama Administration will be able to maintain a relatively low profile, as it encourages and supports regional organizations to take charge of stability operations. The security situation in northern Mali has given al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) an unprecedented opportunity to establish itself permanently in the Sahel region. These Algerian “jihadists” and “salaists” have managed to take over the northern half of Mali and to establish fundamentalist Islamic medieval government.

Ambassador Cohen is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and is President of Cohen & Woods International.
Apart from Sudan, Obama managed to keep the US from taking charge of major crises in Africa during his first four years. But that does not mean the US has been totally uninvolved.

There are reliable reports of coordination between them and the Boko Haram Islamic insurgency in northern Nigeria. Al-Qaeda volunteers from Pakistan, Yemen, and Libya, among other countries, have apparently joined the AQIM group in northern Mali.

Until now, the United States, working within the UN Security Council, has encouraged the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to take charge of this problem. ECOWAS has agreed to stand up 3,500 troops for a military operation to take back northern Mali for the regime in Bamako. Even more nervous about the Mali problem than the United States, France is encouraging rapid military action, but maintains that the Africans have to do it themselves.

A look at the map tells us that the mission to retake Northern Mali from the Islamists can be a logistical nightmare. Even bringing armored vehicles and heavy weapons to the southern capital city of Bamako will not be easy in view of the country’s landlocked status. And Bamako is over 500 miles away from the zone of operations. ECOWAS has no aviation capability to speak of, no special forces, and very little logistics. I see no alternative to major involvement of American and French personnel on the ground, and significant support in air cargo and personnel transport. The worst possible outcome would be a major ECOWAS operation that either fails, or stagnates into an endless counter terrorist fight. Listening to public statements by AFRICOM commander, General Carter Hamm, I hear a soldier enthusiastic about the prospect of cleaning out the viper’s nest in northern Mali. I imagine that a combined US-French operation would be effective, and possibly indispensable.

The second security challenge in Africa for Obama will be the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Will the US decide to join the growing number of governments holding Rwanda and Uganda accountable for the tremendous humanitarian disaster in the northeastern DRC? Will the US continue to treat the failed government in Kinshasa with “business as usual”? It will be impossible for Washington to avoid major decisions on Mali and the DRC during the year 2013, in my view.
Cost Above Quality?
The Importance Of Client Priorities When Selecting Private Security Providers

Philip Strand

Since the withdrawal of many coalition military and government personnel from Iraq, Private Security Companies (PSCs) have found themselves in an increasingly competitive market to provide armed, protective services to commercial clients. New Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) have been adopted by many PSCs currently providing mobile security services in Iraq. While many new TTPs have evolved from changing risk and threat assessments, some new TTPs have resulted from cost-sensitive commercial clients awarding contracts to PSCs based primarily on cost. Without a working knowledge of mobile security operations, however, clients hiring PSCs cannot ensure that they have correctly balanced cost and effective security provision. The priorities that underlie Iraq’s current private security market prompt questions about clients’ perceptions of security, the tactical organization of teams, and the dangers of prioritizing price when selecting security providers.

The priorities that underlie Iraq’s current private security market prompt questions about clients’ perceptions of security, the tactical organization of teams, and the dangers of prioritizing price when selecting security providers.

In August 2012, an ‘expat’ team leader (TL) for a mobile security team was killed in a road traffic accident (RTA) in southern Iraq. The Iraqi Local National (LN) driver, who was allegedly responsible for causing the accident, lost control of the vehicle under poor road conditions, critically injuring the TL. This mobile security team consisted of an expat TL, a second-in-change (2IC) who doubled as the team medic, and several LNs. When the TL was unable to continue as team leader due to his injury, the 2IC had to choose between leading the team or rendering medical assistance to the wounded team members, as one person is incapable of doing both. In this incident, tribal and cultural affiliations took precedence over the chain-of-command. Despite instructions from the 2IC, LN team members rushed to assist the driver, who was a ‘walking-wounded,’ before assisting the TL, who was in visibly critical condition. This RTA was not the result of hostile contact nor was there any hostile follow up in the aftermath of the accident. Had hostile contact occurred, the team would have lacked the cohesion to react in a satisfactory manner.

Philip Strand is a former private security contractor now researching Leadership within Private Security Companies as a member of the Private Military and Security Research Group at King’s College London.
Following this incident, the PSC managing the team decided that TLs would no longer ride in lead vehicles. In the professional opinion of some experienced TLs, this decision did not mitigate future risk because all vehicles in a mobile security formation share equal likelihood of suffering an RTA or hostile contact. Furthermore, other problems stemmed from repositioning the TL, including poor navigation on the part of the LNs in the lead vehicles, lead vehicles driving too fast and separating from the formation, and formations having an overall higher rate of speed as rear vehicles attempted to keep up with lead vehicles. On more than one occasion, mobile security formations lost vehicles while en route to destinations. The decision to place TLs in the second vehicle of a three-vehicle element also led to confusion over where clients should sit during movements because TLs were now occupying seats that would normally be reserved for the clients’ bodyguards.

The RTA incident and management decisions made in the incident’s aftermath highlight several important issues concerning the state of mobile security in Iraq today. Commercial clients are cost sensitive, and they have prioritized cost of security above effectiveness as a criterion for selecting security providers. While threat and risk assessments can help clients decide the minimum security services and skill levels for which they should pay, the RTA incident described above demonstrates that some clients may be paying for security services that are too short on skilled manpower to mitigate risks. PSCs have modified their TTPs to remain competitive according to clients’ selection criteria; the most common mobile security team in Iraq today is staffed as the team described in the RTA incident above due to cost competition rather than concern for effectiveness. Had the 2IC been injured in the RTA incident described above, the TL (who may or may not have been qualified as a medic) would have faced the same shortage of skilled manpower and the outcome of the incident would likely not have been different. Had any clients been injured in the RTA incident along with either the TL or the 2IC, the outcome of the incident would have likely been worse. Had hostile contact occurred at any time during or after the RTA, the outcome of the incident would likely have been catastrophic.

Furthermore, this incident demonstrates that some clients may be unaware of the risks that tribal and cultural affiliations pose to unit cohesion and operational effectiveness during crises. This incident also demonstrates the importance of having sufficiently-skilled and responsive manpower to deal with crises when they arise. Assigning the roles of 2IC and medic to one person may lower costs, but this assignment also lowers a team’s effectiveness to the point that, under some circumstances, the team cannot provide the services that a client expects the team to provide.

Although there are some highly qualified LNs who have worked for years alongside expat PSD TLs and team members, professional knowledge gaps and cultural affiliations still make it difficult for the average LN to fulfill the role of team medic or team leader. Under some circumstances, the decision to employ an additional expat (to split the medic/2IC roles) may be the difference between having a security team that can mitigate risks during crises. A client who possesses a working knowledge of mobile security team “drills and skills” will be better able to correctly balance cost and effective security provision. A client that understands mobile security operations will also be better able to evaluate the operational decisions made by their service providers and discern differences in quality that justify differences in costs. Clients who prioritize cost when selecting security providers effectively underfund their security efforts to the point that their security is only cosmetic, and may someday be disappointed to discover that what they have purchased is not nearly what they need.
**Member News Board**

**ISOA Member News from November-December 2012**

**G4S, IAP Worldwide Services, Fluor, DynCorp, URS, BAE Systems, PwC LLP** awarded G.I. Jobs 2013 Top 100 Military Friendly Employers.

**Air Charter Service** has opened its new Kazakhstan office in the country’s largest city, Almaty.

**Agility** wins “Global 3PL of the Year” Award at Supply Chain Asia Logistics.

**AMECO** has acquired ServiTrade, a Mozambique-based construction equipment rental and project services company.

**BAE Systems** Selected to Provide Activity-Based Intelligence Support for National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

**CH2M Hill** named to Trenchless Technology’s Top 10 Engineering Firms.

**Chapman Freeborn** in partnership with St Anthony Health Foundation and Catholic Health Initiatives organized for the transport of surplus medical supplies from the US to Vietnam.

**Crowell Moring** receives 100% ranking on the Human Rights Campaign Foundation’s 2013 Corporate Equality Index.

**DLA Piper** receives Gold Standard certification from the Women in Law Empowerment Forum.

**DynCorp International** awarded a contract to provide for the mentoring and training of the Afghanistan National Army.

**Fluor** Wins Contract for New Ma’aden Phosphate Project in Saudi Arabia.

**G4S** Awarded Training Top 125 Award for Sixth Consecutive Year and is approaching its 2013 goal of hiring over 6,000 veterans for the White House’s Joining Forces Campaign.

**Global Fleet Sales** Announced Its Partnership Program with World Vision at AidEx 2012.

Former senior US intel official, Dr. John Gannon, has joined the Board of **GLOBAL Integrated Security**

**PwC LLP** launches new member firm in Myanmar.

**SOS International** partners with Al-Essam Group of Iraq and Milio International of Dubai to Form Iraq Oil Technology.

**Unity Resources Group** selected by HCC Specialty to provide crisis response services globally to HCC policyholders.

**URS** led team awarded NATO Management Advisory Services contract.

---

**ISOA MEMBERS & HURRICANE SANDY**

**IAP Worldwide** mobilizes dual-teams to aid Hurricane Sandy victims.

**IRD** assisting in relief efforts following the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy.

**SupplyCore** rapidly responds to Hurricane Sandy with generator support.

---

**MEMBER JOB POSTINGS**

Visit the Careers with ISOA Members page on the ISOA website to find the career pages at ISOA Member organizations.

---

ISOA invites ISOA Members to send us news for the Member News Board at communications@stability-operations.org.
The ISOA Membership

The International Stability Operations Association

The International Stability Operations Association is proud to have a multisectoral membership that represents the various aspects of operations performed in conflict, post-conflict, disaster relief and reconstruction efforts. The Membership Directory provides a visualization of the different roles that our member organizations fulfill in contingency operations by using the icons below to classify each member’s activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>HQ Location</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>HQ Contact</th>
<th>Membership Approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTCO</td>
<td>Ras Al Khaimah, UAE</td>
<td><a href="http://www.agpglass.com">www.agpglass.com</a></td>
<td>Tobias Beutgen</td>
<td>April 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agility</td>
<td>Safat, Kuwait</td>
<td><a href="http://www.agilitylogistics.com">www.agilitylogistics.com</a></td>
<td>Richard Brooks</td>
<td>January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Charter Service PLC</td>
<td>Surrey, United Kingdom</td>
<td><a href="http://www.aircharter.co.uk">www.aircharter.co.uk</a></td>
<td>Tony Bauckham</td>
<td>March 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMECO</td>
<td>Greenville, SC</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ameco.com">www.ameco.com</a></td>
<td>Paul Camp</td>
<td>July 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Glass Products</td>
<td>Ras Al Khaimah, UAE</td>
<td><a href="http://www.agpglass.com">www.agpglass.com</a></td>
<td>Mary Robinson</td>
<td>October 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAE Systems</td>
<td>Rockville, MD</td>
<td><a href="http://www.baesystems.com">www.baesystems.com</a></td>
<td>Nicola Lowther</td>
<td>December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burton Rands Associates</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td><a href="http://www.burtonrands.com">www.burtonrands.com</a></td>
<td>Mary Robinson</td>
<td>October 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapman Freeborn</td>
<td>Fort Lauderdale, FL</td>
<td><a href="http://www.chapman-freeborn.com">www.chapman-freeborn.com</a></td>
<td>Christopher Fisher</td>
<td>December 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH2M Hill Inc.</td>
<td>Englewood, CO</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ch2m.com">www.ch2m.com</a></td>
<td>Tia L. Hutton</td>
<td>April 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA Piper LLP</td>
<td>London, United Kingdom</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dlapiper.com">www.dlapiper.com</a></td>
<td>Tara Lee</td>
<td>January 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA Piper LLP</td>
<td>London, United Kingdom</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dlapiper.com">www.dlapiper.com</a></td>
<td>Tara Lee</td>
<td>January 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ISOA Membership Directory

**OSPREA Logistics**  
**HQ**: Cape Town, South Africa  
**W**: www.osprea.com  
**PC**: Sahil Brandt  
**M**: August 2010

**Reed Inc.**  
**HQ**: Leesburg, VA  
**W**: www.reedinc.com  
**PC**: Marcus van der Riet  
**M**: April 2006

**SupplyCore**  
**HQ**: Rockford, IL  
**W**: www.supplycore.com  
**PC**: Mike Paul  
**M**: March 2012

**OSSI, Inc.**  
**HQ**: Miami, FL  
**W**: www.ossiinc.com  
**PC**: John Walbridge  
**M**: October 2005

**Sallyport**  
**HQ**: Bridgeville, PA  
**W**: www.sallyportglobal.com  
**PC**: Doug Magee  
**M**: August 2011

**Triple Canopy**  
**HQ**: Reston, VA  
**W**: www.triplecanopy.com  
**PC**: Patrick Garvey  
**M**: July 2008

**Overseas Lease Group**  
**HQ**: Fort Lauderdale, FL  
**W**: www.overseasleasegroup.com  
**PC**: Tracy Badcock  
**M**: February 2008

**Shield International Security**  
**HQ**: Seoul, South Korea  
**W**: www.shieldconsulting.co.kr  
**PC**: Lucy Park  
**M**: April 2010

**Unity Resources Group**  
**HQ**: Dubai, UAE  
**W**: www.unityresourcesgroup.com  
**PC**: Jim LeBlanc  
**M**: December 2006

**PAE, Inc**  
**HQ**: Arlington, VA  
**W**: www.pae.com  
**PC**: Tom Callahan  
**M**: October 2010

**SOS International Ltd.**  
**HQ**: Reston, VA  
**W**: www.sosiltd.com  
**PC**: Michael K. Seidl  
**M**: November 2007

**URS**  
**HQ**: Germantown, MD  
**W**: www.urs.com  
**PC**: Iggi Husar  
**M**: April 2009

**Pax Mondial**  
**HQ**: Arlington, VA  
**W**: www.paxmondial.com  
**PC**: Paul Wood  
**M**: January 2009

**SOS International**  
**HQ**: Reston, VA  
**W**: www.sosiltd.com  
**PC**: Michael K. Seidl  
**M**: November 2007

**Vertical de Aviacion**  
**HQ**: Bogota, Colombia  
**W**: www.verticaldeaviacion.com  
**PC**: David J. Burachio  
**M**: September 2012

**Principal Risk Solutions**  
**HQ**: Cardiff, United Kingdom  
**W**: www.principalrisksolutions.com  
**PC**: Simon Webb  
**M**: April 2012

**SOS International**  
**HQ**: Reston, VA  
**W**: www.sosiltd.com  
**PC**: Michael K. Seidl  
**M**: November 2007

**Unity Resources Group**  
**HQ**: Dubai, UAE  
**W**: www.unityresourcesgroup.com  
**PC**: Jim LeBlanc  
**M**: December 2006

**PwC LLP**  
**HQ**: McLean, VA  
**W**: www.pwc.com  
**PC**: Marissa Michel  
**M**: May 2012

**New Member Organization**  
**HQ**: Washington, DC  
**W**: www.newmember.com  
**PC**: John Smith  
**M**: September 2012

**New Member Organization**  
**HQ**: Washington, DC  
**W**: www.newmember.com  
**PC**: John Smith  
**M**: September 2012

---

**Become an ISOA Member!**

**Contact ISOA to find out about our exclusive membership benefits including:**
- Access to the ISOA members-only community
- Partnership discounts for industry training and events
- Special ISOA marketing and branding discounts and opportunities
- Exclusive and timely member-only business intelligence

Contact ISOA for more info at isoa@stability-operations.org.
BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS worldwide

The International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) is a global partnership of private sector and nongovernmental organizations providing critical services in fragile environments worldwide.

ISOA works every day to build, serve and represent a network of professional and ethical organizations by providing diverse member services, publications and events. Through open communication and engagement, ISOA also builds partnerships across sectors to enhance the effectiveness of stability and peacekeeping operations.

Ask your service provider: Are you a member of ISOA?